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INTRODUCTION 
If one accepts the standard ancient definitions of satire, Seneca's De 
Ira must be excluded from consideration as an example of the genre. 
Quintilian, certainly one of the most severe critics of Senecan style, 
mentions Seneca among Rome's philosophers as the author of Dialogi, a 
term which has befallen the De Ira and eleven other extant works of 
similar structure.1 Along with the equally comprehensive Moral Essays, 
the term remains a convenient heading under which to pigeon-hole the De 
Ira.2 Both titles firmly represent a philosophical and more specifically an 
ethical focus whose abiding consequence has been abundant scholarly 
enthusiasm for those aspects of the De Ira. The Apocolocyntosis easily 
admits association with Seneca the satirist; the De Ira evokes only Seneca 
philosophus. 
The designation Dialogus or Moral Essay supposedly establishes that 
the De Ira contains what the title describes: a philosophical dialogue or a 
Stoic moral essay on the vice of anger. If so, there is little to suggest that 
1Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.125ff. 
2John W. Basore, Seneca: Moral Essays I (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1928), xi. 
2 
the De Ira could be classified a satire. According to Diomedes, a fourth-
century grammarian, satire must be verse, a conclusion which precludes 
the possibility that the De Ira could be satire on structural grounds 
alone.3 A false and twofold inevitability is thus sustained: first, the De Ira 
cannot be other than its traditionally received classification; second, its 
prose medium disqualifies it as satire ipso facto. Yet Seneca's essay will 
prove an exception to perscriptive definitions of class or division for 
reasons peculiar to satire as a genre and its historical development--
matters whose neglect have hitherto led to conclusions of premature 
finality.4 
If avoidance of cut-and-dried opinion is to be achieved and the 
possibility of gauging the elements of satire in the De Ira established, 
historical debate over the definition of satire and attendant problems must 
be taken into consideration. Relatively recent acknowledgement that 
3H. Keil (ed.), Grammatici Latini I, (Leipzig, 1857; repr., Hildesheim 
and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1981), 485. The definition appears as 
follows: Satura dicitur carmen nunc quidem maledicum et ad carpenda 
hominum vitia compositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et 
Persius. 
4The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), s.v. "Satire," by R.C. Elliott. "The 
formal verses. as composed by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal is the only 
satiric form to have even a remotely determinate structure, and it 
furnishes exceptions to every generalization ("qui dit satire latine, dit 
melange," writes Lejay)." 
3 
satire cannot be neatly or conveniently classified is an admission that even 
the most widely accepted generalizations about satire from Quintilian or 
Suetonius to the present offer only an incomplete description at best, a 
difficulty to which other genres are unaccustomed. 5 Questions of genre, 
obviated by sharp demarcations of structure and subject-matter, are not 
put to tragic drama or lyric poetry. But satire is a late arrival as a genre; 
its name as well as efforts to summarize its aims are of still later 
provenance, and Horace, looking at his own output, called it not satire but 
chats or conversations. 6 Both circumstances contribute to the 
disagreement over its nature. 
To the extent that definitions agree, both during antiquity and 
afterward, accord is generally founded on tone, theme, or use of figurative 
language; in short, features related to content.7 Scholarly dissension is 
usual on issues of etymology, orthography, or the genre's origins; there is 
a consensus on purpose (viz., censure of vice and folly), topical commentary 
5Ibid., 739. Elliott summarizes the problem well: "But the spirit which 
informs them is too mercurial to be confined to exclusive literary 
structures; it proliferates everywhere, adapting itself to whatever mode 
(verse or prose) seems congenial. Its range is enormous ... " 
6Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93. 
7Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 738. The definition of 
Dr. Johnson offered here, as "a poem in which wickedness or folly is 
censured," is but one of many in which the function of satire is continually 
observed. 
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on the socio-political milieu, or satirical wit and its accessory stratagems--
ridicule, parody, and caricature, when these are the preponderant topics. 8 
Yet it is the very question of morphology that definition strives to resolve 
which elicits fiercest controversy. But here one must challenge the ipse 
dixit of the venerable Quintilian--however esteemed his critical acumen--
to whose auctoritas most arguments ultimately appeal, for his is perhaps 
the most formidable of tribunals before which to appraise a literary work's 
compliance with the lex operis. 
Among the assessments of genre formation in Quintilian's synopsis 
are the celebrated remarks with respect to satire's origin and forms: a 
terse declaration of its Roman genesis, with comments descriptive of the 
usual structures.9 The critic's observations have occasioned prescriptive 
consequences: nevertheless, the actual combinations of verse, or mixed 
verse and prose, must stand. Despite the modern concession that works 
designated satires subsequent to antiquity are exempt from this formula, 
there is relative unanimity that Quintilian's formulary stipulations apply 
8Michael Coffey, Roman Satire (London and New York: Methuen, 
1976), 3-23. This furnishes perhaps the best recent account. Ulrich 
Knoche, Roman Satire, trans. Edwin S. Ramage (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1975), 3-16. Knoche's initial remarks are a worthwhile 
introduction to the relevant issues. However, he later hedges his early 
insistence upon strict definition by acknowledging (p. 89) the status of 
Horace's Epistles as satire. 
9Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93. 
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to all satire written during antiquity.10 In sum, Seneca's De Ira was not 
considered satire by the very critic who described the genre's inception and 
general features, and who also knew Seneca's writings. 
Admittedly, modern allowances for the later transformations of 
satire do not negate the testimonia of Seneca's own and immediately 
succeeding eras.11 Indeed, the De Ira's prose framework and abstract 
features support the judgment that it is a philosophical work. Modern 
criticism, without dismissing the extant examples of Roman satire, draws 
our attention to its intrinsic nature and expression, aside from the artifice 
of definition prescribed by the critics of a given epoch--even the epoch in 
which the definition was first formulated.12 Acknowledgement of Roman 
derivation and conventions, however useful, dismisses a more basic 
inquiry: the essential character of the genre and the special problems it 
poses. 
Modern discussion of satire is instructive. Certainly its recognition 
1
°Knoche, 3, is adamant about this: "Anyone attempting a historical 
treatment of Roman satire has to free himself right at the start from the 
contemporary concept of satire and the satiric." 
11Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962), 3-23. Highet, for example, makes reference to 
Swift, Voltaire, and others as satirists whose medium was prose. He also 
cites the difficulty of determining whether a work is a satire per se or 
simply contains occasional flourishes of satire. All subsequent references 
to Highet refer to The Anatomy of Satire, unless otherwise specified. 
12Ibid. 
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that satire after antiquity abandons absolute adherence to the definitions 
of Roman critics and grammarians discloses a complex, if not curious, 
combination of conclusions. Departure from its Roman forms constitutes 
an historical stage of development in composition and critical 
comprehension which insists on elaboration and reconsideration of the 
genre.13 If divergence of form (an expression of artistic license) tacitly 
represents compliance with the inherent character of the genre, the 
pertinence of form to the very objectives of satire becomes questionable. 
Finally, the phrase lex operis itself leads to a false--and tangled--analogy: 
authors or critics (sometimes both) frame the law; deference or violation 
become the sole ostensible alternatives; the interests of the former invite 
evasions of the law which thereby must appear to comply with it in the 
manner of a legal dodge.14 
In this last instance, exacting separations of genre can often assume 
a quasi-statutory rigor which artistic innovation mollifies. Clearly the 
extension of verse satire to incorporate prose, a method of composition 
practiced by Menippus, Varro, and Petronius, intimates that Roman satire 
13Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 738-40. The synopsis 
offered here neatly describes the variegated development of the genre. 
14Knoche, Roman Satire, 89, offers a leading example by subsuming the 
Epistles of Horace under the statutory (as it were) claims of satire. 
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and its ancient definitions, in addition to ascribing a literary type and 
epoch, amplify the epoch to the detriment of the genre it qualifies. 
However understandable the failure of prescience by Roman 
commentators, the reality of literary development confirms the inability 
of scholars to apply the formal or legal dimension of the lex operis to satire 
and, consequently, the grounds on which the De Ira can be interpreted to 
conform, if not to the precise phraseology of the definition, at least to 
occasions or instances where the quasi-legal language of the definition 
warrants inclusion. Precluding the prima facie observation that Roman 
reviewers and those (such as Quintilian or Diomedes) who deem only 
Roman literary edicts applicable deny the De Ira its appeal by virtue of its 
peculiarities, the very assemblage of elements which comprise Seneca's De 
Ira merits both another appeal and a change of venue. 
At issue then is the classification to which the De Ira, predicated on 
the evidence of its aggregate features, primarily conforms: philosophical 
dialogue or satire. Ancillary but of equal value is the elimination of 
previous impediments to a recognition that the De Ira even contains 
material which suggests a re-examination of its patterns and figures as a 
worthwhile project, despite an abundance of opinion to the contrary. On 
inspection, Seneca's arrangement of topics and figures--e.g., the 
conversational transitions, the role of the adversarius, placement of 
8 
epigrams, descriptive portraits and anecdotes, and vivid imagery--to cite 
several samples--reveal a genuine problem of misplacement rather than a 
specious morphological exercise or evasion of the lex operis by nuance. 
But multiple factors justify reconsideration of the De Ira in addition 
to those listed in the foregoing discussion. The blurring of genres in 
question, satire and the philosophical dialogue, is perhaps only conceivable 
granted unequivocal connections native to them, foremost among which is 
a pervasive preoccupation with ethical matters or variations on a myriad 
of moral themes. Morality is possibly the principal bridge between the two 
literary types. Likewise, although the serious intent of an ethical treatise 
is unmistakeable, it is a grave oversight to underestimate the function of 
wit as a subterfuge for serious interests and purposes. However differently 
the two genres may approach their objectives, whether by sequential proofs 
or the varieties of wit, moral persuasion is a common end. And irony, one 
of the more frequent figures of successful satire, is a device especially 
dependent on seriousness as the contrasting element necessary for its 
effectiveness. Thus, the failure to apprehend irony and, consequently, the 
involvement of humor, is yet another reason why satire may 
unintentionally be taken seriously, for the illusion of philosophic sobriety 
9 
(notwithstanding the Symposium) is central to this misjudgment.15 
Finally, the format of the De Ira, because in several important respects it 
so closely resembles the other Dialogi with which it is conventionally 
grouped, occasions the assumption of a more complete artistic agreement 
than exists between the De Ira and its companion pieces. 
The individuality of the work, Seneca's only dialogue which 
addresses the destructive consequences and folly of a particular vice, 
deserves special comment, not only with respect to the other Dialogi, but 
as a feature especially suitable for satire per se. If the orthodox notion 
holds that novelty, variation, and departure from precedent are generic to 
the literary tradition, this is particularly apt with reference to satire, 
including its most universally accepted representative specimens. And 
although the extant works of the Roman satirists recognized as 
practitioners of the genre adequately possess the common qualities that 
eventually sanctioned a distinct nomenclature, the subtler scholars have 
noted the individualistic complexion of the genre and its variety of possible 
designs.16 Even prior to Quintilian's official imprimatur, the want of 
15Highet, 15, relates the amusement of Swift, in a letter to Alexander 
Pope, at an Irish bishop not believing a word of Gulliver's Travels and, 
consequently, misinterpreting its intent. 
16Knoche, Roman Satire, 5, notes the observation of Wilamowitz that 
"there really is no Latin satire, but only Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and 
Juvenal." See U. von Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, Griechische Verskunst 
10 
exact models compelled the sort of precis Horace provided as an endeavor 
to fix his literary ancestry and role.17 An author working in a fixed genre 
(tragedy or epic, for example) does not need to apologize (sensu stricto) the 
way Horace does with a pedigree of his literary ancestry in order to 
establish his literary type. Later satire, either to forestall ambiguity 
consequent to experimentation or establish a position within the practice 
of the genre, often avails a citation of pedigree, overt or otherwise, as a 
necessary recourse.18 
Direct or indirect mention of lineage is one of several means by 
which the satirist is known as such and his efforts taken for what they 
are. 19 Approximate themes and methods are at times as much thinly 
camouflaged versions of an express acknowledgement of influence as any 
patent attribution of literary stock. As such, Seneca's management of 
theme and technique in the De Ira is at least one criterion among many 
by which to ascertain the sway of earlier Roman satire, since no display 
of literary ancestry is offered. Although unexceptional and inessential 
(imitation being a sufficient as well as the best adulation), Seneca's 
(Berlin, 1921), 42, note 1. 




reticence compels us to resort to an inductive argument. Cognizance of 
affiliation between the De Ira and Roman satire can only proceed, then, by 
by a sort of multi-variant analysis and cautious scrutiny of agreements 
and resemblances of style vis-a-vis antecedent models, since earlier 
prototypes accomodate an authoritative set of criteria with which to 
determine the validity of comparison. 
The particular devices or elements upon which the satirist relies to 
achieve his ends constitute the standards of evaluation absent from the 
terse generality provided by even the best definitions. As with other 
genres, technique is the very substance of satire: it equips the research 
this study hopes to effect with serviceable norms for estimating whether 
kinship between the De Ira and Roman satire is slight, limited, and 
accidental, or entirely too regular to be other than deliberate. In 
combination, the synthesis of Seneca's methods exhibit goals which only 
detailed attention to specific items can initially expect to discover. The 
care Seneca takes, not merely to refute each rationale for indulging wrath, 
but to ridicule and reduce it to absurdity, exceeds dispassionate refutation 
by enlisting the sundry implements of derision employed originally by the 
Greeks in iambics, old comedy, and oratory, and later by his compatriots 
in Rome's (apparently) exclusive addition to the catalogue of approved 
genres. 
12 
In addition to a straightforward or more subtle statement of literary 
ancestry and analysis of parallels and alliances between the De Ira and 
extant Roman satire prior to Seneca's age, other applicable standards are 
germane. Apart from Seneca's choice of prose, the dialogue as he 
structures it, addressing it to his brother Novatus and incorporating a 
fictitious adversarius, bears closer comparison with the satiric monologues 
of Horace than the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero. An apparent 
improvisation or spontaneity, while also characteristic of the philosophical 
dialogue, lacks the realism provided by figures whose function varies 
enormously and in relative proportion to one another in true dialogues.20 
Seneca's interlocutor or adversarius best mimics the simple roles displayed 
by the adversarii of Horace or Bion of Borysthenes, whom Horace credits 
as an exemplar: they are less dramatis personae than token rivals whose 
parts create a facade of opposition in an uncontested triumph. 
Subject-matter is yet another measure of the connection between the 
De Ira and Roman satire; it is also perhaps the most natural, since the 
denunciation of vice or folly is universally found in definitions of satire. 
2
°The arguments of Plato's adversaries feature a more elaborate 
exposition than is found in the De Ira or any of Seneca's other dialogues 
for that matter, an issue that has caught the attention of a number of 
scholars and has prompted speculation about Seneca's departure from the 
stylistic norm of the genre and the diminished role of the adversarius. See 
below, chaps. 4 and 5, passim. 
13 
Seneca largely exceeds the usual topical progress10n and orderly 
gradations of arguments expected in an ethical treatise: he derides, 
caricatures, parodies, and renders absurd--strategies which become the wit 
but vex the wise for whom solemnity is de rigueur. Departures from the 
formality of unmitigated corroboration and refutation by way of artifice 
foreign to the standards of the genre, such as insinuations of humor, or via 
shifts uncharacteristic of an austere syllogistic dialectic, such as insertions 
of anecdote or description, are salient aspects of the De Ira. Such detours 
and their recurrence suggest a diversity of purpose, but the irregularities 
possess a common aspect: dissuasion defers to denunciation of anger as 
folly--perhaps the central folly of Seneca's time. 
Discussions of human weakness and error, especially so 
commonplace a vice as anger, were not without precedent in antiquity; 
there were those who defended its value and expression for diverse 
reasons, as is evident in the De Ira.21 Yet the unremarkable occurrence 
of specific treatment, or the inclusion of anger in general surveys such as 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, advances the impression that anger is 
a topic for discussion first and foremost as a general human predilection. 
But, as Lucilius and Horace earlier, and Juvenal later, Seneca alters the 
21Basore, xiii and 112. Both Posidonius and Sotion are mentioned here. 
Aristotle is cited passim. 
14 
moral emphasis from the general to the specific: anger achieves the 
notoriety of a current event. In Seneca's view, the attested cruelty of the 
period originated from the cultivation of rage, a most apropos social and 
cultural ill for moral criticism on the one hand, but for topical and satiric 
ridicule as well: thus, the unflattering portraits of personages in the recent 
or remote past. Caricatures of the living ceased with Horace; Seneca's 
hostile figures augur Juvenal's Sejanus, too distant and too dead to be 
dangerous. 
If the worst years of the early empire in the first century witnessed 
a flurry of prosecutions for maiestas, they also bore witness to ubiquitous 
accusations of alleged iniuria, a technical Roman legal term of sufficiently 
broad scope to encompass the wider sense in which Seneca has been 
supposed to employ it: a pretext for ira invoked constantly.22 If, however, 
as with Seneca's use of ira, a narrower meaning than the broad, initial 
definitions provided by the standard lexica is intended, the import of 
iniuria widens, thus acquiring a dual significance: as a generic term 
denoting an unspecified insult, injustice, or instance of personal affront, 
22John W. Thomas III, "Roman Criminal Law and Legal Narrative in 
the Neronian Books of the Annals of Tacitus" (Ph.D. diss., Loyola 
University of Chicago, 1993), 84, 117-120. Although this recent study 
emphasizes litigation specific to the N eronian period, background material 
and notes provide a useful introduction to the extent of prosecution for 
both maiestas and iniuria under previous emperors. 
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and a precise, definitive reference to a legal statute whose violation was 
actionable. The conceivable applicability of the latter furthers the present 
thesis: Seneca's interests and purposes are focused on a prevailing 
sensibility or Zeitgeist, not solely an enduring flaw, one out of many, 
intrinsic to the human condition in the manner of previous explanations. 
Ridicule and contemporaneity, then, are traits which betray the 
satirist of unacknowledged pedigree; they also divulge the aim of the De 
Ira: to render the expression of anger a laughable disgrace. The nature of 
Seneca's project entails an attitude very different from philosophic 
detachment, one that involves contempt, scorn, or, perhaps, even 
amusement--and the endeavor to elicit like sentiments among his readers. 
And with verbal touches a subsequent generation would witness in the 
satires of Juvenal, Seneca's exempla shock; his models of ira indulged are 
disturbing, vivid, and grotesque depictions of a cruelty awarded 
approbation, if the intensity and extent of the De Ira are valid indices. 
And if the expectation of carefully ordered reasoning disappoints, N ovatus 
and posterity have become privy to the more surprising methods of satire 
in the De Ira. 
While unfavorable responses to Seneca's designs in part explain his 
periodic unpopularity, their force betrays an odd effect amounting to a 
kind of perverse success: his works produce revulsion or fascination, 
16 
dissidence or endorsement--and to a degree as radical as Seneca's notion 
of anger itself. The De Ira, if it is accurately or otherwise taken as a 
philosophical dialogue, fails to meet our hopes for an unadorned series of 
proofs, or even the modest expectation of lively debate in a dramatic 
setting. Such hope, however, is an inescapable prelude to favor or its 
want, and Seneca's failures or inconsistencies may well mask a desired end 
nonetheless. His gifts were hardly so meager or merely "temporis eius 
auribus accomodatum" as to be insufficient for his objectives.23 Seneca 
directed his attack on anger not only according to the moral deficiencies 
and literary tastes of his age, but also according to a Roman tradition 
which singled out ira as a vice particularly deserving of opprobrium.24 
Abhorrence at anger, a locus communis by Seneca's time, furnished a 
ready topic for satire and also fulfilled a perennial approach demanded of 
satire: an appeal to reform for which ridicule and all its forms furnish a 
means. 
Moreover, if Seneca's desire is reform, satire becomes an acceptable 
prototype for considerations of influence, since that too is one of its 
expected functions. Reform not only permits an array of strategies 
23Tacitus Annals 13.3. 
24Virgil, for example, portrays the human and divine antagonists of 
Aeneas as especially driven by ira, and consistently presents this vice as 
unbecoming the Roman character. 
17 
unavailable to philosophy, but relegates the role of strict argument to the 
lesser prominence of one variant in a medley. For the illogical or 
obdurate, refutation alone might fail to display vice as unattractive. 
Repugnance requires other initiatives, ones familiar to Lucilius and 
Horace--but to Seneca as well. Thus irony, epigram, hyperbole, 
colloquialism, parody, and numerous related implements combine as 
accompaniments to argument in the service of the skilled satirist. The 
conviction that ira is indefensible is certainly one of Seneca's aims in the 
De Ira, but reform must enlist conversion; and this compels him to 
exorcise the nobility from anger until it appears hideous as well as 
irrational. 
Finally, a recapitulation of small compass is in order as a 
preliminary synopsis of those elements of satire whose analysis might 
prove most salutary for evaluating the De Ira from an alternative context. 
To summarize: despite Seneca's failure to cite influence or state pedigree, 
features of the De Ira bear exceptional resemblance to eminent aspects of 
Roman satire. This supports the need for additional study, 
notwithstanding enigmatic difficulties of designation or definition whose 
very solution might only issue, if but partially, from the sort of analysis 
the present enquiry means to afford. Seneca's Dialogus mimics the satiric 
monologue in practice more than it resembles antecedent prototypes of the 
18 
philosphical dialogue. His preferred theme of anger, although addressed 
by divers philosophers, stands in liaison with satire; but unlike philosophy, 
Seneca's motif suggests a topical or contemporary relevance emblematic 
of satire. Finally, Seneca's procedures, recurrently disappointing those 
whose expectation is uninterrupted syllogistic elegance or the dramatic 
suspense of dialectic moving toward resolution, in effect comprise a medley 
of materiel native to satire: argument is abruptly mitigated by the figures 
and conventions of a more informal and spontaneous genre. Impressions 
and vividly descriptive diatribes attend his conclusions, remarkable 
features for a standard ethical teatise, but hardly surprising elements in 
a work of satiric design. 
Of the figures put to use by the Roman satirists, a host are shared 
by other genres. Hyperbole, invective, parody, and other devices, although 
important factors for the cumulative effect of the De Ira and quite 
significant at critical stages of Seneca's discussion, are minor or secondary 
attributes. Aspects of the De Ira which merit protracted and precise 
dissection are those most idiosyncratic to the nature and character of 
satire: more specifically, structural techniques and thematic coincidences. 
Consequently, several major topics will adequately serve as broad 
categories for investigation and convenient points of reference for 
associated features. 
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First, the De Ira justifies comparative analysis with previous and 
subsequent Roman satire, including Seneca's own Apocolocyntosis, in order 
to assess the overall presence of those elements typical of the genre. 
Seneca treats anger not only as a universal moral problem, but as an ill 
particularly prevalent in his own time; in short, his complaint is topical 
in the way that the grievances of Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal were 
directed at habits of the here and now. Furthermore, Seneca dwells on the 
legal consequences of anger, and he regularly emphasizes this and related 
legal issues throughout the work. Discussion of the use and abuse of the 
deli ct of iniuria, which Seneca views as the social instrument of anger, 
occupies a large portion of the De Ira. As a result, Seneca's plea is as 
much an insistence on judicial reform as on moral improvement. 
Finally, the structural anomalies of the work, the irregularities of 
composition where Seneca departs from the standard techniques employed 
by earlier authors of the philosophical dialogue, might best be explained 
by comparison with other genres. The limited role of the adversarius, the 
lack of a dramatic setting, and a conspicuous absence of set characters 
would suggest a different genre as the model for the De Ira. Elements 
present in the work do provide clues, however. Three prominent 
features--the abundance of technical legal vocabulary, Seneca's focus on a 
particular legal issue such as iniuria, and the intermittent advisory 
20 
comments relevant primarily to someone who must decide legal guilt or 
innocence--urge close intertextual study with what fragmentary portions 
of the legal literature as we possess. The combination of satiric technique 
and legal emphasis intimates that the De Ira is a more complex and 
original work than has been previously thought. Seneca assumes the pose 
of both the satirist and jurist. As he ridicules wrathful figures recent and 
remote, he also subjects their rationale that iniuria warrants ira to 
vigorous legal analysis and criticism. The De Ira can thus be seen as a 
censure of those who resort to iniuria in order to satisfy ira in a format 
which parodies the very genre used by the jurists to address such issues--
the epistolary responsum. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DE IRA AS TOPICAL PROTEST 
It is a stock observation among the many students of Roman satire 
that the genre criticises the follies of its age, including the invariable 
absurdities of the law.25 Whether the Romans express their censure in 
the oblique and subtle guise of parody, or by the more forthright tactic of 
open denunciation, law stands in the forefront amid the morals, 
conventions, and practices of the day that fail to meet the standards of the 
satirist. One of the earliest expressions of satiric dismay over the various 
occupations of his contemporaries is the following excursus by Lucili us: 
nunc vero a mani ad noctem, festo atque profesto 
totus item pariterque die populusque patresque 
iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam, 
25Highet, 16-17, cites topical criticism as one of the hallmarks of the 
genre since antiquity. Michael Coffey, 5-10, in one of the more recent 
surveys of the genre, remarks generally on this characteristic of Roman 
satire, but concentrates more on the varieties of social criticism presented 
by each Roman satirist. John Crook, Law and Life of Rome (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1967), introduces comments of the satirists 
passim as partial evidence for the influence of law on Roman social and 
economic life. 
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uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti, 
verba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose, 
blanditia certare, "bonum" simulare "virum" se, 
insidias facere, ut si hostes sint omnibus omnes .... 
(1228--34) 
(But these days as things are from morning until night, 
working day and holiday alike, the whole people and 
senate likewise all bustle about in the forum and 
do not go off anywhere else. All devote themselves 
to one and the same aim and expertise, to be able 
to deceive with circumspection, to hit slyly, to push 
by using flattery, to pretend to be "a good type" 
and to set traps as if everyone were everybody else's 
26 enemy .... 
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Lucilius's complaint, which has been rendered as a dissatisfaction with 
Roman political life, also suggests the tumult and frenzy of the courts as 
a source of inspiration for topical protest.27 Horace, writing a century or 
more later, seems to have shared his predecessor's displeasure, but 
illustrates his annoyance by relating his own happenstance involvement 
in the legal arena.28 
26The translation here is that of Coffey, 49, with minor changes. 
27Coffey, 49, draws attention to the disdain of Roman political life 
obvious in Lucilian satire. More to the point, however, is the satirist's 
mention of the forum, where the courts were located and most of the trials 
occurred, as Seneca relates at 11.9.4. 
28Horace elsewhere takes a dim view of legal matters, as his tongue-in-
cheek request for the jurist Trebatius' counsel (Sermones 2.1) would 
suggest. Cf. also 2.6.20-40 for court time as one of the nuisances of life in 
the city. 
Casu venit obvius illi 
adversarius, et, "quo tu turpissime?" magna 
inclamat voce, et "licet antestari?" ego vero 
oppono auriculam. rapit in ius; clamor utrimque, 
undique concursus. sic me servavit Apollo. 
(1.9.74-78) 
(Suddenly this pest met the man who was suing him, 
who kept screaming: "Where do you think you're going, 
thug," and then asking me "Will you testify?" I 
offered my services. He dragged his opponent off to 
the courts while a crowd gathered and shouted as it 
ran after them. So it was that Apollo had saved me.) 
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Later still, Juvenal returns to the more distanced Lucilian 
perspective of a physically detached witness whose disenchantment betrays 
an unmistakable intimacy with corruption and a sensibility at odds with 
his circumstances. 
quid referam quanta siccum iecur ardeat ira, 
cum populum gregibus comitum premit hie spoliator 
pupilli prostantis et hie damnatus inani 
iudicio? quid enim salvis infamia nummis? 
exul ab octava Marius bibit et fruitur dis 
iratis, at tu victrix, provincia, ploras. 
(1.1.45--50) 
(Why tell how my heart shrivels and burns with rage 
when I see the people hustled by a mob of retainers 
attending on one who has defrauded and debauched 
his ward, or on another who has been condemned 
by a futile verdict--for what matters infamy if 
the cash be kept? The exiled Marius carouses 
from the eighth hour of the day and revels in the 
wrath of Heaven, while you, poor Province, win 
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your cause and weep!)29 
All three satirists in their turn appear to share an amused yet 
scornful identification of court proceedings with public spectacles. Horace 
could readily speak of the "fallacem Circum" ("deceptive Circus") and 
immediately associate it with the "Forum. "30 Juvenal, writing for a 
weary age no longer shocked by the glaring disparities between Rome's 
present and past, its civic ideals and real incivilities, could add caveat to 
consolatio for poor Calvin us, the victim of justice and injustice both. 31 So 
even at the outset, Lucilius could establish a precedent of literary censure 
to replace an authority the official Censors would abdicate by their own 
suspect behavior.32 The reflexive implication of Juvenal's "quis custodiet 
ipsos custodes" ("who will guard the guards themselves?") hints at a novel 
honor for satire: the satirist alone could be Rome's true censor.33 
29The translation, with changes, is based on that of G.G. Ramsay, 
Juvenal and Persius (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 
1940), 7. 
30Horace Sermones 1.6.113-114. 
31Juvenal Saturae XIII. 
32Coffey, 40-49, gives the social and political background of Lucilian 
satire, including the satirist's attacks on policies of the censorship or 
corrupt censors holding an office instituted to uphold public morals. 
331n criticizing the censors, Lucilius "marks them too," so to speak, and 
thus assumes the role of censor by calling attention to their moral failures. 
Horace, Sermones 1.3.24 and 1.4.5, uses the term noto (OLD, entry 3: "to 
put a mark of disgrace against the name") to represent his own role, thus 
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Nonetheless, this brief survey of satiric sentiment exposes several 
remarkable elements. Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal, despite the radical 
differences betokened by the various effects of Roman politics on each, 
display sufficient similarity to suppose a general and more universal 
protest whose details are simply variations on a theme. As the satires of 
Horace demonstrate, there is considerable continuity between the Scipionic 
circle and that of Maecenas. However deliberately Horace highlights the 
similarities between his own age and that of Lucilius and culls the vices 
he prefers to expose, some connection between epochs would prevail given 
the constancy and fidelity of humanity to folly. Moral pollution nurtured 
Roman satire long after Lucilius and ensured the perpetuity of the genre 
until it produced yet the most mordant reviler of Roman manners and 
morals--Juvenal. And however infrequent and occasional Rome's legal 
milieu served as a locus communis for Lucilius and Horace, the social 
changes of the Principate in the legal sphere furnished Juvenal with 
material for an entire satire and extended sections of others. 34 
Juvenal's added emphasis on legal corruption did not lack precedent. 
If satire mirrors the grotesquerie of an era, one must assume a degree of 
identifying the function of the censor with his own task. 
34Juvenal Saturae XIII is a consolatio by the author cautioning against 
the expectation that justice will be just. 
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reality for which satiric exposure and exaggeration are the just 
desserts.35 As a consequence, Juvenal's attention to Roman legal matters 
reflects a social climate which deserved the dishonorable mention. 
Sketches of corruption and futility in the domain of law were acutely and 
interminably detailed earlier by another author whose philosophy and 
prose obscure much of his satiric tone and intent. Notwithstanding the 
choice of structure, the following passage from book two of Seneca's De Ira 
mimics a revulsion not unlike that voiced by Rome's finest verse satirists: 
Quod enim momentum erit quo non improbanda 
videat? Quotiens processerit domo, per sceleratos 
illi avarosque et prodigos et impudentis et ob ista 
felices incedendum erit; nusquam oculi eius 
flectentur ut non quod indignentur inveniant: 
deficiet si totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet 
exegerit. Haec tot milia ad forum prima luce 
properantia, quam turpes lites, quanto turpiores 
advocatos habent! Ali us i udicia patris accusat, 
quae <non> mereri satius fuit, alius cum matre 
consistit, alius delator venit eius criminis, cuius 
manifestior reus est; et iudex damnaturus quae 
fecit eligitur et corona pro mala causa <stat> 
bona patroni voce corrupta. Quid singula 
persequor? Cum videris forum multitudine 
refertum et saepta concursu omnis frequentiae 
plena et illum circum in quo maximam sui 
35E. Courtney, A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1980), 96, provides historical background for Juvenal's 
disgust at the felicitous fate of Marius Priscus, the exiled Marius 
mentioned at 1.1.45-50, including "the luxurious life lived by some exiles" 
attested by various authors and the impoverishment of the provinces 
formerly managed by governors condemned for extortion (for which Gaius 
Verres, propraetor in Sicily, 73-71 B.C, seems to have been the archetype). 
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partem populus ostendit, hoc scito, istic 
tantundem esse vitiorum quantum hominum. 
Inter istos quos togatos vides nulla pax est: alter 
in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur; nulli 
nisi ex alterius iniuria quaestus est .... 
(IL 7 .2--8.2)36 
(For what moment will there be when he will not 
see something to disapprove of? Every time he 
leaves his house, he will have to walk among 
criminals and misers and spendthrifts and 
profligates--men who are happy in being such. 
Now here will he turn his eyes without finding 
something to move them to indignation. He will 
give out if he forces himself to be angry every 
time occasion requires. All these thousands 
hurrying to the forum at break of day--how base 
their cases, and how much baser are their 
advocates! One assails his father's will, from 
which it were more fitting that he respect; 
another arraigns his mother at the bar; another 
comes as an informer of the very crime in which 
he is more openly the culprit; the judge, too, is 
chosen who will condemn the same deeds that he 
himself has committed, and the crowd, misled by 
the fine voice of a pleader, shows favour to a 
wicked cause. 
36Except where indicated, the text of the De Ira followed throughout is 
that of L.D. Reynolds, L. Annaei Senecae: Dialogorum Libri Duodecim 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). The translation is based on that 
of John W. Basore, Seneca's Moral Essays I with modifications noted by 
sections underlined. The primary sources of Roman law frequently 
referred to are cited as Digest, Justinian, Inst., and Gaius, Inst. The texts 
used are as follows: The Digest of Justinian, Latin Text ed. Theodor 
Mommsen, with the aid of Paul Kreuger; English trans. ed. Alan Watson 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Justinian's 
lntitutes, Latin Text ed. Paul Kreuger; English trans. eds. Peter Birks & 
Grant McLeod (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); The Institutes of 
Gaius, Latin Text eds. Seckel and Kuebler; English trans. eds. W. M. 
Gordon and 0. F. Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
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But why recount all the different types? 
Whenever you see the forum with its thronging 
multitude, and the polling-places filled with all 
the gathered concourse, and the great Circus 
where the largest part of the populace displays 
itself, you may be sure that just as many vices 
are gathered there as men. Among those whom 
you see in civilian garb there is no peace; for a 
slight reward any one of them can be led to 
compass the destruction of another; no one makes 
gain save by another's loss .... ) 
This tirade on the moral condition of the times foreshadows Juvenal's 
harsh strains and is reminiscent of Lucilian rancor. In the very next 
chapter, the last of a three chapter diatribe, Seneca's acerbic quip that 
"innocentia non rara sed nulla sit" ("innocence is not rare, but non-
existent") presages Juvenal's bitter "probitas laudatur et alget" ("probity 
is praised and out in the cold").37 
The Senecan passage is extraordinary for many other reasons as 
well. The abstraction and sequential reasoning which characterize 
philosophy are strangely absent, and a curious set of qualities appears in 
their stead. Topical allusions abound: the array of miscreants, the flurry 
of the forum, the depravity and all-embracing disgrace of the courts. As 
with Horace, mention of the Circus follows that of the Forum in close 
succession.38 The chaos Lucilius portrayed began "a mani" ("from 
37Il.9.1, and Juvenal Saturae I.74. 
38Horace Sermones 1.6.113-14. 
29 
morning"); for Seneca "prima luce" ("at dawn") is an equally suitable 
commencement for folly, and he extends the Lucilian "ut si hostes sint 
omnibus omnes" ("as if everyone were everybody else's enemy") to 
encompass even the closest of human relationships--parents and 
children. 39 In short, Seneca never cites Horace or Lucili us by name in 
the De Ira, but his devastating indictment of the Rome of his time 
implicitly connects him with a tradition and establishes a pedigree for his 
undertaking. Despite the prose medium, both motif and execution are 
those of the satirist. 
Other aspects of this passage are also noteworthy. Seneca's 
prolonged account is unanticipated; it disappoints expectations or startles 
a reader who expected the usual pattern of thrust and parry, objection and 
refutation between Seneca and his adversarius. But the generic 
inconsistency accomplishes a skillful shift into the real world, despite the 
judgment by critics of Seneca's prose that such digressions mark a retreat 
to the cheap and shopworn rhetorical displays of the Silver Age 
declaimers. 40 But such an unsympathetic conclusion would be 
39See II.7 .3: "Ali us iudicia patris accusat, quae <non> mereri satius 
fuit, alius cum matre consistit ... "; also II.8.3: "t Hoc uno t ab animalibus 
mutis differunt, quod illa mansuescunt alentibus, horum rabies ipsos a 
quibus est nutrita depascitur." 
400ne of the more famous criticisms of Senecan style, as noted by 
J.R.G. Wright, "Form and Content in the Moral Essays," in Seneca, ed. 
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overlooking the fact that in Horatian satire Seneca's strategy would be 
esteemed as an adept variation or a virtuoso control of transitions between 
topics; it also neglects the obvious informality or the casual manner in 
which Seneca seems to speak extempore, as though spontaneously incited 
to improvise from his revulsion at the social ills of his time.41 Assessed 
by the literary standards of each genre, Seneca's digression from a 
predictable pattern suggests a deliberate recollection of the methods of 
satire: the abrupt break in form jars as effectively as the sudden entrance 
into the province of urban life and its heinous doings. 42 This 
exaggeration of malice and hypocrisy is a flat-out denunciation, not an 
argument, philosophical or otherwise.43 
The destination of Seneca's topical detour is the condition of the 
C.D.N. Costa (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 39, is 
attributed to Caligula in Suetonius Caligula 53.2: "harenam esse sine 
calce." Wright, 39, also cites the comment of Justus Lipsius, one of 
Seneca's admirers, on the De Ira: Libri in partibus pulchri et eminentes 
sunt, in toto parum distincti, & repetitionibus aut digestione confusi. 
41Eduard Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 94, 
convincingly justifies the digressions of Horace. Cf. Kirk Freudenburg, 
The Walking Muse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 109-84, 
for a more recent discussion of Horace's style. 
42Highet, 16-17, remarks that satire "is always concrete, usually 
topical, often personal. It deals with actual cases ... talks of this moment 
and this city, and this special, very recent, very fresh deposit of corruption 
whose stench is still in the satirist's curling nostrils." 
43lbid.' 17 -18. 
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courts. Following the adversarial charge that "Virtus ... ita turpibus irata 
esse debet" ("Virtue ... must be angry with what is base") in chapter six of 
book two, Seneca begins a preface to the satiric description of the next 
three chapters by considering the notion of righteous indignation or 
justifiable anger. The adversarius takes for granted the moral superiority 
of the righteously indignant, and the phrase certainly implies this 
superiority with its modifying adjective. Moreover, his automatic 
connection between ira and virtus seeks to justify or relativize ira, when 
it is all of a kind by Seneca's definition; and anger by whomever or by 
whatever rationale is objectionable.44 Secondly, the link between anger 
and righteousness establishes an irony which lies at the very heart of 
Seneca's purpose in the subsequent passage. 
Alive to both possible and real human inconsistencies and alert to 
the myriad ways humanity is prone to self-deception, Seneca stands the 
argument of his opponent on its head in order to point out the common 
error of designating righteous indignation a mark of moral rectitude. 
What, after all, could be the matter with feeling outraged at crime and 
44F .H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London and Indianapolis: Gerald 
Duckworth & Co. Ltd. and Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2d. ed., 
1989), 152, comments on Seneca's opposition to the "Peripatetic view that 
in moderation it is a useful emotion ... ," the argument made frequently by 
his adversary. For example, at II.11.1: "Utilis est," inquit, "ira, quia 
contemptum effugit, quia malos terret. " Seneca, however, is unambiguous 
at I.9.1: Deinde nihil habet in se utile .... 
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injustice? Seneca tersely explains: "Et quid indignius quam sapientis 
adfectum ex aliena pendere nequitia?" ("And what is more unworthy of the 
wise man than that his passion should depend upon the wickedness of 
others?").45 Seneca recognizes a fundamental irony in his opponent's 
argument, and presses on until the moral high ground of those who think 
that their anger at injustice is consequently acceptable starts to collapse: 
"irasci non est ex dignitate eius, non magis quam maerere" ("it no more 
comports with its (virtue) dignity to be angry than to be sad"), he says.46 
The popular association of passion with ethical standing, a morality of 
emotion, is both absurd and ironic for Seneca: anger ipso facto shows an 
absence of restraint, and righteous anger combines this with self-
aggrandizement. Ira implicates the will, whereas righteousness is actually 
a false assumption of moral status that depends on the very existence of 
vice. Thus not only does Seneca view passion (ira) and moral standing as 
unrelated, but he even maintains the opposite: "ira ob alienum peccatum 
sordida et angusti pectoris est" ("anger on account of another's sin is mean 
and narrow-minded").47 He thus draws attention to a twofold problem: 





it is positively construed as a sign of rectitude. 
The popular affiliation of dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem) 
and ira, which implicitly condemns those without ira to moral inferiority 
for their indifference to injustice, is both a failure to separate the 
perception of injustice from anger and, more importantly, a false 
identification of perception and passion. 48 Seneca recognized the 
psychological benefits of this mistaken identification: it created and 
maintained an illusion of integrity without effort or practice and 
simultaneously disguised infirmity of the will both from the self and from 
others.49 Virtus (virtue), a concept whose very definition implied 
persistence and effort, becomes automatic.50 One need only feel anger in 
order to consider oneself upright. Yet the very absurdity of this 
48The adversarius suggests the affiliation throughout, and it is one of 
the chief arguments which Seneca must counter. In addition to II.6.1, 
II.11.1 is a restatement of the same claim, indicating that Seneca's 
opponent has yet to be convinced: "Utilis est," inquit, "ira, quia 
contemptum effugit, quia malos terret." That absence of ira suggests 
indifference to injustice is argued at I.16.1: "Quid ergo? non irascar 
latroni? Quid ergo? non irascar venefico?" See below, n. 397, on the 
distinction Seneca makes between an agitatio animi (disturbance of the 
mind) and an affectus (intent). See especially II.3.4-5. 
49Seneca argues against any positive connection between virtue and 
emotion at II.6.1-7.1. 
50 At various points in the De Ira, Seneca suggests practices to be 
followed toward the end of diminishing anger: devil's advocacy (II.28.4-8), 
delay (II.29.1-2), and calm associates (III.8.1-6). On virtus, see OLD, entry 
7. 
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determination was necessary to provide Seneca with a welcome prelude to 
the extended satiric portrait to follow. Righteous anger, facilitated by 
injustice, sustains itself on injustice as a constant opportunity for anger as 
a surrogate for genuine moral progress exacted by painstaking practice. 
Pervasive injustice could purchase an . . 1nexpens1 ve 
sanctimoniousness; and both were plentiful in Seneca's Rome.51 To 
repeat his query: "Quod enim momentum erit, quo non improbanda 
videat?" ("For what moment will there be when he will not see something 
to disapprove of?").52 Vice is pandemic, and Seneca's generic list is brief 
but all-encompassing: "sceleratos ... avarosqueet prodigos et imprudentis ... " 
("criminals ... and misers and spendthrifts and profligates ... ").53 His major 
interest is much more specific: the judicial setting of the forum. Seneca 
settles his attention on the court as the most suitable scene, and predicts 
the verdict for those who wish to sate their desires for effortless probity: 
"Deficiet, si totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet exegerit" ("He will give 
out if he forces himself to be angry every time occasion requires").54 Ira 
51At least some basis in fact must have supported Seneca's observations 
at 11.7.2. Suetonius Augustus 29, and Vespasian 10, notes the need for 






always fails from exhaustion (deficiet), since even righteous anger cannot 
cope with endless disgrace and corruption: the cases (lites), the attorneys 
(advocatos), the litigants (reuslalius ... alius,etc.),the witnesses(delator), and 
the judges (iudex). Such is the hyperbole of satire, and it is essential to 
Seneca's purpose. Under the circumstances he has provided, the righteous 
indignation that supposedly distinguishes wisdom would be continuous--
and absurd. 
The endeavor of the adversarius to legitimize anger is perhaps the 
most succinct and accurate summary of his role. 55 In the total context 
of the De Ira, justification or even rationalization are both inaccurate 
terms in comparison. Seneca's alleged grievance is with anger, and a 
thorough philosophical defense is expected; but his complaint is not the 
one-dimensional approach it has been judged; there is another level of 
meaning that emerges on analysis. Besides denoting an opponent in an 
argument or dispute, the adversarius also refers to the opposing party in 
a lawsuit.56 In addition, the argument that anger sometimes possesses 
dignity in someone virtuous (or wise)--prior to a vivid and realistic picture 
55At 1.16.1, Seneca's opponent asks: "Quid ergo? Non irascar latroni? 
Quid ergo? Non irascar venefico?" In both instances the adversariuswould 
have a valid legal claim. Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman 
Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953), 538 and 760, 
comments on these two crimes. 
56See OLD, entry 1, and entries 3a and b. 
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of the Roman forum and its courts--a reason for the reader to hesitate as 
to Seneca's intended meaning. Assigning a philosophical function to the 
adversarius is appropriate if Seneca is writing a philosophical dialogue 
with an ethical program in mind. But if adversarius here denotes an 
opponent in the courtroom instead, the apparent philosophical role may 
shade into a quasi-legal role, Seneca's adversarius may imitate the 
Horatian adversarius of a satiric monologue, and the De Ira itself may 
have a sense quite other than has presently been thought. 
Seneca's direction and theme as discussed thus far are certainly 
germane to these possibilities. The adversarial argument at 2.6 is less a 
justification of anger than an attempt to legitimize it. Seneca does not 
take us to the forum and the courts in response to this position by 
accident. As with much of the De Ira, the vocabulary of chapter seven is 
dense with Roman legal terminology.57 The most prominent term, 
however, appears in the subsequent chapter. Seneca states that "nulli nisi 
ex alterius iniuria quaestus est" ("no one makes gain save by another's 
loss").58 His use of iniuria (injury, outrage) here, after a protracted 
57II. 7 .3 is of particular interest here; the section contains several terms 
possessing a primary legal sense: e.g., causa (case), lites (lawsuits), advocati 
(attorneys), reus (defendant), and iudex Gudge), to cite only the most 
striking examples. See chap. 2, passim, for a lengthier discussion of these 
terms and their importance in the De Ira. 
5811.8.2. 
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expose of the debasement of the judicial system, is a deliberate coda to the 
passage itself and to what he has emphatically asserted in the initial 
chapter of book two: "!ram quin species oblata iniuriae moveat non est 
dubium" ("There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the direct 
impression of an injury"). Ira and iniuria are inextricably combined here 
and throughout the De Ira, and Seneca's ample use of legal vocabulary 
compels closer examination of the term's precise meaning in the work. 
The term itself appears regularly in the De Ira, and although its root 
(ius=statute) would suggest a legal meaning, it can be construed more 
comprehensively as conveying any wrongful act or malfeasance.59 If 
Seneca's end were abstract and "philosophical," the generic significance 
would be sufficient for the maintenance of a Stoic position on anger. Yet 
within Seneca's essay, the context of its usage requires an almost 
exclusively legal interpretation. "!ram quin speciesoblata iniuriae moveat 
non est dubium" ("There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the 
direct impression of an injury") consequently requires a very different 
interpretation: to conclude that the species (appearance) of iniuriae 
(wrongdoing) causes anger is one matter, that the species (case or specific 
legal problem) of an iniuria (legal offense) causes or is a source of anger is 
59Cf. OLD, s.v. ius, entries la and b, 2, and 4a, b, and c. 
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another.60 Seneca's objection to anger, Stoic though it may be, narrows 
and suggests a more specialized purpose.61 His catalogue of corruption 
at the bar at 2. 7 as a topical protest is plain, but too abbreviated a sample 
from which to judge it one of Seneca's principal goals. We must, however, 
understand his frequent and deliberate references to iniuria as a common 
pretext for anger in a fundamentally different sense, since iniuria as a 
violation of law is what makes possible a satiric diatribe on this category 
60Species in the legal sense (OLD, entry 11) means a "specific legal 
situation or case." Ulpian, in Digest 13.6.5.11, provides a typical example 
with regard to the admissability of legal action: videndum, in quibus 
speciebus commodati actio locum habeat. In legal use (OLD, entry 4) 
iniuria refers to any "act, insulting in kind and intention, calculated to 
injure a person's reputation or outrage his feelings (ranging from physical 
assault to defamation of character)." Gains, Inst. 3.220, supplies a model: 
Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum quis pugno puta aut fuste 
percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed etiam si cui convicium factum fuerit, 
sive quis bona alicuius quasi debitoris, sciens eum nihil sibi debere, 
proscripserit, sive quis ad infamiam alicuius libellum aut carmen scripserit, 
sive quis matrem familias aut praetextatum adsectatus fuerit, et denique 
aliis pluribus modis. (Outrage is committed not only by striking someone 
with a fist or a stick, or even whipping him, but also by raising a clamor 
against him, or if someone, knowing that another owes nothing to him, 
advertises his possessions for sale as a debtor's, or if he writes a pamphlet 
or song to defame someone, or if he pursues a matron or a youth, and 
finally in many other ways.) 
61Sandbach, 59-67, 152, offers an overview of the Stoic conception of 
anger and gives a short synopsis of the De Ira. J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 22-36, provides a more 
detailed discussion, emphasizing the differences in philosophical opinion 
on the relationship between human action and emotion within the Stoic 
tradition. 
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of Roman Law. 62 
If the plea of Seneca's adversariusfor righteous anger is an attempt 
to legitimize it (so to speak), elements of Roman Law from the Twelve 
Tables to the N eronian Age, by sanctioning revenge, promote and 
legitimize anger as well.63 Seneca acknowledges the cause and effect 
relationship between ira and ultio (revenge) early in the De Ira and 
returns to it repeatedly. The opening arguments of the adversarius in 
response to Seneca's introductory comments mark the initial connection 
between ira and iniuria, but also presage later discussion of ultio (revenge) 
as the principle promoted by iniuria: 
"Irascimur" inquit "saepe non illis qui lae-
62See chapter two, passim, for further discussion. 
63Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1962), 207, summarizes the issue well: "The fossils to be found in 
the law of delicts, however, are of a different kind, and affect the character 
and substance of the law. But here again the most obvious ... are less 
important than the survival of the principle which underlies them all, the 
principle of vengeance." Seneca primarily employs vindicare (to exact 
reparation, punish, avenge: OLD, entry 5) and ulcisci (to inflict retribution, 
take revenge: OLD, entry 1) to convey reliance on litigation for iniuria. 
At II.32.1, however, he remarks: Inhumanum verbum est et quidem pro 
iusto receptum ultio [et talio]. Non multum differt nisi ordine qui dolorem 
regerit: tantum excusatius peccat. This is the only instance of talio 
(exaction of compensation in kind: OLD, entry 1) in the De Ira, and is the 
term used in the Twelve Tables. E. H. Warmington, ed. and trans., 
Remains of Old Latin III: Lucilius and Laws of the Twelve Tables 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1967), 476: "si membrum 
rupsit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto. " Seneca deliberately places ultio 
(revenge) in the legal tradition. 
serunt, sed iis qui laesuri sunt; ut scias iram 
non ex ini uria nasci." 
(1.3.1) 
("We often get angry," he says, "not at those 
who have hurt us, but at those who intend to hurt 
us; you may, therefore, be sure that anger is not 
born of injury." 
And a sentence later he continues: 
"Ut scias" inquit "non esse iram poenae 
cupiditatem, infirmissimi saepe potentissimis 
irascuntur nee poenam concupiscunt quam non 
sperant." 
(1.3.2) 
("But," he says, "that you may know that anger 
is not the desire to exact punishment, the weak-
est men are often angry at the most powerful, and 
if they have no hope of inflicting punishment, 
they have not the desire.") 
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Indeed, the adversarius denies that anger stems from iniuria immediately 
upon his appearance in the De Ira, a fact that places iniuria in the 
foreground of the discussion. Furthermore, he contends that anger is not 
a desire for exacting punishment. As with iniuria, the term poena (penalty 
for a particular offence) has a legal in addition to a general meaning.64 
But the adversarial position is also remarkable because it not only 
640LD, entry la, gives the legal, and entry 2, the general meaning. 
OLD, entry le, is also instructive, as is another entry in the XII Tables 
(Warmington, ibid): "si iniuriam [alteri] faxsit, XXV [aeris] poenae sunto." 
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Seneca's assumed definition, and this provides Seneca the occasion to 
respond in agreement, rebuttal, or clarification. He concurs with his 
adversarius, but with an important exception. 
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, 
non facultatem; concupiscunt autem homines et quae 
possunt. 
(1.3.2) 
(In the first place, I spoke of the desire to exact 
punishment, not of the power to do so; moreover, 
men do desire even what they cannot attain.) 
The adversariuswas correct in stating Seneca's basic view, but incorrectly 
extended it. Desire and the ability to fulfill it had to remain separate. 
Nevertheless, Seneca's definition as noted by his interlocutor was 
essentially accurate and, as Seneca soon continues, roughly identical to 
Aristotle's.65 
Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest, 
ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponen-
di. 
(1.3.2) 
(Aristotle's definition differs little from mine; 
for he says that anger is the desire to repay 
suffering.) 
Still Seneca distinguishes his own view markedly. Cupiditatem doloris 
reponendi (the desire to repay suffering) and cupiditatem poenae exigendae 
65For Aristotle as a quasi-legal theorist or quasi-jurist, see chapter 5. 
42 
(the desire to exact punishment) differ in an important respect: the latter 
also possesses a generally recognized legal meaning in addition to its "lay" 
sense.66 Thus, from the very beginning Seneca furnishes the De Ira a 
legal context and, what is most surprising, insists on a definition which, 
by contrast with Aristotle's, gets its force from outside--a crucial fact that 
has gone unnoticed. 67 
So this apparently minor variation of definitions has maJor 
consequences: it is a salient piece of evidence added to the steady 
accumulation of data in support of a thesis that a satire on Roman Law, 
not simply an ethical enquiry, was what Seneca had in mind. Its 
prominence early in the De Ira, its position subsequent to the initial 
remonstrance of the adversarius, and the emphasis on terms normally 
applied in a legal manner are impossible to dismiss. At the same time, the 
legal language and satiric features of the previously examined passages in 
the second book advance the case for a satiric purpose even further. 
Seneca has employed legal jargon at crucial points where he could have 
chosen a more neutral vocabulary in the interests of philosophical clarity 
660LD, entry Sc. 
67Basore, 112, attributes the origin of Seneca's definition to Posidonius, 
as preserved by Lactanti us: "ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae. " 
Now here is the legal sense of iniuria mentioned, an interesting oversight 
in view of the exempla and other legal terms that Seneca provides, all of 
which technically fall within the scope of the delict. See chap. 2, passim. 
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and precision; instead, he elects to approach a vice much criticized in 
antiquity from an entirely different angle.68 Seneca's phraseology is both 
explicit and explicitly legal: anger is the cupiditatem poenae exigendae 
("desire for exacting punishment") and its cause is a species iniuriae (case 
of injury/outrage).69 
It becomes more plausible that Seneca is deliberate in his use of 
iniuria as a term appropriated from Roman Law once its context is 
explored. The application of a single word or expression from the law 
would not by itself go to show that Roman Law is a conspicuous theme; 
but Seneca very nearly compiles a legal lexicon in the course of the De Ira, 
as the terminology which qualifies iniuria will indicate. 70 Two especially 
telling examples illustrate this. 
(1) .. .iram ipsam castigandam habet, quae nihilo 
melior est, saepe etiam peior is delictis qui-
bus irascitur. Gaudere laetarique proprium et 
68Malum(evil-doing, wickedness: OLD, entry 3), improbitas(outrageous 
or immoderate behavior: OLD, entry 2), or iniustitia (unjust behavior: 
OLD, entry 1), to give just three examples, are generic terms which Seneca 
might have chosen for his definition of anger. At 11.26.4 and Il.27.1, 
Seneca uses the verb nocere (to harm) in contradistinction to iniuriam 
facere (to commit an injury) in order to distinguish the generic sense from 
the legal. See chap. 2 two, passim, for a detailed discussion of Seneca's 
treatment of iniuria in the De Ira. 
691.3.2 and 11.1.3. 
70See Appendix of Senecan legal vocabulary for a list of legal terms 
used in the De Ira and citations from the work in which the legal sense is 
plain. 
naturale virtutis est: irasci non est ex digni-
tate eius, non magis quam maerere .... 
(11.6.2) 
( ... anger in itself (virtue) considers reprehen-
sible, for it is no way better, often even worse 
than those delicts which provoke anger. The dis-
tinctive and natural property of virtue is to re-
joice and be glad; it no more comports with dignity 
to be angry than to be sad .... ) 
(2) ... nusquam oculi eius flectentur ut non quod in-
dignentur inveniant: deficiet, si totiens a se iram 
quotiens causa poscet exegerit. 
(11.7.2) 
( ... nowhere will (the wise man's) eyes be turned with-
out finding something to move them to indignation. 
he will lose, if he requires himself to be angry 
every time he has a case.) 
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Several terms in the two passages merit analysis in connection with 
iniuria: delictis (delicts) and dignitate (rank, status, standing, esteem) in 
the first section; indignentur (become indignant), deficiet (will lose his 
case), and causa (case) in the second. 
Dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem) and its cognate indignor 
(become indignant) are particularly germane to our examination of iniuria 
as a legal term. In the first passage Seneca takes issue with a 
commonplace of Roman culture and law, that violation of dignitas, one's 
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personal standing or repute, is just cause for anger.71 As defined, the 
important and usual connotations of dignitas are status, rank, position, 
esteem, and importance, or, a condition in which one enjoys one's own and 
others' esteem.72 But Seneca's disagreement is also, by implication, 
dissent from standard Roman legal theory and practice: according to the 
legal tradition, citizens with full rights, especially citizens enjoying 
distinctive rank or honor--tribunes, praetors, or senators, for example--
could take action based on assault to their person or an affront to their 
reputation: that is, their dignitas. 73 The category of Roman Law under 
which actions of this class applied was known as the law of delicts, and the 
delict under which these actions could be pursued was titled iniuria. 74 
Seneca not only associates anger and Roman Law, he boldly places 
ira on a par with those "delictis quibus irascitur" (delicts at which one is 
71Berger, 502: "Specifically iniuria embraces ... offenses against the good 
reputation of a person, as defined in the Twelve Tables, in the praetorian 
edict, in the lex Cornelia de iniuriis, and later in imperial constitutions." 
See n. 107 for additional discussion of the lex Cornelia. 
720LD, entries 3 and 4. 
73lbid. 
74See Nicholas, 207-27, or W. W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law: 
From Augustus to Justinian, 3d ed., rev. Peter Stein (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), 576-604, for the more recent surveys of the law of 
delicts. 
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angered) as "sa,epe etiam peior" ("sometimes even worse").75 As with 
iniuria, delictum (delict) possesses both a general and a technical legal 
sense. 76 It recurs in the De Ira with some frequency, but unlike iniuria, 
which often has a neutral meaning, delictum normally denotes a 
prescribed legal category. 77 For an author versed in the law in a work 
nominally addressed to a brother equally familiar with Roman 
jurisprudence, proximate use of two terms so closely associated in the legal 
literature can hardly be coincidental.78 Nonetheless, the text must and 
does provide a better case. Delictum (delict) refers to a broad classification 
7511.6.2. 
760LD, entry 1, gives the general sense: an act which falls short of an 
approved standard of conduct; a misdeed, offence, or fault. Berger, 430, 
provides the legal meaning: "A wrongdoing prosecuted through a private 
action of the injured individual and punished by a pecuniary penalty paid 
to the plaintiff." And more specifically: "Delictum is the source of one 
group of obligations (obligationes ex delicto) which in the fundamental 
division of obligations is opposed to the contractual ones (obligationes ex 
contractu"). 
77R. Busa, S.J. and A. Zampolli, eds., Concordantia,e Senecana,e, 2 vols. 
(Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1975), 264, cite five 
instances of the word in the De Ira, and all are used in the legal sense. 
78Miriam Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976), 36 ff., 43ff., surveys the education and career of Seneca, and, 
45-48, 83-84, 245, periodically refers to Seneca's brother and addressee, 
later adopted by L. Junius Gallio, and cites his magistracies, particularly 
the proconsulship of Achaea in 51-2 A.D., during which he refused to 
entertain the charges against the apostle Paul as described in Acts: 12-17. 
Cf. Rene Waltz, Vie de Seneque (Paris: Librairie Academique, 1909), 21-37, 
the standard biography of Seneca, for an account of Seneca's education. 
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of Roman law which includes offences grouped under the term iniuria. 79 
Seneca's intentional citation of this legal category is reinforced in the 
same passage. 
Modus enim esse non potest, si pro facto cui us-
que irascendum est; nam aut iniquus erit, si 
aequaliter irascetur delictis inaequalibus, aut 
aut iracundissimus, si totiens excanduerit quot-
iens iram scelera meruerint. 
(Il.6.4) 
(No limit, surely, can be set if the degree of his 
anger is to be determined by each man's deed. 
For either he will be unjust if he has equal 
anger toward unequal delicts, or he will be habi-
tually angry if he blazes up every time crimes 
give him warrant.)80 
As an extension of his rebuttal to the adversarius' contention that it is a 
mark of virtue to be angered by turpibus (disgraceful or base actions), 
Seneca substitutes the more unequivocal delictis(delicts) twice; he thereby 
confines or narrows his reply: it is the law of delicts which entitles the 
pursuit of legal action based on iniuria, and it is iniuria which includes 
the scelera (crimes) regarded as offensive to dignitas (rank, status, 
standing, esteem). 81 
79For violations encompassed by the delict, see chap. 2. 
8
°Rist, 81-91, devotes an entire chapter to this paradox, but without 
citing this passage from the De Ira. 
81Il.6.l: 'Virtus,' inquit, 'ut honestis rebus propitia est, ita turpibus 
irata esse debet. ' 
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Seneca transfers attention from the more comprehensive turpibus 
(disgraceful or base actions) to the legally definitive delictis (delicts) as a 
prelude to his unflattering appraisal of the courts.82 As he had earlier 
carefully distinguished his definition and his terms from the neutral 
terminology of the adversarius and Aristotle, Seneca repeats the pattern: 
his disagreement effectively superimposes a legal shape on the discussion 
of ira. 83 To a Roman magistrate such as N ovatus, there would have been 
no question that nusquam oculi eius fiectentur, ut non quod indignentur 
inveniant (nowhere will his eyes be turned without finding something to 
move them to indignation) meant the delict iniuria, for indignentur 
(become indignant) implied the assault on dignitas (rank, status, standing, 
esteem) which justified an action based on iniuria. But Seneca finishes 
where his adversarius began by returning to turpibus (disgraceful or base 
actions) in a stricter sense: the litigation and the attorneys who promote 
it.84 In so doing, he reverses his opponent's emphasis by referring to lites 
(lawsuits) as turpes (disgraceful) and their advocatos (attorneys) as 
turpiores (more disgraceful).85 Thus, instead of attributing disgrace to 
82For Seneca's diatribe on the courts, see 11.7-9. 
83For these definitions of ira, see 1.3.1-3. 
84See especially II. 7 .3 
85For lites (OLD, entry 1): a dispute at law, a lawsuit. For advocatus 
(OLD, entry 1): one who supports or advises a party to a lawsuit. 
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crimes, which often produce those disturbances of the mind which precede 
ira, Seneca purposely transfers the object of disgrace (and the topic at 
hand) to the legal process and its practitioners.86 
The nee vitia nostra nee remedia pati possumus ("we can endure 
neither our vices nor their cures") of Livy's preface suggests Seneca's focus 
here, and is an earlier and more general statement of the problem Seneca 
speaks of in the De Ira.87 For Livy, the remedies for Rome's moral 
decline seemed as difficult for the state to bear as the moral decadence 
itself, and he prescribes examples for imitation or avoidance from Rome's 
past as a palliative for the social ills of his time. In a similar vein, Seneca 
not only decries the vice of anger, but is also critical of the delict iniuria, 
since this provides anger a legitimate and socially acceptable instrument 
of expression. Yet his method in doing so frequently abandons argument 
for the sake of paradox--or satiric irony, figures much more amenable to 
86 At 11.3.1-5, one of the key chapters in the De Ira, Seneca 
differentiates between ira and the motus animi (disturbance of the mind) 
which comes before it, but not without eventually introducing legal 
connections. Thus, at 11.3.5: Ergo prima illa agitatio animi quam species 
iniuriae incussit non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species; ille sequens 
impetus, qui speciem iniuriae non tantum accepit sed adprobavit, ira est, 
concitatio animi ad ultionem voluntate et iudicio pergentis. Seneca includes 
here the conditions under which iniuria can be legally applied. See chap. 
2. 
87B. 0. Foster, trans., Liyy I: Books I and II (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1919), praef., 7. 
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h. 88 1s purpose. In point of fact, Seneca's dominant theme becomes 
comprehensible only as an outgrowth of satiric irony: the law itself 
services anger in a paradoxical collaboration and alliance. If anger is 
cupiditatem poenae exigendae (the desire for exacting punishment), the 
iniuria that one suffers becomes the accepted means of satisfying it. 89 
Seneca must have seen this eagerness to cause pain as a major social ill 
of his time, much as Livy had observed a general moral collapse earlier. 
His denunciation of anger would require the censure of iniuria because the 
delict was both permissive and promotional, furnishing ira all the benefits 
of a social value.90 Justice ironically becomes the very crime it was set 
up to punish. 
For Seneca to conclude that ira is caused by a species iniuriae (case 
of injury/outrage) was a daring appraisal.91 It implied that the delict--or 
law itself--was responsible for the perpetration of ira. Seneca's 
extravagant condemnation of the courts displays the result of ira and 
iniuria in response to the claim that "Virtus ... ita turpibus irata esse debet 
88See chap. 5 on Seneca's use of paradox and irony as they apply to the 
De Ira as parody of an epistolary legal responsum. 
891.3.2. 
~or the range of the delict and its social consequences, see chap. 2. 
91For the legal sense of species, see OLD, entry 11, but especially 
Ulpian, Digest 4.3.7.3: Labeo ... adfert talem speciem; also 4.4.19.1: post 
speciem in auditorio eorum finitam. 
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("Virtue ought to be angered at what is base").92 But pr10r to his 
diatribe, in what might well serve as a summary of his view as well as a 
satiric reduction to absurdity, Seneca had offered this remark: "deficiet, si 
totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet exegerit" ("He will lose his case if 
he forces himself to be angry every time the case requires"). In the 
context of what precedes and follows, causa can only mean legal case or 
trial, not the more general cause, reason, or occasion.93 At the same 
time, deficiet (he will lose his case) becomes less a suggestion of Stoic 
resignation in the face of injustice than an example of hyperbole: no one 
confronted with grounds for action Seneca presents as commonplace could 
pursue them all or be victorious.94 Seneca's point is twofold: first, the 
connection between ira and causa (case), but secondly, the exaggerated 
importance of causae (cases) which practically demand ira in order to be 
pursued. Injustice is so rife as to entail obligatory outrage on an 
outrageous scale. And as he observes: "Numquam irasci desinet sapiens, 
si semel coeperit" ("Never will the wise man cease to be angry if once he 
92II.6.1. 
930LD, entries 1and2, provide the legal significance; OLD, entries 9, 
7, and 5b provide the more general meanings. 
94Deficiet has a double significance here: to fail to make a legal claim 
(OLD, entry 9d), and to succumb to tiredness or moral weakness (OLD, 
entry 5b). 
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begins").95 But Seneca notes thereafter that "Omnia sceleribus ac vitiis 
plena sunt" ("Every place is full of crime and vice"), and "plus committitur 
quam quod possit coercitione sanari" ("too many crimes are committed to 
be cured by any possible restraint").96 
Satiric hyperbole continues throughout the chapter in the same 
fashion, adding layer upon layer of protest in a manner the satires of 
Juvenal would later recall, as the following should demonstrate.97 
Maior cottidie peccandi cupiditas, minor vere-
cundia est; expulso melioris aequiorisque respectu 
quocumque visum est libido se impingit, nee fur-
tiva iam scelera sunt: praeter oculos eunt, adeo-
que in publicum missa nequitia est et in omnium 
pecatoribus eval uit ut innocentia non rara sed 
nulla sit. Numquid enim singuli aut pauci rupere 
legem? undique velut signo dato ad fas nefasque 
miscendum coorti sunt .... 
(II.9.1-2) 
(Every day the desire for wrongdoing is greater, 
the dread of it less; all regard for what is bet-
ter and more just is banished, lust hurls itself 
wherever it likes, and crimes are now no longer 
secret. They pass before our very eyes, and 
wickedness has come to such a public state, has 
gained such power over the hearts of all, that 
innocence is not rare--it is non-existent. For 
is it only the individual or the few who break 
the law? Everywhere, as if at a given signal, 
9sll.9.1. 
96Ibid. 
97Cf. Juvenal Saturae 3.41-57. 
men rise to level all the barriers of right and 
wrong.) 
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After this more general conspectus of iniquity, Seneca enlarges his 
scope and remarks that what he has previously described is but "pars 
scelerum est" ("only a portion of the crimes").98 He lengthens the list 
with a relentless tally of Roman social and political calamities, yet returns 
to the courts and the righteous ira which his adversarius had 
recommended as a solution to the violated dignitas (rank, status, standing, 
esteem) which warrants an actio iniuriarum (action for outrage). 99 
Adde nunc publica periuria gentium et rupta foe-
dera et in praedam validioris quidquid non resist-
ebat abductum, circumscriptiones furta fraudes 
infitiationes quibus trina non sufficiunt fora. 
Si tantum irasci vis sapientem quantum scelerum 
indignitas exigit, non irascendum illi sed insan-
iendum est. 
(11.9.4) 
(Add now to these, public acts of perjury between 
nations, broken treaties, and all the booty seized 
when resistance could not save it from the stronger, 
the double-dealings, the thefts and frauds and debts 
disowned--for such crimes all three forums supply 
not courts enough! If you expect the wise man to 
be as the indignity of crimes compels, he must not 
be angry merely, but go mad.) 
9811.9.3. 
99Berger, Encyclopedia, 502: "It was in particular the praetorian law 
which ... defended the honor of a Roman citizen against defamation by 
according a special action, actio iniuriarum." 
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Seneca thus ends a prolonged rebuttal of his opponent before advancing to 
a different interpretation of ira and a plea for reform which is typical of 
t . . h 100 a sa inc sc eme. However, Seneca has contributed much to an 
understanding of his design in a brief stretch at nearly the center of his 
essay: chapter six begins with an attempt by Seneca's adversarius to 
sanction anger as an appropriate reaction to injustice; chapter nine starts 
and concludes with an emphatic appeal to the absurdity of this view. 
Even more significantly, the fundamental themes of the De Ira are 
presented in this span, and the means employed to convey them are not 
conventional philosophic methods, but the more subtle figures 
characteristic of satire, such as irony and hyperbole.101 Most obvious in 
this regard is Seneca's conscious accentuation of Roman law and the court 
milieu. His legal landscape offers a grim panorama of corruption: the fora 
teem with business from daybreak, are insufficient for the caseloads, and 
all the participants manifest their guilt or exhibit some form of disgraceful 
behavior. Criminality is ubiquitous according to Seneca, and so is 
hypocrisy: those entrusted with the execution of justice transgress the laws 
themselves and commit the same offenses over which they sit in judgment 
100See Horace Sermones 1.92-100 and Juvenal Saturae 10.346-66. 
101 Highet, 18, lists "the typical weapons of satire--irony, paradox, 
antithesis, parody, colloquialism, anticlimax, topicality, obscenity, violence, 
vividness, exaggeration .... " 
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or for which they provide evidence. Seneca has unremittingly depicted a 
judicial climate so bleak as to suggest a total absence of right. Reasoned 
proof is in abeyance here, supplanted by the extremes of hyperbole, the 
tactic so familiar to the satirist in his quest for reform, but utterly foreign 
to the philosopher in his insistence on sequential reasoning. 
The improprieties of Seneca's forum loom so immense they obscure 
the topic which originally prompted his exaggerated depiction of Roman 
crime and corruption--ira. Seneca has identified his reader, snatched him 
from the expectation of impunity, hauled him to one of the trina fora (three 
forums), and compelled him to endure interminable turpitude--much as the 
adverarial molestus (pest) in Horace--and all in reply to the simple and 
apparently sensible objection, presumably founded on received wisdom, 
that the virtuous are obligated to be angered at injustice.102 Yet what 
may be prematurely judged as unnecessary rhetorical display or an 
unforgiveable detour from a sequence of proofs becomes perfectly 
understandable if Seneca's purpose is satire. In that case, not only does 
his long hyperbole make sense, but, outside a philosophical context, his 
technique ceases to appear flawed from a philosophical perspective and 
takes on a more acceptable--andcreditable--appearance. Seneca's harangue 
seems to be a casual, spontaneous, improvisation without relevance to the 
102See Horace Sermones 1.9. 
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central problem of anger. But this also is a conventional satiric device: a 
deliberate and quite purposeful digression whose end must be more 
d 103 carefully pursue . 
Seneca's tirade leads to two conclusions in reaction to the opinion 
proffered by his adversarius on righteous anger: first, that the sapiens 
(wise man) will never cease from anger, since anger must become the 
hallmark of wisdom; secondly, the extent of iniquity will provoke 
madness. 104 Both conclusions, extreme as they are, hinge on the 
exaggeration which allows them credence. The divergence by which 
Seneca comes to the point is essential to his plan. Only an overwhelming 
survey of contemporary evil, such as Seneca provides, can convincingly 
reduce the possibility of righteous anger to absurdity; and only a polemic 
103Griffin, 16, cites Horace's Sermones as a literary model for Seneca, 
and the digressions in the De Ira possess the approximate spirit and tone 
observed in the satires. Cf. Henricus Weber, "De Senecae Philosophi 
Dicendi Genere Bioneo" (Ph.D. diss., Marburg, 1895), 1-6. Fraenkel, 94, 
notes the following about this technique: " ... the formula and the device of 
the digression whose end it marks are also a means of loosening what 
otherwise might become too tight and systematic an arrangement. 
Throughout his Sermones Horace ... wants to talk, as a gentleman will walk 
in congenial company. In a talk it is perfectly proper to wander, or seem 
to wander, from the subject under discussion and elaborate some side 
issues ... " Cf. Freudenburg, 109-84. 
104Seneca mentions the connection between ira and insania quite early 
in the De Ira, at 1.1.2: Quidam itaque e sapientibus viris iram dixerunt 
brevem insaniam. 
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on the legal condition of Roman society can call judicial recourse to delicts 
into question as a valid remedy by which to redress iniuria. The symbiosis 
between anger and the law of delicts comes into high relief in these 
passages. Seneca begins chapter six of the second book with ira and ends 
the ninth chapter with it, but the dominant and recurrent theme is Roman 
law, and this commands the center of his attention. 
But finally, in addition to hyperbole and apparent spontaneity, these 
passages reveal a third ingredient of satire. Seneca's insinuation of law 
into an essay on anger establishes the basis for an underlying tension 
which, although most obvious in the middle of his discussion, in fact 
pervades the entire work. As he remarks prior to mention of the delicta 
(delicts) with which one becomes angered: 
Nee umquam committet virtus ut vitia dum 
compescit imitetur .... 
(11.6.2) 
(And virtue will never be guilty of simulating 
vice in the act of repressing it .... ) 
Righteous anger in the common view was virtuous, and the Roman law of 
delicts, more explicitly the delict of iniuria, facilitated its expression. And 
herein lies the irony: the actiones iniuriarum, instigated as a consequence 
of outraged dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem), became tantamount 
to an expression of ira. In the guise of probity and under the aegis of 
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Roman statutes, anger was granted unlimited license. As the only vice he 
thought worthy of such lengthy and exclusive treatment in any of his 
philosophical works, Seneca must have estimated anger the principal ill 
of his time. But in order to expose it fully and recommend a genuine 
remedy, Seneca would have to challenge the law which made its 
manifestation an acceptable social and moral pestilence. 
CHAPTER TWO 
INIURIA 
By Seneca's time the Roman law of delict and iniuria as a legal term 
had an extensive tradition and history; both originate in the earliest 
source of Roman law, the Twelve Tables.105 The special character of the 
delict iniuria appears in seminal form there, and it would remain the basis 
on which succeeding eras could rely as a precedent for interpretation or 
amplification. Although the most comprehensive meaning of the term 
signifies unlawful conduct generally or the absence of a right, iniuria as 
a specific delict possesses two prominent features. 106 As a recent author 
105Warmington, 475-77, provides text, translation, and commentary on 
the sources and testimonia for Table VIII, where violations encompassed 
by iniuria are cited. Nicholas, 207-11, and Bruce Frier, A Casebook on the 
Roman Law of Delict (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 1-2, 177, present 
brief synopses of the history and tradition. 
106See OLD, entry 1, and Nicholas, 215. Of special importance here is 
the confusion which may arise concerning the legal use of the word. 
Although it can refer to the delict iniuria, the word itself may also indicate 
the cause of an action when it occurs, as it often does, in the ablative case. 
Thus Frier, passim, standardly translates its frequent occurrence in the lex 
Aquilia as "wrongfully." In the De Ira, Seneca's discussion pertains to the 
delict, as examples to follow will clearly show. Justinian, Inst. 4.3 and 4.4 
highlight the distinction. 
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briefly summarizes, iniuria "included not merely physical assaults and 
oral or written insults and abuse, but any affront to another's dignity or 
reputation and any disregard of another's public or private rights, provided 
always that the act was done wilfully and with contumelious intent. "107 
Thus, physical assault and personal affront or insult were the central 
offenses which the framers of the Twelve Tables intended to address; these 
at least were the broad categories under which the various violations of 
the delict fell. 108 
These two rather expansive divisions eventually subsumed an ever 
wider range of behaviors to which iniuria could apply .109 Aside from the 
practical difficulties produced by the crowdedswollen fora to which Seneca 
testifies, the extended scope of the delict obscures a more basic issue 
regarding the law of delicts and iniuria in particular .110 Modern 
107Nicholas, 216. 
108W armington, 4 7 5-77. 
1~rier, 177, and Nicholas, 216-17, refer briefly to this historical 
development, whose course, as noted by Berger, 502, was shaped by the 
praetorian edict, the lex Cornelia de iniuriis of 81 B.C., and the imperial 
constitutions. Of these, the praetorian edict was perhaps the most 
influential factor in determining what could be considered a violation of 
the delict. Nicholas, 216, carefully examines the expanded role of the 
praetor--established by the lex Aebutia during the second century B.C.--to 
decide actionable offenses. As a force and influence on the prevailing legal 
view on iniuria in Seneca's time, the latitude of interpretation granted the 
praetor cannot be underestimated. 
110See 11.9.4 on Seneca's view of the courts. 
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scholars have noted that the Roman law of delict possessed aspects 
common to both modern criminal law and tort law; the sanctions imposed 
were of a punitive as well as a compensatory nature.111 Although both 
aspects are of interest, the punitive element is more relevant and 
remarkable for legal historians, since it represents the survival of a 
primitive means and ultimately a system or method of redressing 
grievances; the penal nature of delictal actions preserves the principle of 
self-help or vengeance.112 Seneca was himself well aware of the 
vindictive quality of actions for delict, especially iniuria, and he recognized 
a vital connection between the vice of anger and its legitimization or 
encouragement through the most socially acceptable of means--the courts. 
From the very beginning of the De Ira, the legal terms employed are 
unmistakable evidence that Seneca's endeavor is not merely a treatment 
of anger, but of the delict iniuria as well. The legal sense of his definition 
of anger as "cupiditatem ... poenae exigendae" (the desire for exacting 
punishment) (I.3.2) has already been noted, yet this is one instance of 
many where Seneca's expression gains point once given a definite legal 
111Nicholas, 207-8, and Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative 




interpretation rather than an indefinite or general meaning.113 
Variations of this phrase regularly occur in the De Ira, all of which convey 
the notion of penalty as phrased by the Roman jurists.114 Seneca thus 
connects anger to the punitive or vindictive character of the law of delicts, 
as is clear in the first section of the first book: 
... armorum, sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana 
furens cupiditate, dum alteri noceat sui neglegens, 
in ipsa irruens tela et ultionis secum ultorem 
tracturae avidus. 
(1.1.1) 
( ... raging with a most inhuman desire for weapons, 
blood, and punishments, indifferent to itself pro-
vided it can injure another, hurling itself even at 
weapons and avid for revenge even at the cost of 
self as avenger.)115 
Supplicium (punishment), ultio (revenge), and ultor (avenger) are 
prominent in the passage. As the final element of Seneca's asyndeton, 
supplicium (punishment) is highlighted and serves as the genus under 
which armorum (weapons) and sanguinis (blood) are to be included as 
species. Although supplicium denotes punishment in the lexica, it is 
113See Chap. 1, 40-42. 
1140LD, entries la and 2. 
115Cf. the relentless call for revenge by the furies at the opening of 
Seneca's Thyestes. 
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typically applied as a stronger form of poena.116 Both its inclusion and 
position in the series indicate this. Supplicium often specifies retribution 
of a physical nature, especially execution, which accounts for its placement 
subsequent to armorum (weapons) and sanguinis (blood).117 But Seneca's 
reference to ultio (revenge) is no less consequential, for it associates the 
ideas of punishment exacted by law with revenge as a motive.118 
More significant, however, is the progression of thought whereby 
Seneca introduces these terms. Instead of responding immediately to his 
brother's query, he shifts to a denunciation of anger which concludes with 
an exaggerated and grotesque portrait: 
... nam ut furentium certa indicia sunt audax et 
minax vultus, tristis frons, torva facies, cita-
tus gradus, inquietae manus, color versus, crebra 
et vehementius acta suspiria, ita irascentium ea-
dem signa sunt: flagrant ac micant oculi, multus 
ore toto rubor ex aestuante ab imis praecordiis 
sanguine, labra quatiuntur, dentes comprimuntur, 
horrent ac surriguntur capilli, spiritus coactus 
ac stridens, articulorum se ipsos torquentium so-
nus, gemitus mugitusque et parum explanatis voci-
bus sermo praeruptus et conplosae saepius manus 
et pulsata humus pedibus et totum concitum corpus .... 
1160LD, entries 3a and b. 
117Ibid. 
118Berger, 633, highlights this, as does Nicholas, 207. 
( ... for as the marks of the mad are certain--a bold 
and threatening mien, a gloomy brow, a fierce ex-
pression, a hurried step, restless hands, an alter-
ed complexion, a quick and more violent breathing--
so likewise are the marks of the angry man; his 
eyes blaze and sparkle, his whole face is crimson 
with the blood that surges from the lowest depths 
of the heart, his lips quiver, his teeth are clenched, 
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(1.1.3-4)119 
his hair bristles and stands on end, his breathing is 
forced and harsh, his joints crack from writhing, he 
groans and bellows, bursts out into speech with scarce-
ly intelligible words, strikes his hands together con-
tinually, and stamps the ground with his feet; his 
whole body is excited .... ) 
Such an elaborate display at bottom evades the problem N ovatus has 
raised: "quemadmodum posset ira leniri" (in what way anger can be 
diminished). Seneca's digression is not essential to formulating a 
philosophical position, but quite material to a satiric programme.120 
Although he will ultimately answer the question, Seneca must first 
119Dorothy May Paschall, "The Vocabulary of Mental Aberration in 
Roman Comedy and Petronius," Language 15, supplement (Jan.- March, 
1939): 39-45, discusses furere and its derivatives as the terms of choice in 
the law books and the jurists to describe violence in feelings and actions. 
Seneca's list as much resembles a collection of diagnostic signs or 
symptoms as a description of the physiological manifestations of anger. 
Busa and Zampolli, 511-12, list twenty-one cases of furere and its cognates 
in the De Ira. Seneca often employs the term in the same sense in the 
plays. Cf. Phaedra 711 and 937, or Medea 673. 
120Seneca artfully weaves a tapestry depicting the ugliness of ira in 
order to graphically represent its undesirability. Highet, 242, refers to 
this feature of satire as the satirist's paradoxical "aesthetic." See above, 
Chap. 1, 29, on digression as a satiric technique. 
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achieve other ends; anger must appear indefensible and its relationship to 
the delict iniuria must be elucidated. 
In the opening chapter he begins both projects; the hideous vision of 
the angry man renders anger too repulsive to defend, whereas the 
introduction of supplicium (punishment) and ultio (revenge) are indications 
to Novatus that Roman law will be indispensable to Seneca's plan. 
References to the legal underpinnings of ira, however, do not cease with 
mere mention of these two terms; the chapter also contains an extensive 
estimation of the personal consequences of anger, which implies a legal 
background and significance not immediately noticeable . 
... aeque enim impotens sui est, decoris oblita, 
necessitudinum immemor, in quod coepit pertinax 
et intenta, rationi consiliisque praeclusa, van-
is agitata causis, ad dispectum aequi verique 
inhabilis, ruinis simillima quae super id quod 
oppressere franguntur. 
(1.1.2) 
( ... for it is equally devoid of self-control, for-
getful of decency, unmindful of ties, persistent 
and diligent in whatever it begins, closed to rea-
son and counsel, excited by groundless cases, un-
fit to discern the equitable and true, most akin 
to ruins which themselves break on what they crush.) 
All of these effects in themselves possess a superficially universal 
applicability; they could conceivably pertain to anyone overtaken by ira. 
Seneca's addressee, however, was known to have been a Roman 
magistrate, to have presided over the courts, and, given the legal emphasis 
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of Roman education among the upper stratum of society, to have had 
exceptional legal expertise.121 The opening request of N ovatus may have 
been an artistic convention; in any case, his official capacity enjoys 
historical evidence.122 As such, the importance of N ovatus as addressee 
is paramount with respect to the above passage and others in the De 
lra.123 
If the results of ira which Seneca lists are broadly pertinent, their 
presence in a state or judicial functionary is yet more noteworthy, as are 
its consequences. More to the point, the vocabulary Seneca has chosen 
suggests that judicial conduct is precisely his interest; in the context of 
ordinary usage his terms will not bear close inspection. Seneca's brief 
catalogue is of minimal relevance for the slave or freedman, although the 
Stoic moral stance toward ira it represents would be no less personally 
beneficial.124 Civic neglect perhaps best summarizes the sequence. "Sui 
121See above, Chap. 1, n. 78, on the career of Novatus. 
1221bid. 
123Griffin, 9, remarks on Seneca's "frequent emphasis on aspects of 
behaviour that are not strictly private," such as "anger in a judge or a 
princeps," and she notes also that Seneca "chose to address these 
discussions to men engaged in public affairs," including Novatus. 
124Sandbach, 43, surveys various of the Stoic paradoxes, particularly 
the kingship enjoyed by the slave who is master of his own thoughts. 
Strictly speaking, the passage conforms closely with Stoic ethics, as the 
emphasis on self-mastery and reason indicates. For more detailed 
discussion of these two principles within the Stoic system, see Sandbach, 
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impotens" (powerless over oneself) and its opposite, sui potens (self-
controlled), recall the legal phrase sui iuris (in one's own power), which 
meant possession of the full rights and privileges of Roman 
citizenship.125 To be sure, decor (propriety) and necessitudo (obligation), 
although civic ideals, are hardly expected of the general populace in any 
age. 126 Yet the insertion of "rationi consiliisque praeclusa" (closed to 
reason and counsel) and "vanis agitata causis" (excited by groundless cases) 
reveals Seneca's intent as well as his intended audience. Despite the 
generic "reason" and "counsel" afforded the terms, neither ratio nor 
consilium have an integral function in the daily routine of the potter, the 
weaver, the baker, or cook.127 Nor is it debilitating that such folk are 
28-68. 
125As Seneca uses sui impotens, it is synonomous with the "brevem 
insaniam" (temporary madness) he has just mentioned. OLD, entry 2b, 
gives "out of one's mind, deranged" as the sense, whereas sui potens (OLD, 
entry 2) means "one's own master." Sui iuris describes the legal authority 
or potestas of the Roman paterfamilias. See Nicholas, 67-8. 
126For the respective meanings of decor and necessitudo, see OLD, entry 
3, and OLD, entries 1 and 3. 
127 Although ratio has a broad range of possible meanings, OLD, entry 
7a, gives the most comprehensive sense. Generally speaking, however, 
Seneca seems to be using it as an "umbrella" term to denote the entire 
range of mental activities which the word can describe, such as any 
calculation (OLD, entry 1), estimate of proportion (OLD, entry 3), or 
scheme of action (OLD, entry 10). Consilium, whose prefix alone would 
point to a collective undertaking, often refers to a deliberative or advisory 
body (OLD, entry 3a). Even more specifically, consilium refers to an 
official group, such as a council of state, a senate, or jury (OLD, entries 3b 
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"ad dispectum aequi verique inhabilis" (incapable of discerning the just and 
true). In fact "vanis agitata causis" is perfectly straightforward legalese 
for "excited by groundless cases" no less than "excited by trifling causes." 
Thus, the legal bias of the entire sequence becomes conspicuous, and 
Seneca's choice of ira as motif emerges as a specialized and individually 
tailored legal reply to a Roman magistrate. Restraint, propriety, a sense 
of obligation, flexibility, amenability to counsel, resistance to frivolous 
suits, and recognition of what is fair and factual all comprise a set of ideal 
criteria of little significance unless for someone entrusted with judicial 
authority. 128 Seneca's brother and addressee was unmistakably such a 
figure. 
Seneca becomes much more legally explicit in the following chapter, 
a prolonged and rhetorically intricate survey of the civic as well as the 
general consequences of ira which foreshadows his later diatribe on the 
courts and fuses the language of the law with satiric hyperbole.129 
and c). If Seneca uses consilium to qualify ratio, he hardly had the slave 
or freedman in mind. 
128James Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 31-
68 and 102-117, surveys a number of improper influences in the conduct 
of litigation and the problem of "the misbehaving judge." As a suggested 
ideal, Kelly quotes Cicero Pro Caecina, 71 ff.: "Quod enim est ius civile? 
quod neque inflecti gratia neque perfringi potentia neque adulterari pecunia 
poss it ... " In the context of the present study, Seneca adds ira to the list. 
129II. 7 -9 covers the diatribe. 
lam vero si eff ectus ei us damnague intueri velis, 
nulla pestis humano generi pluris stetit. Vide-
bis caedes et venena et reorum mutuas sordes et 
urbium clades et totarum exitia gentium et prin-
cipum sub civili hasta capita venalia et subiec-
tas tectis faces nee intra moenia coercitos ignes 
sed ingentia spatia regiorum hostili flamma re-
lucentia. Aspice nobilissimarum civitatum funda-
menta vix notabilia: has ira deiecit. Aspice soli-
tudines per multa milia sine habitatore desertas: 
has ira exhausit. Aspice tot memoriae proditos 
duces mali exempla fati: alium ira in cubili suo 
confodit, alium intra sacra mensae iura percussit, 
alium intra leges celebrisque spectaculum fori 
lancinavit, alium filii parricidio dare sanguinem 
iussit, alium servili manu regalem aperire iugu-
lum, alium in cruce membra diffindere. Et adhuc 
singulorum supplicia narro .... 
(1.2.1-3) 
( ... moreover, if you choose to inspect its results 
and legal penalties, no plague has cost the human race 
more. You will see murder and poisoning, the vile 
countercharges of defendants, the downfall of cities 
and whole nations given to destruction, heads of 
state sold at public auction, houses put to the 
torch, and conflagration that halts not within the 
city-walls, but makes great stretches of the coun-
try glow with hostile flame. Behold the most glo-
rious cities whose foundations can scarcely be 
traced--anger cast them down. Behold solitudes 
stretching for many miles without a single dweller--
anger laid them waste. Behold all the leaders who 
have been handed down to posterity as instances of 
an evil fate--anger stabbed this one in his bed, 
struck down this one amid the sanctities of the 
feast, tore this one to pieces in the very home of 
the law and in full view of the crowded forum, 
forced this one to have his blood spilled by the 
murderous act of his son, another to have his royal 
throat cut by the hand of a slave, another to have 
his limbs stretched upon the cross. And hitherto I 
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have mentioned the sufferings of individual persons 
only .... ) 
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After a lengthy display of the physiological manifestations of ira, Seneca 
reverts to this equally satiric account of its toll in as acerbic a panorama 
as can be found later in Juvenal.130 The damages caused by anger 
narrow from the miscellaneous "effectus" (results) to the more exclusive 
"damna," a term which, along with its frequently found causative 
damnare, denotes personal or financial loss as a sequel to unlawfulness, 
or the restitution levied as compensation for loss.131 In either case, the 
legal sense is evident; the subject of the section is the extreme criminal 
extent to which ira can proceed, and is conveyed in legal terms N ovatus 
would instantly recognize. 
Seneca begins with caedes, the comprehensive term for murder, then 
proceeds to a litany of specific types whose cumulative effect is enhanced 
by the lengthy polysyndeton and then, in contrast, the anaphoric use of 
aspice, has, and alium. 132 The rhetorical result is that of a relentless 
climax of innumerable examples of homicide and general destruction. But 
130 Juvenal Saturae X, 54-73 closely echoes the tone of the passage. 
William S. Anderson, Essays on Roman Satire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 293-314, provides lengthy treatment of the 
similarities of spirit between the De Ira and sections of Juvenal's satires. 
131See OLD, entries 1and4, s.v. damnum. Berger, 424, supplies some 
detail, and Nicholas, 218-22, still more. 
132For caedes, see OLD, entry 1. 
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Seneca reduces the focus further; murder in its various manifestations 
requires mention of person and place, since Roman law distinguishes the 
degree and severity of many offenses, including murder, on this basis.133 
Thus, the location advances from the private sphere to the public domain, 
from the cubile (bedroom) to the mensa (dinner table) to the forum (court); 
family murder progresses to the assassination of royalty by a slave, from 
parricidium to servili manu regalem. In a brief survey Seneca has 
recounted the direst outcomes of ira in terms consistent with the specifics 
of Roman statute.134 The chapter concludes, however, by Seneca 
reverting to his first association between ira and iniuria. 
Unfortunately, our manuscripts are defective at this point, and a 
section of the text is missing; when it resumes, Seneca has shifted from 
diatribe to dialogue (or satiric monologue) prior to the initial objection of 
the adversarius that ira does not issue from iniuria.135 But Seneca must 
first introduce the concept of iniuria into the argument. 
133Seneca's use of percutere (OLD, entries 1 and 2: "to land a blow; 
deliver a mortal blow") and his mention of spectaculum fori in a similar 
context would automatically imply violations of iniuria and atrox 
(aggravated) iniuria. See Gaius, Inst. 3.220 and 3.224-5. Digest 48.8, on 
the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficiis, provides an overview of the 
distinctions made as to degree and severity with regard to murder. 
134Ibid. 
135Reynolds, 41, offers a brief commentary on the MSS. problem and a 
survey of scholarly conjecture on the content of a missing portion of the 
text. Basore, 110, estimates the loss as a leaf or more of the MS. 
Quid? Gladiatoribus guare populus irascitur et 
tam inigue, ut iniuriam putet, quod non liben-
ter pereunt? Contemni se iudicat et vultu, 
gestu, ardore a spectatore in adversari um verti-
tur. 
(1.2.4) 
(Why? Why are the people angered with gladiators, 
and so unjustly as to deem it an offence that 
they are not glad to die? They consider them-
selves affronted, and from mere spectators trans-
form themselves into enemies, in looks, in ges-
ture, and in violence.) 
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This earliest reference to iniuria, although not made in the context of an 
official judicial setting, mirrors a court proceeding complete with jury 
(populus) and two adversaries (gladiatoribus). 136 At the same time 
"contemni se iudicat" (The people consider themselves affronted) 
establishes that the judge and jury are identical, since iudicat is cognate 
with iudex (judge). Seneca might have used a non-legal vocabulary in 
describing the games, but he chooses a number of standard legal terms 
which culminate with adversarium, the term which completes the extended 
legal metaphor .137 The point, however, is clear; anger assumes every 
136Seneca's use of legal metaphor here to suggest a trial setting is by 
no means idiosyncratic to this passage. For additional examples, see 
below, Chap. 3, passim. 
137The blurring of roles between plaintiff (populus) and judge (iudex) is 
common in Seneca's exempla, and points to a corrupt process he closely 
identifies with the dynamics of ira at 11.1. For the legal sense of 
adversarius, see OLD, entry 3. 
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judicial role but that of defendant; plaintiff, judge, and jury are self-
appointed. Likewise, contemni (affronted) possesses a sense which typifies 
the very substance of the delict iniuria: contempt in word or action, scorn, 
. It 13s or insu . 
Anger, then, creates its own court, a phenomenon which Seneca will 
attend to in greater detail later in the De Ira.139 In the preceeding 
passage Seneca plainly examines ira within the framework of legal 
metaphor in the aftermath of two sections in which Roman law has been 
either directly cited or at least suggested by his selection of terms. 
However the first citation of iniuria as opposed to ira occurs during the 
description of an ordinary Roman social event--the games. The reluctance 
of a gladiator to die did not constitute iniuria by law, but the inference of 
effrontery by the spectators does disclose a principal feature of ira: the 
presumption that its occasion necessarily conveys a willful and intentional 
insult or attack.140 The gladiators no more mock the crowd than the 
ground insults a child who has fallen on it. Nonetheless, Seneca says, 
... sed tantum irascuntur, sine causa et sine in-
i uria, non tamen sine aliqua ini uriae specie nee 
sine aliqua poenae cupiditate. Del uduntur itaque 
imitatione plagarum et simulatis deprecantium la-
138See Chap. 1, 42-45. 
139III.14-21 are of special relevance here. 
140Digest 47.10.3. Cf. 11.26. in the De Ira. 
crimis placantur et f alsa ultione falsus dolor 
tollitur. 
(I.2.5) 
( ... but they are merely angry, without any case 
and without being injured, though not without 
some appearance of injury and not without some 
desire of exacting punishment. And so they are 
deceived by imaginary blows and are pacified by 
the pretended tears of those who beg forgiveness, 
and mock resentment is removed by mock revenge. 
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Seneca stresses the absence of any causa (case) given the absence of 
iniuria; ira, however, is present, as are "poena,e cupiditate" (desire for 
punishment) and "ultio" (revenge), concepts already discussed in relation 
to anger.141 More important still, he clearly demonstrates the lack of a 
necessary connection between anger on the one hand and an iniuria,e causa 
(case of injury) on the other, a lack which he repeatedly emphasizes.142 
Furthermore, Seneca links the poor sense of restraint inherent in the 
anger of children and of devotees of gladiatorial combat, figures whose 
judgment, situation, and reliability are questionable at best. 143 
141See Chap. 1. 
142See especially 11.22-28. 
143The element of play is prominent for both children and spectators at 
games. At best there is confusion between what ought or ought not to be 
taken seriously or considered offensive; at worst there is a truly pernicious 
inability to distinguish between a disappointment and an affront or injury. 
Most of Seneca's examples of irate rulers in book three are models of 
childishness, and he belabors the importance of restraint in childhood at 
II. 19-21. 
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Whereas Seneca explicitly mentions iniuria with regularity in the 
De Ira, implicit references to the delict are more common, and 
understandably so--the terminology as well as the facts itemized in various 
exempla, although unfamiliar to the reader unacquainted with Roman 
legal vocabulary and practice, would be eminently recognizable to N ovatus 
or any other educated Roman.144 Here percussit (to land a blow, strike, 
or hit), for example, would ipso facto imply the delict iniuria, as would 
plagarum, denoting the blows or wounds of which the verb percussit 
implies.145 But these are only two such terms; many more occur in the 
course of the work which convey Seneca's deliberate effort to sustain 
iniuria as a fixed and recurrent element of the discussion. 146 Yet finally, 
Seneca's appeal for personal restraint and, conversely, his criticism of its 
absence in the unrestrained, require persuasive illustrations if the 
exposure and reform of wrongdoing--two of the most important features of 
satire--are to succeed. The various anecdotes which Seneca supplies are 
forceful examples of how a man who avoids ira can avoid suffering iniuria 
144H.I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George 
Lamb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 287-91, examines 
the status and importance of law in Roman education. In light of this 
alone, there would be no need for Seneca to explain common legal 
references; particularly in the case of his brother. See Chap. 1, n. 78. 
145For both terms, see OLD, entry 1, and Gaius, Inst. 3.220. 
146See Appendix. 
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as well. Both the vice and the delict are undesireable, and the elimination 
of one largely eliminates the other. As the title would indicate, anger is 
the stated subject; yet Seneca's preoccupation with iniuria provides 
compelling evidence that this is too simple or partial a conclusion. Two 
other explanations are possible, however: perhaps the Roman law of delict 
is a hidden agenda of Seneca's; or perhaps, too, the long obsolescence of 
Roman legal vocabulary has obscured characteristics of the De Ira that 
would have been obvious in their own day. 
The language of actions for delict consists of a limited number of key 
terms which encompass the behaviors recognized as offensive to either the 
person or personality.147 And just as with Seneca's catalogue of 
examples for caedes (murder), the severity of iniuria was dependent not 
only on the fact (ex facto), but the status of the person violated (ex persona), 
as well as the location of the violation (ex loco).148 In addition to 
percutere(to land a blow) andplagae (blows), contumelia(insult), convicium 
(public abuse), infamare (to bring into ill repute), carmen malum (malicious 
song or poem), libellus famosus (defamatory pamphlet), os fractum (broken 
bone), membrum ruptum (severed limb), occentare (to cast a spell), 
147Berger, 502, gives a basic list drawn from the primary sources, the 
most important of which are Digest 47.10, Gaius, Inst. 3.220-25, and 
Justinian, Inst. 4.4. 
148Ibid. 
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theatrum (abuse at a public event), and atrox (aggravated) or atrocitas 
(severity) are some of the principal terms or phrases which accompany the 
occurrence of iniuria; they appear formally as such throughout, or Seneca's 
exempla imply their legal applicability .149 Once Seneca demonstrates 
the relationship between Roman law, delict, iniuria and ira, he can then 
proceed to answer Novatus' question, "quemadmodum posset ira leniri" 
(how anger may be allayed), but only in the course of providing 
illustrations where instances of ira and iniuria are practically 
equivalent.150 
At nearly the midpoint of the second book Seneca's interlocutor asks: 
Quid ergo? Non incidunt causae quae iram 
lacessant? 
11.14.2 
(What then? Don't cases occur which provoke anger?) 
Causae (cases), were it not for Seneca's efforts to emphasize its legal 
associations, would apparently possess a general meaning, such as the 
149The anecdote about Cato being struck in the public bath at 11.32 is 
perhaps the model case. Seneca uses both percutere (to land a blow) and 
iniuria to describe the incident, yet implies the atrocitas (severity) which 
also results because of the status of the victim. The list is taken from 
Berger, 502. 
150Seneca concentrates a number of such examples at 111.14-21. 
78 
usual "causes" or "grounds."151 Yet after a brief analogy in which 
Seneca suggests that anger must be opposed as an athlete would skillfully 
approach an opponent, he begins a segment which leaves no doubt that 
causae signifies legal cases, and that ira and iniuria are closely 
intertwined. 
Saepe itaque ratio patientiam suadet, ira 
vindictam, et qui primis defungi malis potui-
mus, in maiora devolvimur. Quosdam unius 
verbi contumelia non aequo animo lata in ex-
ilium proiecit, et qui levem iniuriam silentio 
ferre noluerant gravissimis malis obruti sunt, 
indignatique aliquid ex plenissima libertate 
deminui servile in sese adtraxerunt iugum. 
(11.14.3-4) 
(Often, therefore, reason counsels patience, 
but anger revenge, and when we have been able 
to escape our first misfortunes, we are plunged 
into greater ones. Some have been cast into 
exile because they could not bear calmly one 
insulting word, and those who had refused to 
bear in silence a slight injury have been crush-
ed with the severest misfortunes, and, indignant 
at any diminution of the fullest liberty, have 
brought upon themselves the yoke of slavery.) 
The passage combines five notable terms: ira (anger), vindictam (revenge), 
contumelia (insult), iniuriam (injury), and indignati (affronted or 
indignant). Whatever the circumstances, Seneca bluntly asserts the 
151See OLD, entries 5, 6, and 14. A preference for the less common 
meaning is a surprising feature of the standard translation and 
commentaries, since the initial entry in the OLD and the most obvious 
sense of the word indicates "judicial proceedings, a legal case, trial." 
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potential misfortune, including exile, which may result from the 
presumption of insult. But the arrangement of the terms is yet more 
noteworthy; ira leads to vindictam (revenge), then contumelia, which in 
turn implies iniuria and indignati (affronted).152 Seneca has mapped a 
psychological process: anger insists on revenge, having assumed a verbal 
affront which is legally actionable as a consequence of the indignity. At 
the same time a new term appears. Contumelia, which normally denotes 
insulting language or behavior, is a species of the delict iniuria. 153 A 
stronger case can now be made that Seneca's proposed use of iniuria is 
unequivocally legal. 
The topic of insult arises again in the De Ira several chapters later, 
but this time with reference to the original query of N ovatus, which 
Seneca finally undertakes to answer. As he says, 
Quoniam quae de ira quaeruntur tractavimus, 
accedamus ad remedia eius. Duo autem, ut 
opinor, sunt: ne incidamus in iram et ne in 
ira peccemus. 
(11.18.1) 
(Having dealt with the questions that arise 
concerning anger, let us now pass to the con-
sideration of its remedies. In my opinion, 
however, there are but two rules--not to fall 
152For the significance of dignitas, see above, Chap. 1, 44-48. 
153Justinian, Inst. 4.4. 
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into anger, and in anger to do no wrong.)154 
Seneca's first precept ultimately requires him to discuss in full detail the 
origins of habitual anger and the role of early education in the extirpation 
of ira. He thus proceeds from the unbridled expression of anger in 
children to its most likely manifestation in adult society: among the 
wealthy, the nobility, and, most especially, the magistrates. 
Non resistet off ensis cui nihil umquam ne-
gatum est, cuius lacrimas sollicita semper 
mater abstersit, cui paedagogo satisfactum 
est. Non vi des ut maiorem quamquam fortunam 
maior ira comitetur? In divitibus et nobil-
ibus et magistratibus praecipue apparet, cum 
quidquid leve et inane in animo erat secunda 
se aura sustulit. Felicitas iracundiam nutrit, 
ubi aures superbas adsentorum turba circum-
stetit: "Tibi enim ille respondeat? non pro 
fastigio te tuo metiris; ipse te proicis .... " 
(11.21.6-7) 
(He will not withstand rebuffs who has never 
been denied anything, whose tears have always 
been wiped away by an anxious mother, who has 
been allowed to have his own way with his 
tutor. Do you not observe that with each ad-
vancing grade of fortune there goes the greater 
tendency to anger? It is especially apparent 
in the rich, in nobles, and in magistrates when 
all that was light and trivial in their mind 
soars aloft upon the breeze of good fortune. 
Prosperity fosters wrath when the crowd of 
flatterers, gathered round, whispers to the 
proud ear: "What, should that man answer you 
back? Your estimate of yourself does not cor-
154For the legal sense of remedium, see Digest 12.6.23.1. 
respond with your importance; you demean your-
self.") 
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Seneca here supplies as concise a formula for the care and maintenance of 
an uncontrolled temper as can be found in the De Ira: indulge the child 
and you must cajole the adult. Yet the deterrence of ira is implicit in the 
passage as well; thwarted whims and fair criticism are the correctives for 
indulgence and flattery. The passage is remarkable for other reasons also; 
the nature of iniuria is implied by the "offensis" (offenses or affronts) 
which neither the pampered child nor the scions of wealth and position can 
tolerate, with an intimation that the latter are merely variations of the 
former.1155 The "adsentorum turba" (crowd of sycophants) simply 
perpetuates the roles of permissive "mater" (mother) and "paedagogus" 
(guardian); an enfant terrible is father of the man who, as noble or 
magistrate, will interpret his own ira as evidence that he has actually 
suffered an iniuria. 
Seneca's polysyndeton--"divitibus et nobilibus et magistratibus" (the 
wealthy, the nobility, and the magistrates)--aptly concludes with those for 
1550ffensum is generally synonomous with terms more commonly used 
in the legal sense to denote actions which constitute iniuria. Thus, offendo 
(OLD, entry ld) means "to deal (someone) a blow, strike," and is often 
equivalent to percutere (Gaius, Inst. 3.220); but it also has the general 
sense of giving offense (OLD, entry 7). The noun offensum (OLD, entry 4a) 
signifies an "offense committed against a person, injury, wrong." Both 
words occur regularly in the De Ira. See Busa and Zampolli, 916. 
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whom it was crucial to distinguish actionable offenses from diffuse and 
opaque expressions of personal pique. That judicial conduct is the 
centerpiece of the discussion becomes plain in the very next chapter, which 
is reminiscent of the initial chapter of the De Ira.156 Anger in the face 
of iniuria has a twofold significance for judicial conduct; the Roman 
magistrate must not only be able to differentiate between delict and 
personal sentiment, but must also contend with a difficult separation 
between his own passions at times at odds with legal precedent or 
impartial judgment.157 Seneca fully realized these potential conflicts and 
in the following passages subscribes to an ideal of jurisprudence in the 
fullest sense of the term. 
Contra primas itaque causas pugnare debemus. 
Causa autem iracundiae opinio iniuriae est, 
cui non facile credendum est. Ne apertis qui-
dem manifestisque statim accedendum; quaedam 
enim falsa veri speciem ferunt. 
(11.22.2) 
(We ought, therefore, to take our stand at the 
156At 11.22 Seneca clearly proposesjudicial restraint and appeals to the 
need for vigilance when passing judgment or exacting penalties. See 
below, Chap. 3, for a detailed examination of this passage. 
157Kelly, 102-103, elaborates on what Berger, 502, lists as iniuria 
iudicis, and refers to Ul pi an' s definition (Digest 4 7 .10.1.1): "iniquitas ... cum 
quis inique vel iniuste sententiam dixit, iniuriam ex eo dictam, quod iure 
et iustitia caret." A significant portion of the De Ira is devoted to the 
problem of anger as it relates to judicial conduct. See below, Chap. 3, 
passim. 
start of the case. Now the judgment of injury 
is a cause of anger, and to this we should not 
easily give credence. We ought not agree to it 
quickly even by open and evident acts; for some 
things are false that have the appearance of 
truth.) 
Ne sint aures criminantibus faciles; hoc humanae 
naturae vitium suspectum notumgue nobis sit, 
quod, quae inviti audimus, libenter credimus et, 
anteguam iudicemus, irascimur. Quid, quod non 
criminantibus tantum, sed suspicionibus impelli-
mur et ex vultu risuque alieno peiora interpre-
tati innocentibus irascimur? Itaque agenda est 
contra se causa absentis et in suspenso ira re-
tinenda; potest enim poena dilata exigi, non 
potest exacta revocari. 
(11.22.3-4) 
(Let us not give ready ear to accusers; this 
weakness of human nature we ought to note and 
mistrust--we are glad to believe what we un-
willingly hear, and we become angry before we 
pass judgment. And what is to be said when we 
are compelled, not merely by charges, but by 
bare suspicions, and having put the worse in-
terpretation on another's look or smile, become 
angry at innocent men? Therefore we should 
plead the case of the absent person against our-
selves, and anger should be held in abeyance; 
for punishment postponed can still be exacted, 
but once exacted it cannot be recalled.) 
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However much these passages hold true in general, the legal tenor 
focusses their point: the recommendation of principles appropriate to a 
Roman magistrate entrusted with dispensing justice. Opinio (legal 
opinion), iniuriae (injuries), manifestis (plain or clear cut), criminantibus 
(those who make accusations), iudicemus (we judge), agere causam (to plead 
84 
a case), and poena exigi (punishment or a penalty enforced or exacted) 
patently suggest a trial setting and, more precisely, the delict iniuria. 
None of the above terms would have been germane to the ordinary Roman 
with no occasion to evaluate the legitimacy of cases, act as judge, or 
postpone a penalty; all require familiarity with the technical vocabulary 
of the law .158 
Nonetheless, the principal terms which signify delictal action and 
the exempla which illustrate causae iniuriae continue to appear in the De 
Ira; their presence passes unnoticed by commentators and their possible 
importance to Seneca's design escapes detection. The legal expertise of 
Novatus could easily allow Seneca to admit legal terms into his own 
vocabulary, as is apparent in the following passage, a censure of anger at 
the most trivial and commonplace of daily events. 
Quid est enim cur tussis alicuius aut sternu-
tamentum aut musca parum curiose fugata in 
rabiem agat aut observatus canis aut clavis 
neglegentis servi manibus elapsa? Feret iste 
aequo animo civile convicium et ingesta in 
contione curiave maledicta cuius aures tracti 
subselli stridor offendit? 
(11.25.3-4) 
(For why is it that we are thrown into a rage 
by somebody's cough or sneeze, by negligence 
158The opening of Paul's Epistle to the Romans appears, however, to 
assume a general acquaintance with law on the part of his first century 
audience. 
in chasing a fly away, by a dog's hanging 
around, or by the dropping of a key that has 
slipped from the hands of a careless servant? 
The poor wretch whose ears are hurt by the 
grating of a bench dragged across the floor--
will he be able to bear public insult and the 
verbal abuse incurred in the assembly or in the 
senate house with equanimity? 
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Several cardinal features of satire characterize this passage. Seneca's 
mockery of impatience works largely by exaggerating the sensitivity of the 
impatient man in the face of even the most minor of annoyances; 
conversely, restraint is attractive by comparison, although Seneca only 
suggests by implication here what he explicitly urges elsewhere--the effort 
to curb ira. 
While recommending legal restraint, however, Seneca also continues 
to sustain the connection between ira and iniuria in the passage. The 
abrupt contrast between trivialities and public insults is a curious strategy 
which performs a twofold purpose. Certainly petty disturbances--dogs, 
coughs, and sneezes--are no match for the real wounds inflicted publicly by 
verbal or physical assault. Seneca's apparent intent is to note this 
disparity; yet convicium (public insult) and maledicta (general verbal 
abuse) distantly resemble the irritants among which they are included. 
Whatever the apparent differences, all the instances listed belong to the 
same category: they are occasions conducive to ira. The contrast Seneca 
provides serves merely to mark degrees of difference within a single 
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category. But regardless of severity, Seneca advises personal restraint. 
Another distinction is present in the passage, however; convicium and 
maledicta observe a legal sense both overlooked and lost in translation; 
and both are varieties of iniuria. The future tense of feret (endure) which 
introduces the question beginning the passage suggests convicium and 
maledicta can and should be endured, a position consistent with Seneca's 
attitude toward other cases of the delict cited in the De Ira.159 If only 
because they contribute to the denunciation of iniuria as a legitimized 
pretext for anger, each term warrants more detailed analysis. 
In summarizing the circumstances which may contribute to anger, 
Seneca highlights extremes; the pesky fly or fallen key are as venial as 
convicium (public insult) or maledicta (insults) are serious and legally 
relevant. 160 However, another contrast is plain: the latter represent 
159See especially III. 22-29, where Seneca holds up Antigonus, Philip, 
and Augustus as models for emulation. 
160Seneca plainly implies that there is a difference between slaves 
dropping keys and members of the assembly dropping insults. As at 11.6.4, 
where Seneca comments that all delicts are not equal, the thought runs 
counter to the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. Furthermore, Seneca 
seems to shun the absolutism (or reductionism) of Stoic predecessors here 
in favor of the satirist Horace, whose remarks at Sermones 1.3.76-83 
become all the more significant in that they refer to ira: 
Denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae, 
cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non 
ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res 
ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet? 
si quis eum servum, patinam qui tollere iussus 
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deliberate expressions of contempt, the former merely involuntary 
"d t 161 occurrences or acc1 en s. Whereas contumelia denotes unspecified 
insult or outrage, maledicta broadly implies all delictal violations of a 
verbal nature, however severe, and is often cited in conjunction with 
contumelia in the lexica.162 The modern equivalents for various types 
of maledicta such as carmen malum, infamare, or libellus famosus, would 
be libel, defamation of character, or slander.163 Yet, just as Roman law 
differentiated between physical and verbal iniuriae, in the course of 
development it separated private abuse from the public disgrace for which 
convicium is the appropriate category within the more expansive scope of 
maledicta.164 In antiquity as in the modern world simple assault or 
contumelia entailed loss of face or wounded feelings; public abuse 
endangered a most esteemed possession in Roman society, one's dignitas--
semesos piscis tepidumque ligurrierit ius, in 
in cruce suffigat, Labeone insanior inter 
sanos dicatur. 
161See 11.1 and 11.26 on the importance of intentionality and the will. 
His view is consistent with Ulpian's at Digest 47.10.3. pr.-3 
162For both terms, see OLD, entry 1. 
163See Berger, 381, 606, 500, and 562. 
164Convicium as a species of iniuria seems to have been included 
following the expanded authority of the praetor. See Digest 47.10.15.2-3, 
8, 11-12. 
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personal reputation and status.165 In other words, the greater 
consequences of convicium prompted its gravity: personal regard survived 
private affront; it perished with publication of the insult. 
Such exempla reveal a subtlety and sophistication of legal acumen 
which could easily be taken as philosophical unless there is a recognition 
of the language as that of delictal action throughout; at the same time 
Seneca often presents textbook cases without labels to mark his direction, 
a detail not to be overlooked, since overt mention of much legal material 
would be an unnecessary encumbrance for an exchange between men of 
elevated stature and conversant in Roman law.166 The disparity between 
the intentional and accidental in the previous passage is but one instance 
where familiarity with technical stipulations of the law is a prerequisite 
for their interpretation; only the presence of convicium (public abuse) and 
maledicta (insults), the realization of their legal nuance, and analysis 
based on these fortuitous connections let us appreciate Seneca's purpose. 
Were it not for the frequent occurrence of iniuria in the De Ira, it would 
be easy to miss the prominence given both law and satire in the work. Its 
165/nfamia is the social consequence of the loss of dignitas. See Gaius, 
Inst. 3.220; for a brief survey, see Berger, 437. 
166Seneca's historical anecdotes most often double as illustrations of 
iniuria, including the ordinary legal terms associated with the delict. See 
especially ll.32 and III. 14-23. For additional discussion, see below, Chap. 
3. 
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prevalence, however, suggests its importance and forces us to reexamine 
portions of the text for legal connotations hitherto disregarded. 
Since criticism of ira also serves as a criticism of iniuria, Seneca 
delimits occasions of delictal violation, such as conuicium (public abuse), 
from instances where either no technical offense has taken place (a cough, 
sneeze, or dropped key), or from occurrences where some loss has occurred 
which, although conducive to ira, fails to constitute iniuria as an 
actionable offense. As he remarks in a particularly notable chapter, 
Irascimur aut iis a quibus ne accipere potuimus 
iniuriam, aut iis a quibus accipere iniuriam 
potuimus. 
(11.26.1) 
(Our anger is stirred either by those from whom we 
could not have received any injury at all, or by 
those from whom we might have received one.) 
And in what amounts to a broad delineation based on this assertion, 
Seneca proceeds to emphasize a series of unequivocally legal distinctions 
which follow the objection of his opponent that those who have angered us 
have affronted us as well.167 This furnishes Seneca the opportunity for 
a detailed response. 
16711.26-27 chiefly contain differences applicable to legal interpretation 
but can also be understood as philosophical distinctions. Seneca's 
conclusions parallel those in the primary legal sources. See Justinian, 
Ins.t. 4.4 and Digest 47.10.3 pr.-3. The aduersarius places his assertion 
within a legal context at 11.26.3, introducing the word "offendunt," whose 
legal importance has been noted. See above, n. 155. 
Primum saepe antequam hoc apud nos distinguamus 
irascimur. Deinde fortasse ipsi quoque artifices 
excusationes iustas adferent: alius non potuit 
melius facere quam fecit, nee ad tuam contumeliam 
parum didicit; alius non in hoc ut te offenderet 
fecit. Ad ultimum quid est dementius quam bilem 
in homines collectam in res effundere? Atqui ut 
his irasci dementis est quae anima carent, sic 
mutis animalibus, quae nullam iniuriam nobis fac-
i unt, quia velle non possunt; non est enim ini uria 
nisi a consilio profecta. Nocere itaque nobis 
possunt ut ferrum aut lapis, iniuriam quidem facere 
non possunt. Atqui contemni se quidam putant, ubi 
idem equi obsequentes alteri equiti, alteri contuma-
ces sunt, tamquam indicio, non consuetudine et arte 
tractandi quaedam quibusdam subiectiora sint. 
(II.26.2-5) 
(But, in the first place, we often get angry before 
we make this distinction clear to our minds; in the 
second place, perhaps also the doers themselves will 
have reasonable excuses to offer: this one could not 
do better [work] than he did, and it was not an in-
sult to you that he did not sufficiently learn; another 
did not aim to affront you by what he did. In the end 
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what can be more mindless than to accumulate spleen against 
men and then vent it upon things? But as it is the 
act of a madman to become angry at things without life, 
it is not less mad to be angry at dumb animals, which 
do us no injury because they cannot will to do so; for 
there can be no injury unless it arises from design. 
Therefore they can harm us just as the sword or stone 
may do, but they cannot injure us. But some people 
think that a man is insulted when the same horses which 
are submissive to one rider are rebellious toward another, 
just as if it were due to the animal's choice and not 
rather to the rider's practised skill in management that 
certain animals prove more tractable to certain men.) 
Seneca raises a number of issues in this chapter which seem unnecessary 
in a strict assessment of anger. To begin with, a general conclusion 
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emerges that whatever incites ira cannot be automatically assigned to 
iniuria. This distinction is itself an indication that Seneca's continued 
emphasis is a critical evaluation of the relation between the two concepts. 
Not only does iniuria figure four times in the passage, but other legal 
terms--contumelia (insult), contemni (to be affronted), consilium (legal 
counsel or advice), and iudicium (legal judgment)--also occur.168 And 
although the special sense of contumelia has already been shown to denote 
a species of iniuria, its repeated use simply emphasizes the legal 
framework of the De Ira. Furthermore, closer inspection of the chapter 
shows that iniuria is at the center of Seneca's attention, with ira the all-
pervasive psychological setting. 
Seneca's initial comment originates with anger, but only as a 
reference point from which to examine iniuria, the presence or absence of 
which constitutes the actual problem in need of resolution. An additional 
question also arises; namely, whether or not iniuria is even a possibility 
in many instances. The intrusion of the modal potuimus (we could have) 
extends discussion beyond the realm of fact, or, more concretely, received 
injury, to the region of the possible. But Seneca presumably deems this 
168What does or doesn't constitute iniuria is the obvious theme of the 
passage. Seneca's efforts to establish the legitimacy of accusations based 
on contumelia or offensum underscore this, as does his endeavor to 
distinguish nocere (to cause harm) from iniuriam facere (to commit iniuria). 
The language is that of the delict. Cf. Justinian, Inst. 4.4. 
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an essential consideration, since he must refute the idea that anger 
inevitably results from iniuria, or that they are even usually coincidental. 
Jniuria requires offensum, an offense or wrong, but this no more ensures 
a clear-cut case of iniuria than ira does. Seneca thus corrects the assumed 
affiliation of offendunt (they affront) and fecerunt (they have done it) 
offered by his interlocutor; the act which produces an offensum is not 
identical with effrontery .169 The adamant reply that 
"antequam ... distinguamus irascimur" (we become angry before we 
distinguish) underscores a double error: the failure to differentiate acts 
which produce insult from those which intend it, and a mistaken 
perception that ira implies that some kind of iniuria has been 
committed.170 
The misconception or inaccuracy which ultimately seems to disturb 
Seneca involves the misappropriation of iniuria, despite the omnipresent 
reference to ira or its cognates. The idea of potentiality or possibility 
reappears in the chapter, again with iniuria as the object of possibility. 
Seneca thrice employs possunt (they are able) toward a careful end: a 
precise definition of iniuria as delict. Included among the various 
provocations to anger are inanimate objects (nee sentiunt or sine sensu) 
1698 n· 4 ee igest 7.10.3.pr.-3. 
17
°Ibid. Also see Nicholas, 216. 
93 
(they do not feel or are without feeling), animals (mutis animalibus: "dumb 
animals", and other people (homines); but all three categories possess 
attributes which either cancel (non possunt: "they are not able") or 
mitigate (non a consilio: "not from deliberation") even the possibility of 
delictal violation. Seneca readily elucidates the problem, as well as the 
solution, with a significant juxtaposition of terms or phrases. A sword 
(ferrum) or stone (lapis) can cause harm (nocere), but cannot (non possunt) 
cause injury (iniuriam facere); this alone eliminates harm-as-such as the 
purposed sense of iniuria, since nocere sufficiently supplies this 
meaning.171 But iniuria as delict is also evident from Seneca's 
treatment of the two remaining classes--animals and people. 
In his effort to clarify the interlocutor's identification of offendunt 
(they offend) and fecerunt (they have committed), Seneca suggests three 
excusationes iustas (reasonable justifications) which diminish a necessary 
connection between action and offense: the personal incompetence of the 
agent (non potuit melius facere: "he could not have done better"), a lack of 
association between incompetence and insult (nee ad tuam contumeliam 
parum didicit: "he did not sufficiently learn to insult you"), and an absence 
of the intention to offend (non in hoc ut te offenderet: "he did not intend to 
111Nocere (OLD, entry 1) provides the general sense of physical damage 
or hurt. It has a legal sense as well (OLD, entry 2b), but this is restricted 
to damage of a case or claim. 
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affront you in this"). Although each extenuation is valid, the last is most 
remarkable; it summarizes the argument and unequivocally asserts what 
is only implied by the two previous justifications.172 The simple 
conjunction ut conveys an indispensible condition for any sound action 
based on iniuria: purpose or intent. 173 Seneca likewise reinforces the 
necessity of this proviso when he examines whether animals furnish 
grounds for iniuria; they possess neither will nor deliberative power (velle 
non possunt: they are not able to will) and are thus incapable of any 
delictal violation, since iniuria does not exist (non est) unless executed by 
design (a consilio). 174 Similarly, Seneca chides those who reckon 
themselves outraged (contemni) by uncompliant horses, as if horses enjoyed 
opportunity of choice (tamquam iudicio). Thus, after Seneca's careful 
dissection of the attendant complexities, the motif of the chapter becomes 
clear: the causes of ira are many, the grounds for iniuria few. 
172Seneca continues this line of reasoning at II.27, where he discusses 
the inability of the gods or natural forces to be considered technically 
liable for iniuria. Under Roman law such acts were classified as vis maior 
(a greater force), and Seneca's choice to include some mention of this 
points even more emphatically to the legal nature of his analysis. See 
Digest 44.7.1.4, and Berger, 769. 
173See above, n. 168, and Digest 47.10 3 pr.-3. 
174See Frier, 137-48, for detailed examination of liability for animals 
under the Lex Aquilia. Seneca's remark is certainly in keeping with 
precedent. Digest 9.1.1.3 is noteworthy: "Ait Praetor ''pauperiem fecisse." 
pauperies est damnum sine iniuria facientis datum: nee enim potest animal 
iniuriam fecisse, quod sensu caret. " 
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Finally, Seneca ceases oblique or partial discouragement of delictal 
action toward the end of the second book. Having surveyed elements of 
both ira and iniuria, he can at last address the latter directly as a 
manifest, yet largely unrecognized social ill. His rejoinder to a weak 
appeal by a desperate opponent whose previous arguments have miscarried 
is notable. 
"At enim ira habet aliquam voluptatem et dulce 
est dolorem redere." Minime; non enim ut in 
beneficiis honestum est merita meritis repen-
sare, ita iniurias iniuriis. Illic vinci turpe 
est, hie vincere. Inhumanum verbum est et qui-
dem pro iusto receptum ultio [et talio]. Non mul-
tum differt nisi ordine; qui dolorem regerit 
tantum excusati us peccat. 
(II.32.1) 
("But of course there is some pleasure in anger," 
you say, "and it is sweet to return a smart." 
Not at all; for it is not honorable, as in acts 
of kindness to requite benefits with benefits, 
so to requite injuries with injuries. In the one 
case it is shameful to be outdone, in the other 
not to be outdone. "Revenge" is an inhuman word 
and yet one accepted as legitimate, and "retaliation" 
is not much different except in rank; the man who 
returns a smart commits merely the more pardonable 
sin.) 
The polyptoton iniurias iniuriis (injuries for injuries) expresses more than 
rhetorical polish for its own sake; two cases of the same noun represent 
separate cases of the same delict. Seneca succinctly collapses his 
viewpoint on both ira and iniuria into a terse figure of speech. Although 
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delictal violation generates delictal action, the latter is a variation of the 
former. Seneca uses turpe (base), a word usually chosen to disparage insult 
or outrage, to demean legal recourse itself, adding irony to a second 
polyptoton: vinci vincere (to lose one's case rather than win). 175 The very 
specific opinion Seneca has developed about iniuria renders the 
epigrammatic point a point well taken, but he refuses to brake; iniuria 
results in a disgraceful and successful verdict which achieves ultio 
(revenge), a principle he has labored to condemn.176 Yet ultio is pro iusto 
receptum (accepted as legitimate or just), as he finally remarks in a 
progression of thought which advances from elusive irony to definitive and 
unmistakable denunciation. And, as if to punctuate an already emphatic 
position, Seneca concludes with an archaic term from the Twelve Tables--
talio (punishment in kind)--to return his interlocutor and N ovatus to the 
source of iniuria in Roman jurisprudence.177 
As occurs regularly in a satiric monologue, denunciation or censure 
175Cf. II.7.3 with regard to Seneca's choice of turpe (base or shameful) 
to describe the debasement of the courts. 
176Seneca's pejorative view of revenge begins at I.1.1 and is persistent 
throughout the De Ira. See Busa and Zampolli, 1386, for the frequency of 
ultio and its derivative forms. 
177Warmington, 476: "Si membrum rupsit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto." 
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of iniquity or folly proceeds to an invocation of the opposite.178 Seneca's 
anecdote about Marcus Cato furnishes both a transition to the lengthy 
treatment of exemplary actions and figures in the final book and a model 
of wisdom and propriety with respect to iniuria. 
M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit 
imprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? 
Postea satis facienti Cato, "Non memini" inquit 
"me percussum." Melius putavit non agnoscere quam 
vindicare. "Nihil" inquis "illi post tantum pe-
tulantiam mali factum est?" Immo multum boni; 
coepit Catonem nosse. Magni animi est iniurias 
despicere; ultionis contumeliosissimum genus est 
non esse visum dignum, ex quo peteretur ultio. 
Multi leves iniurias altius sibi demisere, dum 
vindicant: ille magnus et nobilis qui more mag-
nae ferae latratus minutorum canum securus exaudit. 
(Il.32.2-3) 
(Once when Marcus Cato was in the public bath, a 
certain man, not knowing him, struck him unwitting-
ly; for who would knowingly have done injury to 
that great man? Later, when the man was making an 
apology, Cato said, "I do not recall that I re-
ceived a blow." It was better, he thought, to ig-
nore the incident than to resent it. "The poor 
fellow," you ask, "got no punishment for such an 
act of rudeness?" No, but much good--he began to 
know Cato. Only a great soul can be superior to 
injury; the most humiliating kind of revenge is to 
have it appear that the man was not worth taking 
revenge upon. Many have taken slight injuries too 
deeply to heart in the act of revenging them. He 
is a great and noble man who acts as does the lordly 
178This is a common practice for Horace. Sermones 1.1.106-07, is a plea 
for moderation ("est modus in rebus") following a diatribe on avarice. 
Juvenal, Saturae 10.346-66, is also typical of this pattern in satire. 
wild beast that listens unconcernedly to the baying 
of tiny dogs.) 
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In the aftermath of a trenchant critique of iniuria in which even the 
laudable "social justice" of a successful suit receives disapprobation, 
Seneca contravenes with an exemplum which not only disparages iniuria 
as a legally and socially proper principle and procedure, but also 
effectively promotes a response to injury and insult which defies 
convention. Cato retaliates neither in kind nor by law; his reaction seems 
extreme and unattainable--even undesireable. However, this locus 
communis of a Stoic sapiens impervious to humiliation is in several ways 
a piece de resistance which achieves more than its standard interpretation 
as an ethical model: it neatly encapsulates Seneca's discussion and 
finalizes his progressive condemnation of iniuria as the legal instrument 
of ira in Book Two.179 
Although much of the terminology of Roman law which Seneca 
inserts in his anecdote is by now familiar, the signal feature of the Cato 
sketch is not. Whereas prior mention of iniuria and its multiform 
179Cf. III.5.7-8. Sandbach, 142-43, briefly discusses Cato the Younger 
as the prototype of the Stoic sapiens. Seneca refers to Cato repeatedly in 
De Constantia Sapientis and, in fact, in many of his other works as well. 
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2d ed., s. v. "Cato Uticensis, Marcus 
Porcius," outlines the career and family background of Cato, both of which 
would have entitled him to vindicate the assault on the grounds of atrox 
iniuria. 
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representations have been of the common sort, the passage in question 
describes an especially grave category of the delict: atrox (aggravated) 
iniuria. The physical assault (percussit) on Cato in public (balineo: the 
bath) constitutes a flagrant violation of iniuria exacerbated by the location 
of the attack.180 Another element, however, compounds an already 
severe offense: an act of aggression directed against the person of a Roman 
magistrate.181 Seneca plainly outlines details necessary for legal 
analysis of the incident: physical assault, a public setting, and a Roman 
official. The manifest occurrence of atrox iniuria (aggravated injury) would 
require no special explanation for an addressee with legal expertise; nor 
would Cato's reaction (or failure to react) surprise Novatus on ethical 
grounds. Yet Cato's Stoic apatheia, the commonly recognized object of the 
anecdote, is likewise a refusal to litigate. This is a previously unobserved 
item of consequence which, when understood as a satiric insistence on 
reform and a model case of iniuria, alters the sense of the account as 
180See Gaius, Inst. 3.224-225. 
181Although it can't be known for certain that Cato held a magistracy 
at the time of the reported incident, the context offers two clues that this 
was probably the case. First, Seneca uses illi (OLD, entry 4b: "that 
famous, the well-known") to describe Cato, which could refer to his renown 
at the time of the incident, his subsequent renown, or both. Second, 
Seneca describes Cato's attacker as not knowing (ignorans) who Cato was 
and returning to apologize, implying a subsequent recognition of the 
severity of his offence. 
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merely a standard example of the Stoic sapiens in control of his passions 
and able to refrain from anger.182 The application of vindicare (to exact 
reparation, punish, or avenge an offense) specifies the legal position to be 
inferred from Cato's restraint.183 Moreover, the subsequent remarks 
with which Seneca concludes the episode secure the legal context and 
provide an opinion: iniuria is to be disdained and revenge avoided as an 
even greater indignity. 
If the endless adversarial exchange of iniurias for iniuriis is to 
abate, ultio (revenge), the motive which ultimately justifies iniuria, must 
no longer appear pro iusto receptum (accepted as legitimate). The Cato 
anecdote attempts this project and marks a significant juncture in the De 
Ira for several reasons. The status of the offense is the climax of Seneca's 
recurrent references to iniuria and its categories. The exemplum and the 
chapter which frames it supercede prior discussion of the deli ct in function, 
since they provide a more complete sense of Seneca's purpose. The 
components--Roman law, satiric rebuke, and proposed reform--combine to 
displace the conventional opinion that a Stoic position toward anger is the 
primary intention of the De Ira.184 Cato's refusal even to acknowledge 
182Rist, 1-21, provides an informative discussion of Stoic apathy. 
1830LD, entry 5. See below, n. 317. 
184See above, Introduction. 
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an occasion of iniuria furnishes a model for reform, but also underscores 
the inadequacy of law as the social implement of moral change. That law 
per se operates as a subterfuge for ira requires more explicit censure of its 
role in Roman society. If iniuria poses a problem which masquerades as 
a solution, the very rule of law which permits the disguise compels the 
straightforward satiric recognition of a problem as a problem. 
CHAPTER THREE 
REFORM 
With an indignation which has not gone unnoticed, Seneca depicts 
the tragic personal, social, and legal consequences of ira and iniuria in the 
numerous digressions which have in part contributed to the judgment that 
the plan of the work is flawed. 185 Seneca's purpose is not merely critical, 
however, but corrective as well, since this too is an important function of 
satire. 186 At the same time, suggested remedies are necessary for 
Seneca to address the problem allegedly posed by N ovatus at the 
beginning of the work: the reduction of anger.187 He approaches the task 
of reform, first of all, by way of practical directives, and finally, through 
presenting historical exempla as models for avoidance or emulation. 
185William S. Anderson, Essays on Roman Satire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 315-16, has pointed out a resemblance between 
the indignation of Juvenal in the early satires and that of Seneca in the 
De Ira. The Oxford Companion to Ancient Literature, ed. Sir Paul Harvey 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 133, in what might be considered the 
scholarly consensusofthe time, concludes a brief description of the De Ira 
thus: "The plan of the work is defective." 
186Highet, 241. 
187See I.1.1. The sections where Seneca actually replies to Novatus' 
question ( "quemadmodum posset ira leniri '') do not comprise the bulk of 
the complete work, but appear unexpectedly and casually. 
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In the third and final book of the De Ira, Seneca offers a remedy for 
anger, having already demonstrated its undesirability, by combining both 
of the approaches just mentioned. But, as before, ira serves as the useful 
pretext for another digression. Ethical and psychological considerations 
of anger lead him toward the topics of law, the courts, and, above all, 
iniuria. The now-familiar vocabulary of delict reappears. Contumelia 
(insult), iniuria (injury), lis (lawsuit), ultio (revenge), litigare (to litigate), 
convicium (clamor), poena (penalty), supplicium (capital punishment), 
percutere (to strike a blow), causa (legal case), all continue to appear 
frequently at pivotal stages of an often irregular and unpredictable 
arrangement of topics and approaches.188 Yet despite the apparent 
absence of a uniform progression, at first glance, there are still observable 
patterns of which the previously cited and obvious transition from ira to 
iniuria is only one; the long anticipated treatment of anger here which 
returns to added refutation, derisive censure, and admonition are other 
such hidden patterns.189 Nonetheless, iniuria remains the constant 
188Seneca's prolonged description of the physical and social 
manifestations of ira (1.1.3-2.3), his diatribe on the courts and the folly of 
ira (II. 7-9), and his long series of anecdotes about rulers moved by ira 
(111.14-21) present three cases in point. J.R.G. Wright, 39, speaks of 
Seneca's compositions as "fragmenting into a myriad of separate parts," 
and credits Caligula (Suetonius Caligula 53.2) with insight for remarking 
that Seneca "harenam esse sine calce." 
189See especially II.1, 3.4-5, 26-28, and 32-33. 
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which recurs to provide a predictable legal format. The effort to dissuade 
or discourage litigation in the final book justifies the extensive attention 
which Seneca had given iniuria in book two, and the climax of book three 
places the earlier diatribe on the courts in high relief.190 Here Seneca 
criticizes the fundamental infirmity of the rule of law as a moral standard 
in the following impassioned sequence: 
Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus legibus in-
nocentem? Ut hoc ita sit, quam angusta innocentia 
est ad legem bonum esse! Quanto latius officiorum 
patet quam iuris regula! Quam multa pietas human-
itas liberalitas iustitia fides exigunt, quae 
omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt! Sed ne ad illam 
quidem artissimam innocentiae formulam praestare 
nos possumus: alia fecimus, alia cogitavimus, alia 
optavimus, aliis favimus; in quibusdam innocentes 
sumus, quia non successit. Hoc cogitantes aeguiores 
simus delinguentibus, credamus obiurgantibus .... 
(II.28.2-4) 
(What man is there who can claim that in the eyes of 
every law he is innocent? But assuming that this 
may be, how crabbed is the innocence whose standard 
of virtue is the law! How much more comprehensive 
is the principle of duty than that of law! How many 
are the demands laid upon us by the sense of duty, 
humanity, generosity, justice, integrity--all of which 
lie outside the statute books! But even under that 
other exceedingly narrow definition of innocence we 
cannot vouch for our claim. Some sins we have commit-
ted, some we have contemplated, some we have desired, 
some we have encouraged; in the case of some we are 
innocent only because we did not succeed. Bearing this 
in mind, let us be more fair to those who commit de-
190See II.6-9. 
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licts, and let us trust those who censure us .... ) 
Earlier in the second book Seneca cleverly devaluated the apparent 
merits of righteous anger by three satiric devices--hyperbole, irony, and a 
reductio ad absurdum--which effectively redirect the focus of discussion 
from ira to the court milieu and, at the same time, produce a diatribe on 
legal corruption. 191 The passage just quoted represents a somewhat 
similar digression in that the preceeding emphasis on ira (11.25) 
metamorphoses into a minute analysis of conditions essential for legal 
action based on iniuria (11.26-27), followed by a spirited objection to setting 
up law by itself as the standard of appropriate conduct (11.28).192 The 
rhetorical question with which Seneca begins (Quis est iste qui profitetur 
omnibus legibus innocentem: What man is there who can claim that in the 
eyes of every law he is innocent?) functions more to introduce the 
juxtaposition of moral ideals with the minimal requirements of the law 
than to supply a satisfactory answer. Juris regula (the principle of law) 
and publicae tabulae (the statute books) are only the most basic 
requirements of moral behavior; pietas (duty), humanitas (humanity), 
liberalitas (generosity), iustitia (justice), and fides (integrity) are loftier 




legal statutes, are the preferred models. As his initial question implies, 
since total compliance with law is rarely attained, forbearance toward 
others ought to serve as a desireable and necessary goal. The restraint for 
which Seneca calls, however, demands equanimity toward the technical 
illegalities implied by delinquentes (those who commit delicts) and 
obiurgantes (those who censure others for their delicts). 193 Not 
surprisingly, the deli ct about which Seneca expostulates for the duration 
of the chapter is iniuria. 
The transition from ira to iniuria reappears in the third book as 
well. As in the prefatory remarks of the first book, Seneca proposes to 
address the problem of ira--a promise only partially fulfilled. The 
inextricable association between the vitium (ira) and the delictum (iniuria) 
continues with civilization itself as an occasion of ira . 
... quibus incultus mos agrestisque vita est, 
circumscriptio ignota est et fraus et quodcumque 
in foro malum nascitur .... 
(llI.2.1) 
( ... the uncivilized state of some and their rustic 
mode of life keep them strangers to trickery and 
deception and all the evil that the forum breeds .... ) 
193Seneca uses obiurgatio (OLD, entry la: "to reprove, reprimand, 
rebuke, upbraid," and entry 2a: "to chastise, punish (with blows,etc.)") as 
~early synonomous with contumelia or percussus. Busa and Zampolli, 906, 
hst seven occurrences of the word and its cognates in the De Ira. Cf. 
1.16.2, 11.24.2, 11.28.4, 111.1.2, 111.12.6, 111.13.3, and 111.14.2. 
107 
No gens (nation) is immune from ira for Seneca, but a peculiar opportunity 
to indulge it is afforded by the forum, a precinct of Rome whose avoidance 
he advises. 
Forum advocationes iudicia fugere debere et 
omnia quae exulcerant vitium, aeque cavere las-
situdinem corporis; consumit enim quidquid in 
nobis mite placidumque est et acria concitat. 
(111.9.3) 
(We should shun the courts, court-appearances, 
and trials, and everything that aggravates our 
weakness, and we should equally guard against 
physical exhaustion; for this destroys whatever 
gentleness and mildness we have and engenders 
sharpness.)194 
The Senecan prescription for eliminating ira clearly involves the shunning 
of situations likely to provoke it, most especially the courts, and, more to 
the point, events or situations furnishing the grounds for iniuria. Despite 
his [earlier] elaborate condemnation of both ira and iniuria throughout the 
two previous books, Seneca prolongs his criticism. And where ira receives 
attention, discussion shifts to the delict and its attendant 
circumstances.195 If the forum (the courts), advocationes (court 
194Cf. 11.6-9. Seneca returns to the connection between the judicial 
process and ira, a motif which is by now apparent. 111.43.5, the final 
section of the De Ira, concludes this theme. 
195The transition from ira to iniuria may give the appearance of 
tangentiality when in fact there is none. 11.7-9, for example, is an 
unnecessary and irrelevant stretch if the legal context and satiric purpose 
go unrecognized. 
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appearances), and iudicia (trials) signify malefic occasions in general, 
Seneca leaves no doubt as to the particulars in the chapter. 
Fugere itaque debebit omnis quos irritaturos ira-
cundiam sciet. "Qui sunt" inquis "isti?" Multi 
ex variis causis idem facturi: offendet te superbus 
contemptu, dicax contumelia, petulans iniuria, livi-
dus malignitate, pugnax contentione, ventosus et 
mendax vanitate; non feres a suspicioso timeri, a 
pertinace vinci, a delicato fastidiri. 
(111.8.3-4) 
(It will, therefore, be a man's duty to avoid all 
those who he knows will provoke his anger. "Just 
whom do you mean?" you ask. There are many who 
because of various cases will produce the same re-
sult. The proud man will offend you by his scorn, 
the caustic man by an insult, the forward man by 
an affront, the envious man by his malice, the con-
tentious by his wrangling, the windy liar by his 
hollowness; you will not endure to be feared by a 
suspicious man, to be outdone by a stubborn one, or 
to be despised by a coxcomb.) 
The proud, the caustic, the petulant, the spiteful, and the combative 
offer easy justification for ira, but they also initiate the circumstances 
which beget grounds for litigation under Roman law. Seneca's choice of 
causis, usually translated "causes," more convincingly suggests the legal 
sense; judicial proceedings, the interests of one side in a dispute, legal 
grounds, or a legal position are more fitting and possible renderings.196 
The series which follow pairs off personal agency--so, for example, superbus 
196See OLD, entries 1, 2, 6, and 14b respectively. 
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(arrogant), dicax (sarcastic),petulans (forward), pugnax (contentious)--with 
subsequent result--with contemptu (scorn), contumelia (insult), iniuria 
(affront), contentione (wrangling)--in a manner which only supports the idea 
that a legal sense is intended. 197 Psychological and legal processes again 
coalesce in an inevitable sequence of associations; scorn implies the 
effrontery which compels a dual conclusion: subjective recognition of 
iniuria and the assumption of an actionable case. The sets that follow are 
not legally significant to the same degree; still, timeri (to be feared), vinci 
(to be defeated), and fastidiri (to be despised) are equally pejorative in a 
psychological sense: they disturb the animi tranquillitas (peace of mind) 
characteristic of the Stoic spiritual ideal.198 Each of the given 
consequences proceed from offendet (will offend), the principal verb from 
which the juxtapositions follow grammatically in a neat balance of rhetoric 
and meaning. The particulars of iniuria emanate from the universal 
principle of law under which they are subsumed: any serious species of 
offense--physical (pugnax) or verbal (dicax). The question raised by 
N ovatus requires a resolution which covers all the problems of law raised 
197Seneca unmistakably lists the steps toward litigation. The 
progression is noteworthy: the attitude of scorn (contemptus: OLD, entry 
1) proceeds to insult (contumelia), a violation of the delict (iniuria), and 
finally, litigation (contendo: OLD, entry 8c). 
198Rist, 1-36, discusses the Stoic ideal or "good" at considerable length. 
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by deli ct, and, more exactly, iniuria. When Seneca recommends a retreat 
from ira and iniuria in the passage, he is thus providing the background 
for a prescription that the forum (courts), advocationes (court appearances), 
and iudicia (trials) be avoided. 
Although Seneca keeps up the parallel treatment of delict and vice, 
iniuria and ira, at different stages of book three, aspects of his approach 
vary as in the earlier books.199 Ira nevertheless persists as a subterfuge 
for his criticism of iniuria at each important phase of the discussion; less 
by diatribe, a conspicuous feature of the second book, than by the open 
recommendation of personal reform, a strategy he now employs with much 
emphasis. 200 A prudent man, in Seneca's view of things, would do well 
to endure assault and insult, or percussus and contumelia, and Seneca 
employs two methods of promoting an ethic of tolerance and discretion. 
Seneca's order of presentation resembles the reformative passages of 
previous and subsequent satiric monologues; in particular, those of Horace 
and Juvenal.201 One approach is the direct statement and imposition of 
a viewpoint which overshadows the artificial objections of an adversarius, 
199111.10.4-11.3, for example, offer the practical suggestions which the 
reader is initially led to assume will be offered. Even in these sections, 
however, Seneca's emphasis is as much concerned with overlooking iniuria 
as with curtailing ira. 
200Ibid. 
201See above, Chap. 1, 21-26. 
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the tack Seneca takes throughout the De Ira and no less significantly in 
the final book.202 Condemnation and ridicule of specific vices yield to 
admonition and advice, satiric elements also prominent in the 
diatribe.203 In book three Seneca unites these features of the diatribe 
with suggestions for reform in a prolonged succession of exempla to avoid, 
which constitute a second approach common to satire. 
The majority of exempla consist of sordid accounts of the extreme 
cruelty which results from unrestrained ira and absence of all 
accountability. In each case exalted sovereigns endure a perceived affront, 
insult, or indignity and react with excessive and arbitrary retribution. 
The first historical figure Seneca portrays is Cambyses, who reacts to the 
salutary advice of his minister, Praexaspes, with unjustified retaliation. 
Cambysen regem nimis deditum vino Praexaspes 
unus ex carissimis monebat ut parcius biberet, 
turpem esse dicens ebrietatem in rege, quern 
omnium oculi auresque sequerentur. Ad haec ille: 
"Ut scias" inquit "quemadmodum numquam excidam 
mihi, adprobabo iam et oculos post vinum in of-
ficio esse et man us." Bibit deinde liberalius 
quam alias capacioribus scyphis et iam gravis ac 
violentus obiurgatoris sui filium procedere ultra 
202Horace's Sermones offer the best parallel. R. Hirzel, Der Dialog, vol. 
2 (Leipzig, 1895; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 24-27, surveys 
Seneca's "aehnlichkeit mit Horaz" and the Sermones as models for the 
Dialogi. 
203Highet, 24-35, discusses these techniques, and Griffin, 13-16, 
mentions them as prominent in the Dialogi. 
limen iubet adlevataque super caput sinistra manu 
stare. Tune intendit arcum et ipsum cor adules-
centis (id enim petere se dixerat) figit rescisso-
que pectore haerens in ipso corde spiculum ostendit 
ac respiciens patrem interrogavit satisne certam 
haberet manum. At ille negavit Apollinem potuisse 
certius mittere. Di illum male perdant animo 
magis quam condicione mancipium! Eius rei laudator 
fuit cuius nimis erat spectatorem fuisse. Occasio-
nem blanditiarum putavit pectus filii in duas partes 
diductum et cor sub vulnere palpitans: controver-
siam illi facere de gloria debuit et revocare 
iactum, ut regi liberet in ipso patre certiorem 
manum ostendere. o regem cruentum! o dignum in 
quern omni um suorum arcus verterentur! Cum exsecrati 
fuerimus illum convivia suppliciis funeribus solven-
tem, tamen sceleratius telum illud laudatum est 
quam missum. Videbimus quomodo se pater gerere 
debuerit stans super cadaver fili sui caedemque 
illam, cuius et testis fuerat et causa: id de quo 
nunc agitur apparet, iram supprimi posse. Non male 
dixit regi, nullum emisit ne calamitosi quidem 
verbum, cum aeque cor suum quam fili transfixum 
videret. Potest dici merito devorasse verba; nam 
si quid tamquam iratus dixisset, nihil tamquam 
pater facere potuisset. Potest, inquam, videri 
sapientius se in illo casu gessisse, quam cum de 
potandi modo praeciperet < ei > quern satius erat vinum 
quam sanguinem bibere, cuius manus poculis occupari 
pax erat. Accessit itaque ad numerum eorum, qui 
magnis cladibus ostenderunt, quanti constarent 
regum amicis bona consilia. 
(111.14.1-6) 
(Since Cambyses was too much addicted to wine, Praex-
aspes, one of his dearest friends, urged him to 
drink more sparingly, declaring that drunkenness 
is disgraceful for a king, toward whom all eyes and 
ears are turned. To this Cambyses replied: "To con-
vince you that I never lose command of myself, I 
shall proceed to prove to you that my eyes and my 
hands perform their duty in spite of wine." There-
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upon taking larger cups he drank more recklessly 
than ever, and when at length he was heavy and be-
sotted with wine, he ordered the son of his critic 
to proceed beyond the threshold and stand there with 
his left hand lifted above his head. Then he drew 
his bow and shot the youth through the very heart--
had said that this was his target--and cutting open 
the breast of the victim he showed the arrow-head 
sticking in the heart itself, and then turning 
toward the father he inquired whether he had a 
sufficiently steady hand. But he replied that 
Apollo himself could not have made a more unerring 
shot. Heaven curse such a man, a bondslave in 
spirit even more than in station! He praised a 
deed, which it were too much even to have witnessed. 
The breast of his son that had been torn asunder, 
his heart quivering from its wound, he counted a 
fitting pretext for flattery. He ought to have pro-
voked a dispute with him about his boast and called 
for another shot, that the king might have the 
pleasure of displaying upon the person of the father 
himself an even steadier hand! What a bloodthirsty 
king! What a worthy mark for the bows of all his 
followers! Though we may execrate him for terminating 
a banquet with punishment and death, yet it was more 
accursed to praise that shot than to make it. We 
shall see later how the father should have borne him-
self as he stood over the corpse of his son, viewing 
that murder of which he was both the witness and the 
cause. The point now under discussion is clear, 
namely, that it is possible to suppress anger. He 
did not curse the king, he let slip no word even of 
anguish, though he saw his own heart pierced as well 
as his son's. It may be said that he was right to 
choke back words; for even if he had spoken as an 
angry man, he could have accomplished nothing as a 
father. He may, I say, be thought to have acted 
more wisely in that misfortune than he had done in 
recommending moderation in drinking to a man who 
would have much better drunk wine than blood, with 
whom peace meant that his hands were busy with the 
wine-cup. He, therefore, added one more to the 
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number of those who have shown by bitter misfortune 
the price a king's friends pay for giving good advice.) 
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Not a few details of this episode are worthy of discussion and are no 
less remarkable than the tale itself. Elements of satire and law 
dramatically emerge from what would otherwise be a typical piece of 
pseudo-historical melodrama.204 In a grisly narration of king Cambyses' 
demonstration of regal poise for Praexaspes, the latter exhibits a nearly 
inhuman and unimaginable, yet heroic, refusal to succumb to even an 
utterance of protest as involuntary witness to the callous murder of his 
son. Along with Seneca's later exempla, the passage represents a 
seemingly impossible suppression of ira, as well as a tasteless and 
deliberately abhorrent choice of historical incidents to recount; more 
extreme, perhaps, than was necessary for a project purporting to advise 
restraint on anger.205 Having earlier shown a careful attention to 
particulars and a not haphazard arrangement of legal terms and rhetorical 
devices, Seneca's exemplum suggests an agenda less obvious to the legally 
204Cf. Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, 
American Philological Association, Classical Resource Series, trans. J. C. 
Yardley, no. 3 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994). 
205Generally speaking, Seneca's exempla are exaggerated and not 
representative of the ordinary instances of iniuria which he protests. 
Seneca's hyperbole suggests the triviality or insignificance of legally 
defined iniuria by contrast with the extreme circumstances he describes 
in his anecdotes. 
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uninformed or aesthetically repelled. The degree of barbarism Cambyses 
displays is matched by Praexaspes' forbearance. Dismissal of this and 
similar anecdotes as vulgar and Praexaspes' as insensible is a premature 
appraisal. 206 The passage warrants a second look. 
Seneca prefaces such exempla with a brief summary statement that 
he will emphasize ira among supreme rulers and its restraint or 
suppression among their subjects. The explicit declaration of purpose, 
however, once again fails to say it all. The story of Cambyses and 
Praexaspes on first impression is loathsome; its gruesome facts disgust and 
shock in a manner unbecoming his philosophic attempt to discourage the 
expression of ira. The horrific details he presents, however, are not 
completely unexpected or atypical given the horrors present in Senecan 
tragedy, a genre where exaggerated and pejorative portrayals of royal ira 
are far from intrusive or unusual and are embellishments of the myths on 
which the tragedies of Seneca are based. 207 Mention of exemplary 
206This and other exempla, "Silver Age" as they may seem in spirit and 
tone, merely retell in sequence tales told at intervals in the narrative of 
Herodotus. The Cambyses anecdote, for example, is taken from book three 
of the Histories, and the Harpagus incident which follows at Ill.15 
originally appears in book one of the Histories, as noted by Justus Li psi us 
apud Joh. Fred. Gronovius, L. Annaei Senecae: Opera Quae Exstant 
(Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevir, 1672), 116-119. 
207D. and E. Henry, The Mask of Power: Seneca's Tragedies and 
Imperial Rome (Warminster, Wilshire and Chicago: Aris and Phillip Ltd. 
and Bolchazi-Carducci, 1985), 56-74, and 157-176, provide a worthwhile 
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figures--Antigonus, Philip, and Augustus--would seem to suffice for 
Seneca's originally stated goal of dispelling ira, but he nonetheless 
furnishes two sets of exempla for contrast and comparison. An imbalance 
clearly exists, however, and instances of behavior to be avoided far 
outweigh those meant for imitation. 208 Censure of angry rulers 
predominates in the succession of tales, whereas approval of peaceful 
sovereigns receives less attention; but a quasi-quantitative evaluation of 
these passages misses the mark. 
The outrageous and cruel conduct of Cambyses, Harpagus, Dari us, 
and others form a curious counterpoint to the equanimity of an Antigonus 
or Augustus. At the same time a second set of oppositions is most 
apparent; rulers of either gentle or harsh persuasion are set up in contrast 
with candid underlings whose candid truth-telling is a constant throughout 
the anecdotes. Unspeakable acts and unfathomable reactions eclipse ira 
by the sheer cumulative effect of the horrors catalogued. The 
discouragement of vice sinks into a role subordinate to the shock inspired 
by the events--an effect atypical of the philosophical dialogue but 
recent study of this theme in the tragedies. 
208The examples of unrestrained anger extend from III.14-21; 111.22-24, 
a more limited selection, offer models of self-control. The imbalance itself 
suggests the disproportion in actual occurrence. 
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commonplace in satire.209 Where one citation of princely atrocity would 
fulfill a remedial purpose, a succession of grotesque portrayals accumulate 
to offer an interminable hyperbole from which each anecdote itself 
contains a pair of exaggerated examples of tyranny and submission. This 
strategy of presenting odious behavior followed by models for emulation 
forms a pattern recognizable in some of the most memorable satires of 
Juvenal and Horace.210 Both ample use of hyperbole and an inclusion 
of antithetical models indicate Seneca's satiric intent and his 
accompanying insistence on reform. 
In the same vein, if exaggeration effectively overshadows any 
dispassionate analysis of ira in Seneca's exempla, doubt is cast on the 
actual role of ira in the narratives. Upon closer analysis iniuria once 
again looms as an object of concern beneath Seneca's lurid depiction of 
anger. Cambyses plainly over-reacts to the frank suggestion of 
Praexaspes, whose response to the king's verdict is equally drastic. Yet 
this mutual extravagance easily obscures the issues at hand. Praexaspes' 
assessment of Cambyses' intemperance as "turpem" (base) is construed as 
209See above, Chap. 1, passim. 
210Horace Sermones I.3.38-56 offers models for minimizing the flaws of 
others after presenting examples of faultfinding. At I.1.117-119, Horace 
extols the satisfied dinner guest in contrast to the list of malcontents 
mentioned at I.3-14. 
r 
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contumelious affront; all the more so for its public utterance at a banquet, 
a condition which would classify Praexaspes' offense as convicium under 
1 211 Roman aw. Indeed, the foreign setting and time frame of this 
traditional account would hardly have obscured a decidedly Roman 
interpretation for N ovatus or other Romans familiar with the law of 
delict.212 In addition, a Roman appreciation of the tale as a legal case 
could only construe Cambyses' cruel retaliation as his willful and 
capricious misinterpretation of bona consilia (good advice) as being atrox 
iniuria or maiestas (treason). The king infers an offense (ex facto) in public 
(ex loco) against his person (ex persona) by someone of lesser status.213 
Other aspects of the incident are also noteworthy, however. Seneca's 
addressee, whose judicial expertise is well documented, could hardly have 
disregarded the obvious trial format of the exemplum, nor could he have 
passed over certain idiosyncratic features of the judicial process recounted. 
211See Gaius, Inst. 3.220 and Digest 47.10.15.4. A Roman of Seneca's 
time no doubt would have also understood the offense as maiestas 
(treason). See below, n. 214. 
212Seneca explicitly inserts the legal terms obiurgator (detractor), 
mancipium (slave), and supplicium (execution) into the Herodotean tale. 
213W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law: From Augustus to 
Justinian, 3d ed., rev. Peter Stein (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1963), 592, discusses these particulars, as does Berger, 502. Digest 
47.10.7.8. cites the authority ofLabeo for determining the conditions which 
constitute atrox iniuria. This would predate Seneca and place recognition 
of aggravated iniuria early in the classical period of Roman law. 
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The highlights of the story are, in fact, less germane to ira than to 
procedural anomalies readily obvious to a Roman legal expert. Cambyses 
assumes the roles of adversarius (plaintiff), advocatus (attorney), iudex 
(judge), and carnifex (executioner), an exceptional circumstance in itself 
which departs from common practice.214 In addition to there being no 
effort at establishing intent, as well as neither anyone to plead 
Praexaspes' case nor any petition in his own behalf, Cambyses metes out 
214Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 
13-27, discusses common judicial procedure and the roles of the 
participants; in the same work, 593-600, Schulz examines the actio 
iniuriarum and refers to a monetary fine as the customary penalty. The 
anecdote points to something more, however, than atrox iniuria. Both 
Crook, 252-53, and A. H. M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman 
Republic and Principate (Totown, New Jersey: Rowan and Littlefield, 
1972), 106-107, refer to the disturbing development cited by Tacitus 
(Annals I, 72) whereby forms of iniuria (particularly defamation) began to 
be considered within the scope of the criminal law of treason, or maiestas, 
during the reign of Augustus, and whereby criticism of the emperor or 
those associated with him counted as such. The Cambyses tale provided 
an historic--and barbaric--parallel for the increasingly common 
correspondence between maiestas and iniuria during the principates of 
later emperors. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and 
Constitutional History, trans. J.M. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 
63, n.1, mentions the ever farther-reaching application of maiestas in the 
course of the first century of the Empire. This change marks a departure 
from the happy separation of iniuria from maiestas implied by the sermo 
between the jurist Trebatius and Horace at Sermones 11.1.79-86. Finally, 
at Apocolocyntosis 10, Seneca charges Claudius with the same brutal 
caprice for which he had earlier found Cambyses responsible: Die mihi, 
dive Claudi, quare quemquam ex his, quos quasque occidisti, antequam de 
causa cognosceres, antequam audires, damnasti. His comments are as 
critical of maiestas and the circumvention of normal due process as of atrox 
iniuria. 
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a supplicium (execution) of the most dire sort where poena would suffice 
as a penalty commensurate with what Cambyses has assumed are the 
facts.215 Finally, and perhaps the most egregious feature of the story 
other than the novel and utterly brutal character of Cambyses' retribution, 
remains what a Roman would term a crimen in the case of anyone but a 
tyrant.216 Heinous as it is that Cambyses retaliates against Praexaspes' 
son, someone innocent of the effrontery which he presumes and at which 
he has taken offense, he commits murder as well: on all counts a 
capr1c10us exercise of political authority, but foremost for Seneca's 
215Jbid. 
216Crimen (OLD, entry 4: "A misdeed, crime") is technically an 
antonym of delictum according to Berger, 418, and the two terms generally 
serve to distinguish public from private wrongs. The same author 
maintains that in "postclassical language the two terms are used 
interchangeably since public prosecution absorbed the wrongdoings 
previously classified as delicta." The De Ira, it should be noted, was 
written still somewhat early in the classical period, when the distinction 
between crimen and delictum held true. For present purposes, murder in 
retaliation for iniuria would itself have been a crimen. The rules change 
dramatically, however, if the victim of an insult is the emperor. At this 
point, iniuria becomes the crimen maiestatis (treason), and a public rather 
than a private wrong. The Twelve Tables permitted retribution in kind 
(talio) for iniuria which involved harm to the body of another, but only 
monetary penalties for harm to reputation. Cf. Warmington, 474-79. 
Seneca finds talio reprehensible at 11.32.1. See Digest 48.8 on the Lex 
Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficiis for the relevant background on Roman 
legal considerations of murder. 
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purposes, an abuse of judicial authority.217 
A short summary and appraisal of Seneca's exemplum and its 
relative significance is in order. Although Seneca pledges to list exempla 
which illustrate ira and its suppression among rulers and subjects 
respectively, in effect he is providing much else besides.218 Legal 
nuances and satiric devices are most noticeable, considerably surpassing 
ira as the immediate object of interest.219 The very term ira is in fact 
understated as a description of Cambyses' cold-blooded tour de force; a 
demonstration of skill so perverse that disgust and revulsion are the 
primary effects of its report. The exaggerated quality of the incident 
Seneca has chosen thus becomes a defining element. The account contains 
a legal in addition to an ethical purview. Several outstanding details of 
the ancient legend possess an altered importance for the imperial reader 
conversant with Roman legal tradition. The conceivable interpretation of 
Praexaspes' bona consilia (good advice) as contumelious and suggestive of 
both convicium (clamor) and atrox iniuria (aggravated iniuria), the judicial 
217The exempla not only provide cases where anger is expressed or 
controlled, they also demonstrate how personal and official judgment 
effectively coincide in the person of a ruler. Private ira thus assumes a 
much larger significance. Cf. I.16.5-7 and II.29.3-4. 
218See the brief preface to the anecdotes at III.13.7. 
219The insertion of a short narrative into a diatribe or monologue 
occurs, for example, in Horace, Sermones II.6.77-117. 
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layout of the tale, and procedural abnormalities implied by Cambyses' 
actions are all elements peculiar to a Roman exegesis of the story, but 
irrelevant to its initial Greek audience.220 Despite minimal use of legal 
diction, that the anecdote was set as an example of delictum and crimen 
could hardly have eluded a trained legal perspective such as that of 
Novatus. 
Similar effects permeate the remainder of Seneca's exempla. The 
tales of Harpagus' banquet (III.15.1), Darius and the sons of Oeobazus 
(111.16.3), Xerxes and the son of Pythius (III.16.4), Alexander and Clitus 
(III.17.1), Alexander and Lysimachus (III.17.1), Lysimachus and 
Telesphorus (III.17 .2-3), represent Greek and barbarian types, whereas the 
stories of Marius and Sulla (III.18.1) and Gaius Caesar's nobles, Betilienus 
Bassus and Sextus Papinius (III.18.3), provide Roman counterparts.221 
Acts or statements perceived as examples of iniuria, judicial caprice, and 
220Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 598, offers a noteworthy commentary: 
"The law of iniuria is genuinely Roman law. The whole development--
primitive rules of the Twelve Tables, praetorian reform, liberal 
interpretation of the Edict by the lawyers--is typically Roman. The rules 
of the Edict show the true Roman feeling for decency, privacy, and good 
repute and are closely connected with Roman customs and manners. 
Greek influence, which has been alleged by some, is neither proven nor 
probable." Given Seneca's era, maiestas (treason) would have been 
immediately recognizable in the stories. 
221Joh. Frid. Gronovius, L. Annaei Senecae: Opera Quae Exstant, vol. 
1 (Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevir, 1672), 118-125, cites the sources from which 
Seneca draws. 
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unjustified executions abound in a manner peculiar to a legally informed 
Roman audience. In a real sense, lex (law) or ius (statute) can be 
considered as wholly Roman as satura (which is "tota nostra''), an irony 
which imbues the De Ira and shapes its appeal to both legal and satiric 
sensibilities.222 Seneca's illustrations, reminiscent of passages from 
Lucilius and Horace, censure, denounce, exaggerate, and even disgust.223 
The exempla themselves, however, aside from the prose framework 
demanded by the work, emphasize a feature less prevalent or necessary to 
Lucilius or Horace, who lived in times more congenial to libertas as a 
comprehensive and vital political reality: Seneca's exempla from the past 
are distant enough to be safe models for criticism.224 Since elements of 
222To Quintilian's Roman claim for the origin of satire (Instiutio 
Oratoria, X.1.93) must be added a Roman claim for the development of the 
science of law. Marrou, 289, puts it thus: "The one really great feature of 
Latin education was in fact the opportunity it provided of a legal 
career.Jaw was the great creation achieved by the genius of Rome ... " 
223In this, at least, Lucilius is the more appropriate model, if only 
because he seeks to shock. Cf. XVII. 567-73, XXIX. 885, or XXIX. 907. 
Horace's denunciations are less mordant, and images which might revolt 
his audience are absent. 
224M. L. Clarke, The Roman Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), 103-105, offers a brief discussion of the loss of libertas during 
the early empire, or "the funeral of the Free State" as Ronald Syme, The 
Roman Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 1, phrases it. Coffey, 
136-37, mentions the dangers of attacks on contemporaries in Juvenal's 
time, and Gilbert Highet, Juvenal The Satirist (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1954), 9, notes that exempla from the distant past are a characteristic of 
Juvenal's work. Although Seneca chose figures from the past for 
consideration, his denunciation of past procedures which resembled 
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his satiric diatribe refer to a generic present in the De Ira, Seneca names 
no names; perhaps a telling indication of the extent of iniuria in practice 
no less than the need to devalue it. 
These trends persist as well in the exempla Seneca provides for 
emulation, of which the anecdotes about Antigonus have the same point 
as the subsequent anecdotes about Philip and Augustus. 
Quid enim facilius fuit Antigono quam duos 
manipulares duci iubere, qui incumbentes regis 
tabernaculo faciebant quod homines et peri-
culosissime et libentissime faci unt, de rege 
suo male existimabant? Audierat omnia Antigonus, 
utpote cum inter dicentes et audientem palla 
interesset; quam ille leviter commovit et: 
"Longius" inquit "discedite, ne vos rex 
audiat." Idem quadam nocte, cum quosdam ex 
militibus suis exaudisset omnia mala impre-
cantis regi, qui ipsos in illud iter et inextri-
cabile l utum deduxisset, accessit ad eos qui 
maxime laborabant et cum ignorantis a quo ad-
i uvarentur explicuisset, "nunc" inquit "male 
dicite Antigono, cuius vitio in has miseras 
incidistis; ei autem bene optate qui vos ex 
hac voragine eduxit." Idem tam miti animo 
hostium suorum male dicta quam civium tulit. 
ltaque cum in parvulo quodam castello Graeci 
obsiderentur et fiducia loci contemnentes hos-
tem multa in deformitatem Antigoni iocarentur 
et nunc staturam humilem, nunc conlisum nasum 
deriderent, "gaudeo" inquit "et aliquid boni 
spero, si in castris meis Sil en um habeo." Cum 
hos dicaces fame domuisset, captis sic usus est 
ut eos qui militiae utiles erant in cohortes 
discriberet, ceteros praeconi subiceret, idque 
maiestas must have involved some risk. 
se negavit facturum fuisse, nisi expediret iis 
dominum habere qui tam malam haberent linguam. 
(llI.22.1-5) 
(What indeed would have been easier than for 
Antigonus to order the execution of the two 
common soldiers, who, while they leaned against 
the royal tent, expressed--as men will do with 
equally great danger and delight--their ill 
opinion of their king? Antigonus heard every-
thing, only a canvas intervening between the 
speakers and the listener; this he gently shook 
and said, "Move a little further off, for the 
king might hear you." Again, one night, when 
he overheard some of his soldiers invoking all 
kinds of curses upon the king for having led 
them into such a road and inextricable mud, he 
went up to those who were struggling most, and 
when he had got them out, without revealing who 
their helper was, he said, "Now curse Antigonus, 
by whose fault you have fallen upon this mishap, 
but bless him who has led you out of this swamp." 
He also bore the abuse of his enemies as calmly 
as that of his countrymen. And so, when he was 
besieging some Greeks in a small fort, and they, 
confident in their position, showed open contempt 
for the enemy, and cracking many jokes upon the 
ugliness of Antigonus scoffed now at his diminu-
tive stature, now at his flattened nose, he merely 
said, "If I have a Silenus in my camp, I am fortu-
nate and hope for good 1 uck." When he had subdued 
these wags by hunger, he disposed of his captives 
as follows: those who were fit for military service 
he assigned to regiments; the rest he put up at 
auction, saying that he would not have done so had 
it not seemed good for men who had such an evil 
tongue to find a master.) 
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Although far less expansive than his collection of tales which recall 
tyrannical caprice and cruelty, the anecdotes chosen for their value as 
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models for imitation required less embellishment, if only because the two 
sets of stories serve markedly different functions. In proportion to the 
entire length of book three, both groups of exempla taken together seem 
unwieldy or unnecessary, and a refutation based on Stoic moral principles 
does not require the obvious exaggeration of incidents and revolting 
conduct reported on the one hand, or the promotion of ideals and virtuous 
responses suggested on the other.225 Yet hyperbole is justified by a 
satiric end, as is the exhortation to reform implied by exempla depicting 
moral exemplars of which Antigonus is the earliest, although not perhaps 
the most eminent. Philip and Augustus are no less admirable, but the 
account of Antigonus and his restrained attitude toward the common 
soldier contain features common to the other narratives as well. As a 
group they combine elements which curiously link them to the preceeding 
exempla that had illustrated the connection between ira and iniuria. 
Subsequent to the earlier exempla and immediately prior to those 
225This is perhaps what Justus Lipsius, as cited by J. R. G. Wright, 39, 
meant by his comment about the De Ira: "in toto parum distincti, & 
repetitionibus aut digestione confusi." It would seem that one example to 
be avoided and one to be copied would have been sufficient for Seneca to 
make his point. Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1946), 226, mentions the post-classical abridgement of the 
judicial literature of the age and the pruning of statements of the facts of 
cases. In addition to satiric exaggeration, the number of anecdotes would 
not seem unusual in a parody of legal writing which would contain several 
cases to illustrate a legal point. See below, Chap. 4. 
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whose first figure is Antigonus, Seneca adds a legal consideration to his 
prefatory commonplace on models for avoidance and emulation. 226 
Et haec cogitanda sunt exempla quae vites, 
et illa ex contrario quae sequaris, moder-
ata, lenia, quibus nee ad irascendum causa 
defuit nee ad ulciscendum potestas. 
(lll.22.1) 
(These should be regarded as examples to be 
avoided; the following, on the other hand, 
are to be imitated, being instances of re-
strained and gentle men, who lacked neither 
a case conducive to anger nor the power of 
requital.) 
In addition to the clear division of exempla, however, Seneca's choice of 
terms continues the legal emphasis and sustains continuity with previous 
definitions of crucial terms.227 The legal significance of both causa 
("case," and the reason or cause for bringing one) and potestas (complete 
or full citizen rights) could hardly elude the notice of the educated Roman, 
226Cf. Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, praefatio 10: "Hoc illud est praecipue in 
cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in 
inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod 
imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites." 
227For causa, see OLD, entry 1: "judicial proceedings, a legal case, 
trial." Potestas (OLD, entries la and c) meant power in a "legal or quasi-
legal context." Cf. Gaius, Inst. I.48-49: "nam quaedam personae sui iuris 
sunt, quaedam alieno iuri sunt subiectae. Sed rursus earum personarum, 
quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, aliae in potestate, aliae in manu, aliae in 
mancipio." Seneca refers to Praexaspes as mancipium (slave) at III.14.3. 
It is noteworthy that both causa and potestas are Seneca's terms of choice 
in the short preface to exempla for emulation. 
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much less Novatus, especially given the substance of the exempla which 
follow. Both words nevertheless suggest a legal sense by the accounts 
which they preface, all of which entail varieties or degrees of iniuria upon 
which the personalities in the anecdotes declined to pursue--a circumstance 
germane to Seneca's objective: the deterrence and refusal of legal action 
based on the delict. 
Seneca cites three separate occasions on which Antigonus, according 
to the story, endures contumelious disregard by his own soldiers or by his 
enemies; indignities to which he reacts with an ingenuity and 
magnanimity Seneca praises. The incidents stand in stark opposition to 
the foregoing exempla. The cruel and ingenious supplicia (punishments) 
inflicted by sovereigns on their subjects in the earlier accounts often 
accompany only the slightest pretext or justification. 228 Whereas 
Praexaspes' advisory comments are accounted effrontery by an intimate 
Cambyses, the subordinates of Antigonus lack any such ties with their 
leader and his enemies are ipso facto inimical; their derision is hardly 
unexpected or surprising. In sum, Seneca's examples exhaust the 
228The story of Cambyses and Praexaspes, for example, hinges on a 
remark intended as beneficial and in the best interests of Cambyses. 
Seneca uses bona consilia (good advice) to describe the comments of 
Praexaspes (111.14.6) and refers to his relationship with Cambyses as 




possibilities, and he establishes far more than the straightforward 
presentation of sets of anecdotes whose design is a simple opposition 
between indulgence in ira and Stoic discipline. The contrasts extend much 
further, and reveal considerable legal detail. Seneca's villains dispense an 
inclement judgment on the most tenuous grounds; his ideal rulers overlook 
genuine causes for grievance. 
The recognizable categories of iniuria pervade the Antigonus 
exemplum and its companion pieces, the narrative passages extolling 
Philip and Augustus (111.23). The offensive speech in public against the 
highest of officials is flagrant in each case, and in every instance the 
affront to dignitas differs radically from the ostensibly objectionable 
conduct of the various underlings in the first set of exempla. Technical 
violations of iniuria in the second series of tales are patent and cannot be 
compared to the actions of a Praexaspes, for example, whose advisory 
intent requires distortion to be understood as abusive or outrageous. As 
a consequence, the sets of exempla disclose undercurrents in addition to 
the manifest opposition between hyperbole and shock at one extreme, and 
reformative models at the other. Seneca's tyrants (be they barbarian, 
Greek, or Roman) represent an extreme in almost every detail from offense 
to judgment and execution, whereas his enlightened rulers express an 
exceptional restraint and curbing of autocratic imperium (authority) or 
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potestas (power) in the face of open variations of iniuria. This is clear both 
in the selection of legal vocabulary and a survey of the facts included in 
the cases Seneca presents. 229 He describes Philip as possessing 
"contumeliarum patientia" (an endurance for insults) and Augustus as 
content "a conviciatore suo secedere" (to withdraw from his maligner), 
phrases which plainly indicate that retaliation would have been the 
expected response: in other words, Seneca is explicit about the legally 
actionable nature of the offenses outlined. 230 
If the earlier exempla contain illustrations of speech injurious to 
dignitas on dubious grounds at best, the contumely vented on Antigonus, 
Philip, and Augustus is unquestionable, and renders Seneca's introductory 
"nec ... causa defuit" (nor was a case lacking) accurate. Just as exact, 
however, is the phrase "nee ad ulciscendum potestas" (nor the ability to 
avenge) as an additional condition to be observed in the following 
narratives. Dissimilarities in the use of potestas (authority/power) form 
229From Seneca's account--a true one at least in terms of its fidelity to 
the spirit of the Herodotean original--the grounds for iniuria or maiestas 
are ambiguous in the case of Praexaspes' remarks. Digest 47.10.3.1-2 
emphasizes intent as a necessary criterion, one which Seneca suggests was 
absent by describing Praexaspes' objections as bona consilia (llI.14.6). 
23
°R.emarkably, Seneca does not refrain from using legal language that 
denotes iniuria when describing the conduct which goes unavenged or 
unpunished. The specific vocabulary used to designate legal offenses is 
present in the exempla showcasing restrained rulers. The contrast 
between clear-cut and doubtful cases of iniuria is marked. 
131 
perhaps the most striking feature differentiating the two sets of exempla. 
For satiric as well as legal purposes, the reactions of Seneca's prototypes 
of cruelty or clemency furnish abundant material for comparison.231 As 
previously noted at length, the legally distinctive element characterizing 
the responses of Cambyses, Alexander, Gaius Caesar and others concerns 
the gross debasement of ordinary judicial procedure: the abandonment of 
an expected series of phases and a normal separation of roles. 232 
Antigonus, Philip, and Augustus are equally autocratic, despite the more 
apparent violations of iniuria recounted. The absence of an appropriate 
trial is a central fact which characterizes all the exempla, but an important 
difference is conspicuous: Seneca's tyrants display an abjuratory rejection 
of legal recourse despite clear entitlement to such recourse.233 Seneca's 
models of restraint refrain from ira, but from iniuria as well, dispensing 
neither poena (punishment or monetary penalty) nor supplicium (more 
extreme punishment; torture or execution); his villains on the other hand 
231The stark opposition between vice and virtue, or folly and wisdom, 
is one of the hallmarks of satiric technique. Horace Sermones I.1 offers a 
ready model. Avarice and miserliness are offset by the ideal of 
contentment with what is at hand. Highet, Anatomy of Satire, passim, 
discusses this characteristic of satire at considerable length. 
232See above, 129-130. 
233Jones, 90-95, and Crook, 250-55, lay out the details of due process in 
cases of maiestas or iniuria. The praetor normally presided over cases of 
iniuria, and the senate tried cases of maiestas. 
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exact a supplicium subsequent to a travesty of the legal process which 
effectively overwhelms and is a distraction from the expressed theme--
• 234 ira. 
Seneca's point in juxtaposing these exempla becomes increasingly 
evident and merits a brief summary. Although on the face of it an 
endeavor to differentiate approaches to ira and promote the Stoic ideal, the 
narratives themselves include much else that distracts from these ends. 
Furthermore, the appropriateness of the anecdotes to a strict philosophical 
discussion is itself questionable, not to mention the disproportionate scope 
Seneca assigns them.235 Yet the exempla readily offer the clues needed 
to resolve these issues, if one is prepared to accept a satiric purpose and 
forego the tempting conclusion that they represent one more 
demonstration that the De Ira is only a disorganized mass of arguments, 
colorful digressions, and anecdotes. 236 The incorporation of contrasting 
exempla as models for avoidance or emulation is a familiar technique in 
234For Seneca's addressee and for a Roman audience in general, the 
legal nuances present in the anecdotes and the number of anecdotes--far 
from being a distraction--wouldmost likely have been an expected addition 
to his criticism of anger; especially so, considering the form he seems to 
have been parodying. See below, Chaps. 4 and 5, for parallels between the 
De Ira and the judicial responsum. 
235Ibid. 
2~he latter view--or variations of it--has been a common one among 
scholars. See Wright, 39, and 65 n.7. 
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Roman satire, and an effort to discourage vice and advance virtue requires 
the least flattering portrayal of the former accompanied by the most 
plausible presentation of the latter.237 Seneca certainly accomplishes 
these ends in the ten chapters that he devotes this project. Ira, however, 
is less the focus of the narratives than iniuria, whether alleged or 
established by the facts as given. As a consequence, the exempla are not 
simply a survey of provocations and responses to ira, but a display of types 
of actual or assumed iniuria and remedies for it. The narratives thus 
become concrete causae (cases), traced from the initial offenses (delicta) to 
eventual penalties (poenae/supplicia) or grants of clemency (clementia), and 
Seneca concludes the exempla with a plea for legal restraint which 
altogether omits ira . 
... pro quocumque illud nobis respondeamus, sapien-
tissimos quoque viros multa delinguere, neminem esse 
tam circumspectum cuius non diligentia aliquando 
sibi ipsa excidat, neminem tam maturum cuius non 
gravitatem in aliquod fervidius factum casus impingat, 
neminem tam timidum offensarum qui non in illas dum 
vitat incidat. 
(111.24.4) 
(. .. whoever it may be, let us say this to ourselves in 
237The satires of Horace offer numerous examples; in particular, the 
diatribes of Book 1(1.1,1.2, 1.3) and Book 2 (2.2, 2.3, and 2.7). Rudd, 1-35, 
and 160-201, carefully examines Horace's treatment of virtue and vice in 
these satires. Horace even personalizes his examples, and recalls his own 
father using this very method of presenting models for avoidance and 
emulation (Cf. Sermones 1.4). 
his behalf that even the wisest men have committed 
many delicts, that no man is so guarded that he does 
not sometimes let his diligence lapse, none so season-
ed that accident does not drive his composure into 
some hot-headed action, none so fearful of giving of-
fence that he does not stumble into it while seeking 
to avoid it.) 
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Having given adequate illustration to iniuria, and to quite opposite 
methods of redress, Seneca resumes his previous course for the remainder 
of the De Ira, giving cursory attention to the mitigation of anger so as to 
satisfy his initial pretext for the work. No sooner does he begin to discuss 
ira, however, than his theme once again reverts to iniuria, the courts, and 
an admonitory recommendation to abstain from litigation. Most of the 
legal vocabulary associated with the delict reappears as Seneca moves 
toward a finale much resembling the close of a satiric monologue.238 The 
adversarius implicit in the ubiquitous "inquis," has admirably and in 
timely fashion afforded him the justification for a diatribe on the courts 
and iniuria, for numerous exempla which contrast alternative reactions to 
iniuria, and for a sustained advocacy of reform. This last characteristic, 
a chief aim of satire and a hallmark of the spirit of satire, clearly takes 
the form of a plea for legal restraint in the concluding chapters of the final 
238Cf. Horace Sermones 1.1.108-119, where the satirist returns to his 
central complaint and suggests a more appropriate attitude. Seneca's 
hortatory illud nobis respondeamus (let us say this to ourselves) begins a 
similar advisory statement to conclude the preceding exempla. 
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book of the De Ira.239 It now becomes plain that iniuria, the delict about 
which Seneca has complained and offered anecdotal evidence, is the 
disease for which ira (the apparent cause) is, in fact, only a symptom. And 
in keeping with the medical metaphor he freely employs throughout, 
Seneca carefully begins a chapter with this telling comment: 
Quanto satius est sanare iniuriam quam ulcisci! 
Multum temporis ultio absumit, multis se iniuriis 
obicit dum una dolet. 
(111.27.1) 
(How much better it is to heal than to avenge an 
injury! Vengeance consumes much time, and it ex-
poses the doer to many injuries while he smarts 
from one.) 
The object of "sanare," so accurately indicative of Seneca's effort as well, 
is not iram here, but iniuriam. 
Despite recurrent mention of ira for the balance of the work, equal 
if not greater attention is paid to iniuria and its judicial consequences. As 
in earlier sections of the De Ira, the two notions appear in tandem, and it 
will be worthwhile to give a brief selection of citations where they either 
coincide or a connection is implied. 
I. ... sic animo aequiore fert ab aliquo laedi, ab 
aliquo contemni, cuicumque venit in mentem nullam 
239Reform has long been considered one of the motives of the satirist. 
Highet, 241, notes the observation of Dryden that the "true end of satire 
is the amendment of vices by correction," a view in keeping with 
Diomedes' definition. See above, Introduction, 2. 
esse tantam potentiam in quam non occur at ini uria. 
(IIl.25.1) 
( ... so a man is more content to be injured by one, 
to be scorned by another, if he takes thought that 
no power is so great as to be beyond the reach of 
injury.) 
II. ... propri um est magnitudinis verae non sentire percus-
s um .... Qui non irascitur, inconcussus iniuria per-
stitit, qui irascitur, motus est. 
(III.25.3) 
(The mark of true greatness is not to notice that 
you have received a blow ... The man who does not 
get angry stands firm, unshaken by iniuria; he who 
gets angry is overthrown.) 
III. "Plus mihi nocitura est ira quam iniuria. Quidni 
pl us? illi us modus cert us est, ista quo usque me 
latura sit dubium est." 
"Non possum" inquis "pati; grave est iniur-
iam sustinere." Mentiris; quis enim iniuriam non 
potest ferre qui potest iram? 
(III.25.4-26.1) 
("My anger is likely to do me more harm than iniuria. 
And why not more? The limit of the injury is fixed, 
but how far the anger will sweep me no man knows." 
"I cannot," you say, "be forbearing; it is dif-
ficult to submit to iniuria." That is not true; for 
who that can tolerate anger will yet be unable to 
tolerate iniuria?) 
IV. . .. maxima est enim factae iniuriae poena fecisse, 
nee quisquam gravius adficitur quam qui ad suppli-
cium paenitentiae traditur. 
(III.26.2) 
( ... for the greatest punishment for iniuria is having 
done it, and no man is more heavily punished tha 
he who is consigned to the torture of remorse.) 
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In a short span following his exempla, Seneca refers repeatedly to 
iniuria, and his deliberate mention of "laedi" (to be injured), "contemni" 
(to be scorned), and "percussum" (blow) leaves no doubt that his intended 
request for forbearance pertains to actionable offenses covered by the 
deli ct. 240 At the same time a return to persuasion or reasonable 
argument, so often interrupted by literary figures and conventions, once 
again becomes the chief means of appeal.241 Yet this too, although the 
mainstay of a philosophical endeavor, is a necessary but not exclusive 
ingredient of the satiric design to reproach vice and encourage its 
elimination.242 Seneca now builds layer upon layer of argument, but 
240See above, Chap. 2, 68, n. 133, on the association between percussus 
and iniuria. Laedo (OLD, entries 1-4) and contemno (OLD, entry 1) both 
signify contumelious words or actions. 
241Seneca's physiological description of the angry man and wild beasts 
(1.1.3-7), his diatribe on the courts (II. 7-9), and the anecdotes (111.14-23) are 
just a few of the many examples of Seneca's departure from strict 
argument. 
242Griffin, 13-20, explores the possible traditions on which Seneca might 
have relied in writing the dialogi. The problem itself arises, in fact, from 
the expectation that Seneca present a lucid and straightforward argument 
against anger which progresses without digression. That Seneca does not 
fulfill this expectation represents a failure in technique only in that the 
De Ira fails to satisfy a preference for such a format. In this sense, the 
work is undoubtedly flawed. The expectation of a linear and 
uninterrupted argument, however, is also flawed in that it presumes our 
author's inability to continue a sustained argument when he does, in fact, 
achieve this for considerable stretches of the work. At the same time, this 
expectation is also a refusal to accept the possibilty that Seneca's 
digressions may present evidence of models other than philosphical ones, 
even though no extant model has been discovered which provides a more 
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close reading of the line of reasoning in each of these passages cannot fail 
to mark iniuria as his primary object of emphasis. One retort to his 
adversarius clearly demonstrates this. 
Adice nunc quod id agis, ut et iram feras et 
iniuriam. 
(III.26.1) 
(Besides, what you now propose is to tolerate 
both anger and iniuria.) 
The causal connection suggested here is plain; ira results from iniuria, as 
the adversarius implies. Yet Seneca conjoins them as separate issues: ira 
and iniuria. Likewise, he places them on the same level, since both are 
problematic. Be that as it may, it is not difficult to discern precisely which 
problem he chooses to address. 
Denique debeat poenas; non est quod cum illo paria 
faciamus. 
(III.25.2) 
(Suppose in the end he deserves punishment; then there 
is no reason why we should match his misdeeds.) 
In the context of the sentence and the De Ira in general, poenas 
(punishments) assumes the unmistakable sense of legal penalty incumbent 
on iniuria, which he urges the reader to repudiate, in addition to the 
or less exact parallel for the De Ira. See Chap. 4, passim, in which a case 
is made for the epistolary responsum as the model for the De Ira. 
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principle of vengeance intrinsic to ira.243 
In the final passage of the four, Seneca refers to poena (penalty) a 
second time, and introduces the stronger term supplicium (execution) 
immediately afterward. Mention of these legal penalties carries 
considerable weight, for his argument now emphasizes the contrast 
between what is allowable by law on the one hand, and what is demanded 
in accordance with higher principles. Seneca had drawn attention to this 
disparity earlier in the De Ira, remarking on the limited standard of virtue 
the law provides compared with other criteria, such as pietas (duty), 
humanitas (humanity), liberalitas (generosity), iustitia (justice), or {ides 
(integrity).244 His second use of poena is clearly intended as part of a 
moral position in contrast with iniuria. To repeat the crucial passage: 
... maxima est enim factae iniuriae poena fecisse, 
nee quisquam gravius adficitur quam qui ad suppli-
cium paenitentiae traditur. 
(III.26.2) 
( ... for the greatest punishment of iniuria is having 
done it, and no man is more heavily punished than 
he who is consigned to the torture of remorse.) 
Seneca's view is radical and in the common perspective unconventional, 
but quite consistent with an ethical insight which begins with Socrates in 
243See above, Chap. 2, pp. 62-3. 
244 II.28.2 
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the Apology: the criminal is the primary victim of his own crime. 245 
This sentiment as expressed in the De Ira certainly connects its 
author with a tradition, yet it is a custom and viewpoint assimilated by 
the Roman satirists as well, of which Horace is the closest model. 
Although Seneca had been anticipated by his predecessors, his detailed 
analysis of anger is novel and has extraordinary scope.246 Once again, 
just as he had earlier differentiated his own definition of ira from that of 
Aristotle by introducing the terminology of Roman law, he now produces 
an old idea in a characteristically Roman manner--its obvious legal 
application.247 And once more, the operative term is poena (penalty), 
which he augments with supplicium (execution), as if to remove any doubt 
as to his intended meaning.248 In terms of Seneca's persistent and 
245 Plato Apology 18.c-d. 
246Griffin, 168, mentions Posidoni us and Sotion as two of Seneca's 
sources for the views expressed in the De Ira. No work on anger which 
predates Seneca survives other than in fragments. Jan Fredrik 
Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with 
Introduction and Commentary (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 1976), 151, mentions Bion as a source for later pieces on 
anger by Philodemus, and cites Antipater and Sotion as authors to whom 
works on anger have been attributed. 
247Seneca's definition of ira at l.3.2, "diximus cupiditatem esse poenae 
exigendae" (I have ruled that it is the desire to exact a penalty), is 
contrasted with Aristotle's "cupiditatem doloris reponendi" (the desire to 
repay suffering). The phrase poenae exigendae places ira in a legal 
context. See below, Chap. 5, for the formulaic sense of diximus. 
248See above, Chap. 2, pp. 62-3, on the legal meaning of supplicium. 
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recent references to iniuria, the implication of the Socratic view acquires 
a decidedly Roman cast, since he removes the general notion of 
wrongdoing and its consequences from the realm of abstraction and secures 
a practical legal context with precise and very circumscribed limits. More 
than simply a truism or offhand remark, the assertion that the greatest 
penalty for iniuria is to have committed the delict (111.26.2) expands the 
original Socratic idea by superimposing a legal framework as an exact 
referent. 
Despite its legal nuance, Seneca's comment retains a measure of the 
Socratic sense for the simple reason that his appeal presumes a higher 
moral authority and precepts which transcend the law; in fact, this is the 
essential basis of his claim.249 The recommendation not to feel the blow 
nor be stunned by contumelious affronts breaks with accepted Roman 
practice, as does the injunction to suffer iniuria, an exceptionally foreign 
doctrine (Indeed, Greek!) for a people to whom their obdurate belief in the 
preservation of dignitas was a cardinal social tenet. 250 Yet this is what 
Seneca unequivocally urges in the passages quoted; the poenae (penalties) 
249Cf. 11.28.2, a passage in which officium (duty) is set in opposition to 
iuris regula (the principle of law). In sum, the consistency of Seneca's 
opposition of law to morality is apparent in his choice of terms. 
250H. Wegehaupt, "Die Bedeutung von dignitas in den Schriften der 
republikanischen Zeit" (Ph.D. diss., Breslau, 1932), offers a comprehensive 
discussion of this term. 
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and supplicia (punishments) entitled by law are deprecated. A position as 
radical as the one he presents must certainly have jarred the the Roman 
sensibility perhaps even more than the modern.251 Nonetheless, his 
advocacy, while neither denying legitimate delictal claims nor suggesting 
an acquiescence tantamount to the approval of crime, definitely pleads 
avoidance of litigation, about which he is quite specific in the last sections 
of the De Ira. 252 
If Seneca's outspoken denunciation of legal action proceeding from 
iniuria begins to reach a climax in these last chapters, it succeeds in part 
because he adeptly unites two of the strategies of satire: first, the topical 
criticism of the earlier books, and then the proposed reforms which are the 
251Seneca's criticism of talio (retaliation in kind) and ultio (revenge) at 
11.32.1, principles upheld either explicitly or implicitly in the Twelve 
Tables, runs contrary to the fundamental Roman sense of justice. See 
Nicholas, 207, on the principle of vengeance in Roman law. 
252Seneca by no means attempts to deny the severity of iniuria, as he 
indicates repeatedly, nor does he suggest that the commission of the delict 
is acceptable. Responding to the legal argument of his adversarius at 
11.33.1 that we will not be slighted or scorned if we avenge an injury (si 
vindicaverimus iniuriam), Seneca takes no issue with legal recourse as 
such, but only with litigation pursued as a consequence of any motive 
other than expedience (utile). In addition, Seneca suggests an approach to 
iniuria (11.28-31) which compares with Horace's advice on overlooking the 
faults (vitia) of others (Sermones 1.3.19-98). Remarkably, the passage from 
Horace concludes with comments on ira; in point of fact, the spirit and 
tone of this portion of the satire displays an uncanny resemblance to 
Seneca's advisory comments at II.28-31 in the De Ira and may have served 
as his model. 
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central focus of the final book. But in the meantime, the mitigation of ira, 
Novatus' initial request, is of secondary importance compared with 
avoidance of iniuria and the courts, which Seneca now asserts 
emphatically . 
... nunc ex imperio irae loquemur; cum illa abierit, 
tune videbimus, quanto ista lis aestumanda sit. 
In hoc enim praecipue fallimur: ad ferrum venimus, 
ad capitalia supplicia, et vinculis carcere fame 
vindicamus rem castigandam flagris levioribus. 
"Quomodo" inquis "nos i ubes intueri, quam omnia, 
per quae laedi videamur, exigua, misera, puerilia 
sint!" Ego vero nihil magis suaserim quam sumere 
ingentem animum et haec propter quae litigamus 
discurrimus anhelamus videre quam humilia et ab-
iecta sint, nulli qui altum quiddam aut magnificum 
cogitat respicienda. 
Circa pecuniam plurimum vociferationis est: haec 
fora defatigat, patres liberosque committit, venena 
miscet, gladios tam percussoribus quam legionibus 
tradit; haec est sanguine nostro delibuta; propter 
hanc uxorum maritorumque noctes strepunt litibus et 
tribunalia magistratuum premit turba .... 
(III.32.2-33.1) 
(. .. at the moment we shall speak under the authority 
of anger; when that has passed, then we shall be able 
to see at what value we should appraise the lawsuit. 
For it is in this that we are most liable to be wrong. 
We resort to the sword, and to capital punishment, and 
an act that deserves the censure of a very light whip-
ping we punish by chains, the prison, and starvation. 
"In what way," you ask, "do you bid us discover how 
paltry, how pitiful, how childish are all those things 
by which we think we are injured!" I, assuredly, 
could suggest nothing better than that you realize how 
sordid and worthless are all these things for the sake 
of which we litigate, rush to and fro, and pant; these 
do not deserve a thought from the man who has any high 
and noble purpose. 
Most of the outcry is about money. It is this which 
wearies the courts, pits father against son, brews 
poisons, and gives swords alike to the legions and to 
cut-throats; it is daubed with our blood; because of 
it the nights resound with hideous quarrels of husbands 
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and wives; <and by day> the crowds swarm to the tribunals 
of the magistrates.) 
Mention of ira at the start abruptly ceases, to be replaced with a 
succession of judicial images. Seneca shirks the commonplace and 
ordinary case; the circumstances of ira to which he alludes are sufficiently 
severe as to warrant a legal intervention he nevertheless regards as often 
unnecessary, if not ignoble. 
Immediately following his reference to ira, Seneca discusses its 
consequences in terms of the standard Roman expression for lawsuit 
(lis).253 A list of particular and especially stringent legal penalties 
pursuant to litigation appears next, confirming his intention to place ira 
within a legal schema and underscoring the effects of both ira and lis: 
ferrum (sword), capitalia supplicia (capital punishment), vinculis (chains), 
253Lis (OLD, entry 1: "A dispute at law, a lawsuit") appears at the 
beginning and at the end of a passage rife with legal references. Seneca 
cleverly combines its more general meaning (OLD, entry 2: "A dispute, 
quarrel, disagreement") with its legal significance by placing it 
immediately prior to the connective et (and), thus co-ordinating the 
structure (the two clauses) as well as the content (the images of private 
and public conflict). 
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carcere (prison), fame (starvation). Seneca's passing use of ira becomes 
quickly overshadowed by concerns of an exact legal nature, a pattern 
which by now has become identifiable and expected. Phrases such as 
"vindicamus rem" (we punish) and "propter quae litigamus" (for the sake 
of which we litigate) hardly conceal the exigency of reducing the lawsuits 
which he believes "nulli qui altum quiddam aut magnificum cogitat 
respicienda" (do not deserve a thought from the man who has any high and 
noble purpose). 254 Rather than return to ira, Seneca furthers this theme 
in his next chapter, but with a continued reversion to the protest of the 
legal arena employed so often in the second book. 255 In doing so, 
however, he turns to another commonplace topic of satiric ridicule: 
avarice.256 Conflict over money wearies the courts, as he says; it also 
engenders domestic discord and produces the crowds at the tribunals. 
Finally, Seneca climaxes his criticism of this vice with an overt censure, 
begun in the previous chapter, of the willingness to go to trial. 
hi sunt propter quos oculi clamore exprimantur, 
fremitu i udiciorum basilicae resonent, evocati 
ex longinquis regionibus sedeant iudicaturi 
254Berger, 766, cites the technical phrase rei vindicatio as meaning 
"laying claim to, asserting one's right." In this instance, res (OLD, entry 
11) pertains to the matter at issue in a court of law. 
255Cf. II.7-9. 
256Cf. Horace Sermones I.l. Seneca's comments at III.33.2 parallel 
those of Horace in both general treatment and tone. 
utrius iustior avaritia sit. 
(III.33.2) 
(But these are what men shout for until their eye-
balls start; for the sake of these the lawcourts 
resound with the din of trials, and jurors summoned 
from distant parts sit in judgment to decide which 
man's greed has the more just claim.) 
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The insertion of avarice into the discussion produces a mixture or 
medley which is typical of satire and essential to its nature.257 Just as 
he combines topics in a brief span, Seneca intermingles objectives in the 
concluding chapters of the De Ira, thereby achieving a medley of 
approaches as well. Diatribe, reform, and systematic argument coalesce 
to match the variety of concerns treated. Despite the obligatory and 
periodic reversion to ira, the legal terminology associated with iniuria 
recurs throughout; "verba contumeliosa, motus corporum parum 
honorificos," and "interpretationesmalignas vocis alienae" (insulting words, 
disrespectful gestures, and malicious misconstruction of another's words) 
and similar phrases assume the place of prominence in Seneca's final 
considerations.258 Ira reappears constantly, if only to establish a 
convenient point of departure from which to elaborate his numerous 
proposals and recommendations for reform, all of which directly relate to 
257Coffey, 11-23, provides a lucid discussion of the origin and nature of 
satura, as does Knoche, 3-16. 
2581Il.34.1 
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acts covered by the deli ct. 259 Not unexpectedly, then, does Seneca close 
the De Ira with a clear condemnation of the "cupiditatem ... poenae 
exigendae" (the desire to exact a penalty) with which he opened.260 It 
should come as no surprise that he summarizes his message with an 
asyndetic flurry of legal circumstances to be shunned. 
Interim, dum trahimus, dum inter homines sumus, 
colamus humanitatem; non timori cuiquam, non peri-
culo simus; detrimenta iniurias, convicia velli-
cationes contemnamus et magno animo brevia feramus 
incommoda: dum respicimus, quod aiunt, versamusque 
nos, iam mortalitas aderit. 
(111.43.5) 
(Meanwhile, so long as we draw breath, so long as we 
live among men, let us cherish humanity. Let us not 
cause fear to any man, not danger; let us disdain 
losses, injuries, public abuse, and taunts, and let 
us endure magnanimously our short-lived annoyances. 
While we look back, as they say ,and turning around, 
immediately death will be upon us.) 
259The key words and phrases associated with iniuria--contumelia 
(insult), conuicium (clamor), percutere (to strike a blow)--repeatedly occur 




THE DE IRA AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSUM 
The prominence of Seneca's emphasis on the legal consequences 
associated with ira is by now apparent: descriptions of the social results of 
anger invariably include the crowded courts, anger is defined and 
discussed in terms of the delict iniuria, and recommendations for reform 
largely consist of repeated appeals for judicial restraint. But the legal 
content of the De Ira raises the possibility of a legal format as well, and 
the structure of the work remarkably parallels the observed features of the 
judicial or epistolary responsum, a genre in which the Roman jurists 
carefully examined individual legal issues or points of law, often at great 
length and in detail. Comparison of known characteristics of the responsa 
with the technical language and formal elements of the De Ira, in addition 
to underscoring Seneca's persistent focus on iniuria, explains the most 
important structural anomalies of the work which have set the De Ira 
apart from earlier representatives of the philosophical dialogue. 
Senecan scholars of the past century have suspected that the Dialogi 
generally and the De Ira in particular admit influences and models other 
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than the philosophical dialogue.261 Their suspicions are well justified: 
structural and stylistic similarities between many of the dialogues and 
other genres, notably the Hellenistic diatribe and Horace's Sermones, have 
been recognized.262 Attention to an individual moral theme, spontaneous 
or unsystematic organization, a pointed style, vivid imagery, and 
colloquialisms are all features common not only to the Hellenistic diatribe 
and Horace's satire, but to the De Ira as well.263 Like his predecessors, 
Seneca chooses a universal moral ill to castigate, tries to expose its 
undesirable effects, and urges the benefits of alternate courses of 
action.264 Vividly though he describes the mad countenance of the angry 
man or the hideous results of anger, even when justified, Seneca's 
descriptions of the pernicious legal and social consequnces of ira are even 
more striking; and it is primarily this legal perspective which brings the 
elements of satire into sharp focus in the De Ira. He directs his criticism 
261Griffin, 6-16, briefly discusses the scholarly conclusions over the past 
century on the structure of the ten dialogues in the Codex Ambrosianus 
and the Epistulae Morales; she includes a survey of some of the literary 
models on which Seneca may have relied in writing the dialoges. 
2621bid., 13-16. 
263lbid. 
264Examples from Bi on and Horace are plentiful. Kindstrand, passim, 
1976) offers an excellent commentary on individual moral issues which 
Bion discussed. Rudd, passim, analyzes Horace's moral concerns and 
frequently points out his indebtedness to Bion. 
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of the age to ajudicial milieu rife with abuse, along with dispraise of folly, 
and recommendations for restraint. In the course of this, ira, which 
Seneca now calls a delict, stands revealed as not only a moral issue, but 
a legal issue as well.265 
The fact remains, however, that De Ira is the title of the work at 
hand as it has been transmitted, not De Iniuria; anger is the ostensible 
subject, and its relevance to iniuria requires further analysis in light of 
Seneca's frank discussion of the delict. Likewise, the three elements of 
satire heretofore discussed--topical protest, censure of iniuria, and 
recommendations for reform--comprise but a few of the salient features of 
the De Ira and only partially succeed in determining Seneca's purpose. 
Aside from this, the work has prompted numerous questions which have 
largely been left unanswered, but have led to considerable speculation 
about Seneca's literary models.266 Certainly the prevalence of satiric 
techniques in a reputed philosophical dialogue is a conspicuous departure 
from the stylistic norms of the genre.267 Yet other aspects of the De Ira 
violate the conventions of the type as well. Unlike the most representative 
2651.16.1 
266Griffin, Introduction and Appendix B2. 
267Hirzel, 24-34, examines the Senecan dialogues within the tradition 
of the genre and notes some of the peculiarities of style which characterize 
the dialogues. 
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specimens, such as the Platonic dialogues or those of Cicero, the De Ira 
has no definite setting and lacks even the pretense of conversation.268 
At the same time, there are no named interlocutors; indeed, so far from 
being a proper dialogue with all its give and take, the only named 
personality is Theophrastus, whose appearance in an apostrophe makes the 
absence of a real addressee all the more striking. Seneca's adversarius is 
the virtually anonymous subject of "inquis" or "inquit. "269 As a 
consequence, this rather significant accumulation of unorthodox elements 
makes dialogus a flatly inappropriate generic designation of the De Ira, 
despite the testimony of Quintilian or the title attached to the Codex 
Ambrosianus.270 If dialogus is an unsatisfactory term to describe the 
268Griffin, 413-14, comments on these anomalies and remarks that 
during the early Empire dialogi still referred to "philosophical works with 
named characters and organized debate," features which continued to 
mark the dialogue long after Seneca's time. 
269 At I.12.3, Seneca uses the vocative "Theophraste;" at l.14.1, he 
employs the nominative "Theophrastus." Theophrastus, however, is not 
a "character" within the dialogue. Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid. 
Gronovius, 22-25, explain the first mention of Theophrastus as follows: 
"Significat igitur, Theophrastum & Peripateticos, popularia serere: & 
vulgum, quam sapientes, judicem malle; as for the latter citation: "Hoc 
Peripateticisenserunt ... " Griffin, 414-415, notes parallels between Seneca's 
use of the indefinite "inquit" and Cicero's use of the figure; she also 
comments that the audience would naturally attach remarks which follow 
"inquit" to the accuser in judicial speech, an observation which hints at 
the role this formulaic verb plays in the Roman legal literature. 
270Quintilian 10.1.129. Reynolds, praefatio, discusses the title and the 
mss. tradition. Cf. Griffin, 13. 
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design of the De Ira, we must search for precedents elsewhere, and the 
satiric techniques and legal content already observed may perhaps offer 
clues and provide a direction not yet taken. The exaggerated portrayal of 
a particular vice was typical of the diatribe, along with the unsystematic 
and casual presentation characterized by stretches of bitter censure, by 
argument, or by exhortations to improvement and virtue. The occasional 
interjections of an impersonal interlocutor and a colloquial style are also 
present, characteristics which are hallmarks of the satiric monologues of 
Horace and parallel at least some of the stylistic elements of the De 
Ira.271 Nonetheless, neither investigation of its philosophical tradition 
nor study of its satiric background accounts for the absence of the genuine 
give and take which had been standard in the philosophical dialogue prior 
to Seneca's age.272 Finally, the serious and highly technical nature of 
Seneca's legal comments on iniuria and various ancillary issues has thus 
far gone unrecognized because scholars have disregarded the juristic 
literature of individual legal problems. This sparse yet important body of 
literature may well have served as a precedent for Seneca's purposes in 
271Fraenkel, 76-153, Knoche, 73-98, Coffey, 63-97, and Rudd, passim, 
each examine some or all of these characteristics of Horatian satire. 
272See Hirzel, 24-27. 
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the De Ira.273 In addition, the choice of a distinct class of legal literature 
on which to pattern the De Ira, when combined with noticeable satiric 
features, raises the possibility of still another satiric element being at 
work in Seneca--the element of parody.274 
As has been seen, Seneca has staked out a position on various issues 
connecting anger with Roman jurisprudence and is familiar with its 
terminology and practice: technical distinctions between types of iniuria, 
recommendations appropriate for judicial magistrates, protracted criticisms 
of overcrowded courts and unnecessary suits, and anecdotes replete with 
the appropriate legal terms, judicial settings, and examples of litigation 
forestalled or avoided. At the very heart of the De Ira, Seneca summarizes 
his view of the law within the larger context: 
Ut hoc ita sit, quam angusta innoeentia est ad legem 
bonum esse! Quanto latius offieiorum patet quam iuris 
regula! Quam multa pietas humanitas liberalitas 
iustitia fides exigunt, quae omnia extra publicas 
tabulas sunt! Sed ne ad illam quidem artissimam in-
nocentiae formulam praestare nos possumus .... 
(Il.28.2-3) 
(But assuming that this may be, how limited is the in-
273Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1946), 223, describes the literature of problems as "works devoted 
exclusively to problems, to the most difficult and perplexing questions of 
law. Their titles vary--Digesta, Responsa, Quaestiones, Disputationes, and 
so on ... " Cf. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and 
Constitutional History, trans. J.M. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 
103-115. 
274See below, Chap. 5. 
nocence whose standard of virtue is the law! How much 
more comprehensive is the principle of duty than that 
of law! How many are the demands laid upon us by the 
sense of duty, humanity, generosity, justice, integrity-
all of which lie outside the statute books! But even 
within that other exceedingly narrow formula of innocence 
we cannot distinguish ourselves.) 
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In one of Seneca's more impassioned appeals, there is no mention of ira as 
such, even though one might have expected it; only the clear contrast of 
standards between strict legitimacy on the one hand, and virtue on the 
other. Seneca's preference is certainly the latter, and is consistent with 
his remarks on iniuria throughout the De Ira. 
At the very beginning of the same chapter, however, he opens with 
a curious protasis. 
Si volumus aequi rerum omnium iudices esse ... 
(Il.28.1) 
(If we intend in all matters to be fair judges ... ) 
Seneca's subsequent contrast of moral and legal criteria for action acquires 
added emphasis in light of this simple condition. If we assume the plural 
of the personal pronoun is not rhetorically all-inclusive, but spoken with 
reference to the author and his addressee, Seneca's remark recalls the sort 
of language used in memoranda between two Roman officials responsible 
for dispensing justice, much in the manner of a type of juristic writing 
known as a responsum, in which an expert in Roman jurisprudence 
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furnishes an answer to a question concerning a special point of law.275 
Thus, if satire of the delict iniuria and its abuses is one of Seneca's 
primary aims in the De Ira, what better model could he have chosen for 
a parody of law than a familiar genre specifically employed for the formal 
discussion of legal problems and their nuances?276 
As with of the parallels between the diatribes ofBion ofBorysthenes 
and Seneca's Dialogi investigated at the turn of the past century, the 
evidence upon which to compare extant samples of judicial responsa with 
275Berger, 681, provides this brief summary on the responsa: "A type 
of juristic writing. The jurists used to publish their answers .. .in collections 
entitled Responsa. We know of responsa of Labeo, Sabinus, Neratius, 
Marcellus, Scaevola, Papinian, Paul, Ulpian, and some other jurists. The 
adaptation of the original responsafor publication required sometimes the 
addition of specific argumentation, particularly when opinions of other 
jurists were being rejected. Some jurists dealt with the cases, on which 
they had given opinions (responsa) as respondent lawyers, in other works, 
such as Quaestiones, or Digesta(Celsus, Julian, Marcellus) and vice versa, 
they inserted some real or fictitious cases they discussed as teachers in the 
works published as Responsa." Griffin, 167-68, briefly touches on Seneca's 
concern with the appropriate behavior of a judge. 
276Highet, 67-147, offers a somewhat dated, yet still adequate, 
discussion of the various types of parody, including parody which is not 
comic, but a borrowing of form in a completely new setting. He divides it 
into two main classes: formal and material. In the latter, the form of the 
original being parodied is maintained, while the thought conveyed is 
inappropriate to the chosen form. In the case of the De Ira, Seneca's use 
of the responsum would at first sight seem an unusual choice of forms in 
which to criticize anger. See below, Chap. 5, passim, for discussion of the 
irony involved in Seneca's approach. 
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Seneca's De Ira is meager and fragmentary.277 Nonetheless, aside from 
details of Seneca's biography which offer near certainty that he would 
have been acquainted with the genre, a satisfactory case based on internal 
data can be made that the judicial responsum--at least as it was 
traditionally structured in the classical period of Roman law--was his most 
likely literary model for the design of the De Ira.278 If this indeed is the 
case, a plausible explanation for previously inexplicable elements of the De 
Ira which have no precedent in earlier philosophical dialogues can be 
made; and Seneca's rationale for omitting the customary stage, characters, 
or the repartee of conversation can be discerned. Moreover, if the De Ira 
is fashioned after the judicial responsum, a genre whose extant specimens 
are either abridged or epitomized, it would be the sole complete (although 
literary) representative of the type, thereby supplying a valuable and 
significant source for further study of the legal literature of problems. 279 
277Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26, surveys the problems resulting 
from the limited evidence. 
278Griffin, passim, reviews Seneca's legal and political careers, 
spanning a period well into the classical age of Roman law in which the 
literature of problems came into its own. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 
92, lists Labeo and his teacher Trebati us as two of the jurists of the period 
of whose opinions we have some knowledge. Horace (Sermones 2.1) 
requests the advice of Trebatius and refers to Labeo disapprovingly (i.3.82). 
See also Otto Lenel, Palingenesia Juris Civilis 1. ii 343-52. 
279Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226, comments on these problems as 
typical among works as poorly transmitted as the Responsa. 
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Seneca's repeated discussion of iniuria in a prescribed legal sense, 
not to mention the range of its applicability or basic disposition, discloses 
technical familiarity with a circumscribed area of the Roman law of delicts 
and is the most obvious sign that at least one of his objectives in the De 
Ira was quasi-legal commentary. Much of the work is consequently 
devoted to the interrelationship between ira and iniuria, or vitium (vice) 
and delictum (delict). Furthermore, Seneca's unremittingly satiric 
treatment of iniuria in particular and legal action in general, far from 
constituting a distraction, actually enhances what appears to be his overall 
design: to parody a responsum in which this particular delict is disparaged 
as a social vice and ira is as technically dissected as if it were a delict. In 
fact, Seneca quite boldly arrives at precisely this conclusion regarding 
anger fairly early in the work, and in a legal context. 
Ergo ad coercitationem errantium sceleratorumque 
irato castigatore non opus est; nam cum ira delictum 
animi sit, non oportet peccata corrigere peccantem. 
"Quid ergo? non irascor latroni? Quid ergo? non 
irascar venefico?" Non; neque enim mihi irascor, 
cum sanguinem mitto. Omne poenae genus remedi loco 
admoveo. 
(l.16.1) 
(Consequently, there is no need that correction be 
given in anger in order to restrain the erring and 
the wicked. For since anger is the delict of the 
mind, it is not right to correct wrong-doing by doing 
wrong. "What then?" you exclaim; "shall I not be 
angry with a robber? Shall I not be angry with a 
poisoner?" No; for I am not angry with myself when 
I let blood. To every form of punishment I will 
resort, but in lieu of a remedy.) 
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Not only does Seneca call anger a deli ct of the mind here, but he 
discusses it within the framework of two delictal violations--robbery and 
poisoning--and in terms which refer to legal action (remedi) and penalty 
(poenae). 280 Be that as it may, the most significant detail of the passage 
is his reference to ira as "delictum animi" (deli ct of the mind). Seneca 
transfers anger from a philosophical or moral context to a legal one. This 
is no idle remark nor casual metaphor on Seneca's part, but a deliberate 
and pointed comment which implies an approach toward anger that alters 
the entire purpose of the work as it has been understood: namely, the 
thorough and complete expression of a Stoic view on anger.281 
Seneca's fundamental attitude toward ira certainly displays the 
recognizable tenets of Stoicism; the dangers and folly of passion (adfectus) 
are noted; instead, action grounded on the will (voluntas) and on reason 
(ratio) is advised.282 This perspective is clear from the outset and is 
280See Nicholas, 209-15, and Berger, 760. 
281See Sandbach, 152. Cf. Wright, passim, and Basore, 112. 
282Seneca's epigrammatic remark at 1.9.4 summarizes his view of the 
passions: "adfectus quidem tam mali ministri quam duces sunt." He 
emphasizes voluntas and ratio throughout, but 1.8.1 is a representative 
passage: "Nam si coepit ferre transversos, difficilis ad salutem recursusest, 
quoniam nihil rationis est, ubi semel adfectus inductus est iusque illi 
aliquod voluntate nostra datum est." Rist, 22-36, on human action and 
emotion, and 219-32, on knowing and willing, provides an in-depth 
consistent throughout the De Ira. Seneca refers to ira as 
... hunc praecipue affectum ... maxime ex 
omnibus taetrum ac rabidum. 
(I.1.1) 
( ... this, the most hideous and frenzied 
of all the emotions ... to an exceptional 
degree.) 
Similarly, in the same chapter, he establishes that 
... iram ... aeque enim impotens sui est, ... rationi 
consiliisque praeclusa .... 
(1.1.2) 
( ... anger ... is equally devoid of self-control ... 
and closed to reason and counsel.. .. ) 
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On the surface, therefore, it is readily apparent why the De Ira has long 
been assumed to be an exhaustive, if not bloated, examination of anger 
from a strict Stoic perspective.283 Furthermore, Seneca's effort to 
distinguish carefully his definition of ira from that of Aristotle greatly 
adds to this impression.284 Nonetheless, this conclusion fails to account 
for two important phenomena: first, Seneca's extensive and accurate use 
of Roman legal terminology; secondly, the methodological agreement 
between Roman law and Stoic moral theory in determining legal liability 
in the case of the former, and moral culpability in the latter case. The 
discussion of these issues within the Stoic tradition. 
283See Wright, 39-40. 
284Seneca refers to Aristotle's views at I.3.3, l.9.2, l.17.1, lll.3.1, and 
III.17 .1. Cf. Aristotle De Anima 403a 30. 
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standards of law he employs to decide a violation of iniuria are the 
identical criteria relied upon to judge anger. In effect, legal and 
philosophical methods merge. Rather than being an obstacle to 
understanding Seneca's actual purpose, however, this correspondence of 
approaches leads to the paradox whereby ira can be assessed as a delictum 
(delict) and iniuria as a vitium (vice). Likewise, it reveals the rationale for 
his acerbic topical criticisms of iniuria and his admonitions to avoid 
litigation, which would seem to be a curiously tangential concern in a 
work devoted to anger. Ira is indeed the more central concern in the Stoic 
view, but finds expression not only in crime itself, but also in the very 
remedia (legal remedies) provided by the ius civile (civil statute). 285 
Seneca must accordingly maintain the preeminence of a more elevated 
standard than civil law; but to achieve this he must illuminate ira as a 
delict in terms of a higher moral schema, as though it were a genuine 
legal issue analyzed in a format suited for such analysis: the judicial 
responsum. 
As a form intended to address a particular legal problem, the 
responsum had its origins in the sacerdotal opinions of the pontifices 
285Hans Juli us Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 61-70, offers a brief 
examination of the ius civile and its importance in the development of 
Roman Law. 
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(priests) during the archaic period of Roman jurisprudence.286 Although 
the responsum retained many of the basic features of these early responsa 
Pontificum (responses of the priests), it had developed considerably by 
Seneca's time, having derived at least some inspiration for various of its 
characteristics from Hellenistic literature of a similar cast, 
notwithstanding a number of distinctively Roman elements, such as a 
"predilection for a fully comprehensible concrete case, ... professional taste 
for detail, and ... very modest interest in systematization. "287 In the 
classical period of Roman law, traditionally fixed from the beginning of the 
reign of Augustus, the genre was solidly secured as the form in which 
leading jurists would publish their answers to specific legal questions.288 
Referred to by this point as the Responsa Prudentium, the replies of such 
noteworthy figures as Labeo, Proculus, Sabinus, and Cassius began to 
comprise a considerable body of legal literature of which only fragmentary 
passages have survived.289 Despite the little we possess, however, from 
the evidence which remains, much can be ascertained about the structure 
and content of the responsa and, in some instances, about the formulaic 
286Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 16-19. Cf. Berger, 681. 
287lbid., 223-24. 
288Ibid., 99. Cf. Kunkel, 103-108. 
289lbid., 141-44. Schulz describes both the state of the evidence and 
attempts to reconstruct the lost portions of the texts. 
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phraseology and special vocabulary normally employed in these writings--
enough, in fact, to be able to make it reasonably certain that the 
responsum was the model for the De Ira. 
Mention has already been made of structural anomalies of the De Ira 
which fail to adhere to the recognized conventions of the philosophical 
dialogue: primarily, the lack of a setting, the absence of characters 
engaged in conversation or, if you will, dialogue, and the recurrent 
presence of an indefinite speaker who offers objections by way of 
interjections.290 Emphasis on the exceptions to the norm, however, will 
ultimately mislead us, unless our attention is redirected to those features 
which the work actually does incorporate. One such element is apparent 
in the very first sentence of the first book. 
Exegisti a me, N ovate, ut scriberem quemadmodum 
posset ira leniri, nee immerito mihi videris hunc 
praecipue affectum pertimuisse maxime ex omnibus 
taetrum ac rabidum. 
(I.1.1) 
(You have importuned me, Novatus, to write on the 
subject of how anger may be allayed, and it seems 
to me that you had good reason to fear in an especial 
degree this, the most hideous and frenzied of all 
the emotions.) 
The De Ira is addressed to Seneca's elder brother, Novatus, who is 
directly named only three additional times; at the opening of the second 
290See above, Introduction. 
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and third books, and near the conclusion of the final book. The third book 
begins in a manner similar to the first. 
Quod maxime desiderasti, Novate, nunc facere temp-
tabimus, iram excidere animis aut certe refrenare 
et impetus ei us inhibere. 
(III.1.1) 
(We shall now, Novatus, attempt to do what you have 
especially desired--we shall try to banish anger from 
the mind, or at least to bridle and restrain its fury. 
N ovatus is not merely addressed in both passages by Seneca under the 
guise that he is responding to a request for practical assistance, nor do 
these introductory statements offer any suggestion that theoretical or 
philosophical speculation on a Stoic view of ira had figured in Novatus' 
appeal. Taken at face value, the beginning of at least two of the three 
books supposes a wish for an advisory response and, quite literally, 
Seneca's reply to that petition is the De Ira. 
As it stands, then, the repeated reference to an addressee at the 
outset of each book--particularly if one ignores the curious lack of setting, 
characters, or genuine dialogue--more closely and obviously resembles a 
letter, the apparently common form in which the Responsa Prudentium 
(replies of those experienced in law) were conveyed from the start of the 
classical period.291 Although the epistolary responsum had apparently 
291Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 93, discusses the letter as the form of 
choice in which to present the responsa. Cf. Kunkel, 108. H. F. Jolowicz 
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not been used by the jurists of the Republic, the responsa would easily 
have been adapted to this form and, beginning with Labeo, the jurist 
prominent in Horace's Sermones, clear evidence of epistolary responsa 
becomes available. 292 Later testimony, as well as actual specimens of 
the juristic literature of problems which has come down to us, reinforce the 
view that the responsa of the classical period were commonly published 
originally as letters in reply to questions posed by students, fellow jurists, 
or other interested parties on all manner of possible legal points or 
problems.293 Seneca himself, in fact, indicates his acquaintance with the 
responsum as a type of juristic writing practiced by the jurisconsults in two 
passages in particular from the De Beneficiis and Epistulae Morales . 
... ut dialogorum altercatione seposita tamquam iuris 
consultus respondeam: mens spectanda est dantis; bene-
fici um ei dedit, cui datum voluit. 
(V.19.8) 
( ... to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and to give 
a response as a jurisconsult, I should say that the 
purpose of the giver must be considered; he gave the 
benefit to the one to whom he wished it to be given.) 
and Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 
3d. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 376, also comment 
on this. 
292Horace, Sermones, I.3.82. Regarding evidence for the epistolary form 
of the responsa, see above, n. 289. 
293Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 91-93. 
Quid, quod etiam sine probationibus ipsa monentis auc-
toritas prodest? Sic quomodo iurisconsultorum valent 
responsa, etiam si ratio non redditur. 
(XCIV.27) 
(But cannot the authority of the one providing advice 
avail even without proofs? It is like the replies of 
the jurisconsults, which hold good even though the 
reasons for them are not delivered.) 
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Although these ofThand comparisons reveal Seneca's familiarity with the 
responsa themselves, further analysis of structure and language is 
necessary to support the conclusion that the epistolary format in which the 
De Ira seems to have been written actually parodies the very responsa to 
which he alludes in the De Beneficiis and Epistulae Morales. 
Much has been concluded by scholars in the past century about the 
legal literature of problems in general and, more particularly, the letter 
as a genre in which to convey legal opinion.294 A number of central facts 
figure critically on the problem at hand and merit discussion, the most 
important of which seems to be the well-documented process of compilation 
in the post-classical age by which only those opinions most pertinent to a 
given legal topic were drawn from an already sizeable body of juristic 
writing, a process which led to the conciseness of arrangement 
294Ibid., 91-93, and 224-26. 
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characteristic of Justinian's Digest or Gaius' Institutes.295 However 
useful this practice may have been for the purposes of the compilers, only 
an abbreviated sense of the complete structure and exact content of legal 
literature of the archaic and classical ages has survived.296 As one of the 
more eloquent summaries of the problem and its consequences has it, 
"abridgement and epitomization led to the statements of the facts of cases 
being pruned of the colorful actual details which enlivened the classical 
original; they were stripped of all that was legally irrelevant and made 
merely typical; the epistolary form was expunged; sometimes the 
statement of facts was even struck out altogether and the discussion thus 
reduced to naked abstract rules.297 The final result, then, is a loss of 
much of what a judicial responsum in epistolary form really consisted, 
including "specific argumentation, particularly when opinions of other 
jurists were being rejected."298 
Despite the abridged and fragmented nature of the evidence, a 
sufficient number of the elements which comprise an epistolary responsum 
can be cited and used as criteria by which to assess the adaptation of the 
295Ibid., 91, 141-44, and 226. 
296Ibid. Cf. Lenel, pal. i, praefatio, and Wolff, 103. 
297Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226. 
298Berger, 681. Cf. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226. 
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De Ira to this form. The surviving fragments do indicate patterns or 
particularly salient aspects also represented in the De Ira, one of the most 
notable being the prevalence of a technical or formulaic vocabulary for 
expressing legal opinion or referring to other legal opinion, including the 
praetorian edict.299 The verbs ait (he says), respondeo (I reply), dixi (I 
have ruled), inquit (he says) or inquis (you say), and quaero (I inquire) all 
have special significance in this regard as legal technical terms to be 
added to the extensive technical language on iniuria cited earlier.300 In 
short, the legal dimension of the De Ira becomes all the more expansive, 
as further examination of Seneca's use of these verbal forms will prove. 
In the same vein, epistolary responsa of the classical period were both 
casuistic and cautelary. 301 The most difficult and perplexing problems 
299Schulz, 224-25. Cf. Berger, 359, under "Ait." 
300Berger, 359, notes the following on ait and aiunt: "In juristic 
writings, opinions of other jurists are thus introduced in this way, e.g., 
Labeo ait. In the commentaries on the praetorian edict, the words praetor 
ait (inquit) precede a literal quotation. Excerpts from statutes, 
senatusconsulta and imperial enactments are also often attached to ait." 
Cf. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224-25, on respondeo, quaero, and dixi, 
and Jolowicz and Nicholas, 95-97. Griffin, 414 n.7, remarks that inquis or 
inquit in judicial speech would be attributed to the accuser. Both ait and 
inquit alone universally precede a quoted objection on the part of Seneca's 
adversary, following the pattern observed in the juristic literature. See 
below, Chaps. 4 and 5. As for the technical vocabulary of iniuria, see 
Chap. 2. 
301Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-24, comments on the casuistic 
nature of the responsa, noting that they "derived from juristic speculation 
as well as practice" and showed a "Roman predilection for a fully 
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of every branch of Roman law were scrutinized in the responsa, and this 
required both specific argumentation and a presentation as well as a 
resolution of cases, often from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective. 302 Likewise, determining the admissibility of a course of 
action--the cautelary or advisory function of the responsum--constituted a 
most common characteristic of the form. 303 Taken together, the presence 
of all of these elements in the De Ira emphasizes that its framework is 
first and foremost legal, not philosphical. Furthermore, these legal aspects 
provide grounds for considering the work a satire of law as a deficient 
standard of human conduct and ira as a delict in a more exacting ethical 
comprehensible concrete case, ... professional taste for detail, and ... very 
modest interest in systematization." In his survey of the literary output 
of the jurists, 226ff., Schulz frequently refers to the casuistic character of 
the surviving fragments. The cautelary or advisory nature of the responsa 
originates, according to Schulz, 15-17, in the early Republic with the 
pontifices, who offered advice on the admissibility of a sacral act. David 
Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 4-5, 
lists phrases which substitute for the imperative and iussive, such as 
"oportet, necesse est, mos est, fas est, ius est, religio est, piaculum est, 
licitum est, constitutum est ... " All may be described as cautelary or 
advisory expressions, whether in a religious or civil context. In a stricter 
sense, according to Jolowicz and Nicholas, 96 n.5, cautelary referred 
specifically to a cautio, a written stipulation. Cf. Berger, 384-85, on the 
various types of cautiones. By cautelary here, I mean the more general, 
or advisory, sense by which the responsa could be described. 
302Jolowicz and Nicholas, 95-6, and 359-63, comment on these features. 
Cf. Kunkel, 103-108, and Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 91-93, and 223-26. 
303Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26. 
t 304 sys em. 
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In particular, most specifically in his use of certain verbs, Seneca 
closely borrows the vocabulary commonly employed in the responsa (1) to 
denote the question or problem at hand, (2) to introduce a contrary 
argument or opinion, and (3) to cite a formal ruling dispensed previously 
by the author or another jurist.306 Variations of the verb quaero (I 
inquire) and its cognate quaestio (inquiry) are a case in point. Ambiguity 
has been said to exist between the responsum and the quaestio, another 
type of problematic juristic writing. 306 And although the lines between 
the two forms have been said to blur, the frequency of quaero (I inquire) 
and quaestio (inquiry) in the De Ira are to some extent inevitable, since the 
responsum may have been as much a reply to a request or question posed 
by another jurist as an unsolicited reaction to a prevailing legal view.307 
304At II.28.2, approximately midway through the De Ira, Seneca 
expands his preceding criticisms of iniuria to include a general judgment 
on the limitations of the law. 
305Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224-25. 
306Ibid. Cf. Berger, 663 and 681. 
307Ibid. The legal context of Seneca's use of quaeramus at II.13.1 is a 
prime example, and clearly bears out Schulz's observations: "Non est quod 
patrocinium nobis quaeramus et excusatam licentiam, dicentes aut utile id 
esse aut inevitabile; cui enim tandem vitio advocatus defuit?'' Patrocinium 
(Berger, 622: " .. .legal assistance given to a party in a trial by an 
advocate."), the direct object of quaeramus, is a common legal term; 
advocatus (OLD, entries la and b: "a professional pleader, advocate, 
counsel.") completes the thought and makes the legal context indisputable. 
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The former situation obviously applies to the De Ira, and Novatus' appeal 
for advice, whether genuine or contrived, remains a request which insists 
upon a reply. In similar fashion, as the passages of diatribe and the 
ongoing censure of iniuria reveal, N ovatus' request also offered Seneca the 
pretext to oppose the received opinion on iniuria as a delict as well. 
Nonetheless, the forms quaesitum est (it has been asked), quaerimus 
(we ask), quaerendum est (it must be asked), and quaestio (the question) all 
appear in the De Ira in a formal context suggestive of Seneca's principal 
purposes, and each instance where these forms occur is noteworthy, 
beginning with quaesitum est (it has been asked) early in the first 
book.308 Almost immediately following his acknowledgement of Novatus' 
request, an exaggerated description of the irate man, and a diatribe on the 
social consequences of anger, Seneca departs from a graphic depiction of 
ira to a more systematic and rational analysis, which he summarizes in 
the following passage. 
Quid esset ira quaesitum est, an in ullum aliud 
animal quam in hominem caderet, quo ab iracundia 
distaret, quot eius species essent: nunc quaeramus 
an ira secundum naturam sit et an utilis atque ex 
aliqua parte retinenda. 
(1.5.1) 
(Hitherto we have inquired what anger is, whether it 
belongs to any other creature than man, how it dif-
308I.5.1. 
fers from irascibility, and in how many aspects it 
appears; let us now inquire whether anger is in ac-
cordance with nature; whether it is expedient and 
ought, therefore, in some measure to be kept.) 
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Seneca thus recapitulates the topics of the two previous chapters and 
establishes a direction for further discussion; but the excerpt is remarkable 
for other reasons also. Quaeramus (let us inquire) closely follows 
quaesitum est (it has been asked) in a point-by-point agenda; first, of the 
main topics covered in the two previous chapters; secondly, of themes 
about to be pursued. The passage is a strikingly succinct, methodical, and 
systematic piece of prose in comparison with the more extended stretches 
of diatribe or exaggerated description; in short, its formality is abrupt and 
uncharacteristic, but all the more striking for this very reason and 
consequently the more deserving of close attention. 
In a brief display of clarity and concision that perhaps many of 
Seneca's readers would vainly expect to pervade the entire De Ira, the 
essential outline of a program or a statement of purpose is apparent. More 
interesting, however, is the double occurrence of other forms of quaero (I 
ask or inquire): quaesitum est (it has been asked) with which to begin the 
passage and refer to what ideas have preceded, and quaeramus (let us 
inquire) with which to signal what considerations will follow. Thus, in an 
ostensible statement of intent, Seneca employs the verb typically used to 
indicate either doubtful legal issues or cases in casuistic writings such as 
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the responsa.309 Furthermore, Seneca's queries aim to make precise 
distinctions--between ira and iracundia (irascibility), animal and human 
aggression, the natural and unnatural, the expedient and impractical--
much in the same fashion as a jurist in pursuit of accurate legal 
distinctions. 
In the second book Seneca has no need to preface a declaration of 
intent; Novatus' petition for counsel has already been acknowledged and 
ira has been as grotesquely pictured as in some of the most impassioned 
speeches in his plays.310 Nevertheless, quaestio (inquiry) still occurs once 
and quaerimus (we inquire) twice within the first two chapters, again to 
mark the exact refinements necessary to his investigation. The three 
passages in which these forms are present demonstrate the same formality 
and systematic concision as in the selection cited earlier, and merit equally 
close study. 
(1) Primus liber, Novate, benigniorem habuit materiam; 
309Schulz,Roman Legal Science, 224. Cf. Berger, 662: "The jurists used 
these locutions to introduce doubtful cases in which "a question arises" ("it 
has been questioned") about the legal solution of the situation presented. 
The terms occur not only in collections of so-called quaestiones, but also in 
other writings of the casuistic type. Similar phrases were: quaestio 
(quaestionis) est, quaestio in eo constitit (=the question consists in that)." 
31
°Cf. what Wright, 47, calls "a fairly accurate description of the 
physical appearance produced by anger in its subject" at I.1, II.35, and 
III.4 with similar descriptions at Medea 380-96, Thyestes 732-43, and 
Phaedra 360-86. 
facilis enim in proclivia vitiorum decursus est. 
Nunc ad exiliora veniendum est; quaerimus enim ira 
utrum iudicio an impetu incipiat, id est utrum sua 
sponte moveatur an quemadmodum pleraque quae intra 
nos <non> insciis nobis oriuntur. Debet autem in haec 
se demittere disputatio, ut ad illa quoque altiora 
possit exsurgere .... 
(Il.1.1-2) 
(My first book, N ovatus, had a more bountiful theme; 
for easy is the descent into the downward course of 
vice. Now we must come to narrower matters; for we 
ask the question whether anger originates from choice or 
from impulse, that is, whether it is aroused of its 
own accord, or whether it behaves like much else that 
does not arise within us without our knowledge. 
But the discussion must be lowered to the considera-
tion of these things in order that it may afterwards 
rise to the other, loftier themes.) 
(2) Iram quin species oblata iniuriae moveat non est 
dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsa statim sequatur et 
non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente 
moveatur quaerimus. Nobis placet nihil illam per 
se audere sed animo adprobante .... 
(Il.1.3-4) 
(There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the 
direct impression of injury; but the question is 
whether it follows immediately upon the impression 
and springs up without assistance from the mind, or 
whether it is aroused only with the assent of the 
mind. Our opinion is that it ventures nothing by 
itself, but acts only with the approval of the mind.) 
(3) "Quorsus" inquis "haec quaestio pertinet?" Ut 
sciamus quid sit ira; nam si invitis nobis nasci-
tur, numquam rationi succumbet. 
(Il.2.1) 
("But," you ask, "what is the purpose of such an in-
quiry?" I answer, in order that we may know what 
173 
anger is; for if it arises against our will, it will 
never succumb to reason.) 
174 
All three passages resemble the excerpt from book one (I.5.1) not 
only in tone and composition, but particularly in the technical insertion of 
quaerimus (we inquire) and quaestio (the question) to mark the casuistic 
nature of the endeavor. In each case a statement of purpose or short 
overview of Seneca's plan is noticeable; in fact, the brief span in which 
these sections occur comprise an extended declaration of objectives 
interrupted only by analogies apparently included to justify the direction 
his discussion must take before he can arrive at illa altiora", those "other, 
loftier themes" which are contrasted with the objects of quaerimus (we 
inquire). 311 Again, as in the parallel passage in the first book (l.5.1), 
Seneca systematically addresses problematic issues in need of resolution. 
The formal distinctions he pursues here are related to his initial question: 
"quid esset ira quaesitum est" (we have inquired what anger is).312 
Seneca repeats this objective a second time in reply to the impatient 
interjection of his adversarius in the second chapter of book two. The 
311Seneca juxtaposes these technical questions unfavorably with what 
he vaguely terms "illa altiora" (loftier matters), thereby implying a 
subordinate status to legal analysis. "Illa altiora" becomes more apparent 
later in book two (ll.28.2), when he contrasts the narrowness of innocence 
before the law with the more exacting demands of moral rectitude. 
312Cf. I.4-5. 
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purpose of the quaestio (question) is simply "ut sciamus quid sit ira" ("in 
order that we may know what anger is). Seneca thus reiterates the 
problematic character of ira with a substantival variant of quaesitum est 
(it has been asked). More importantly, he emphasizes the significance of 
establishing appropriate distinctions necessary to a solid understanding of 
anger, distinctions which he has just framed as indirect questions 
introduced by quaerimus (we inquire), the formal term of legal 
examination. 313 
Just as the use of quaerimus (we inquire) or quaestio (the question) 
establishes a legal design, Seneca's method of resolving the questions he 
poses proceeds by way of analysis as easily employed to determine moral 
culpability according to a Stoic ethical model as to fix legal liability under 
Roman law. The occurrence of iniuria in the second passage, however, 
makes it more probable that a judgment of legal liability is the more 
probable goal, especially in view of the prominence given to iniuria 
throughout the De Ira. Although the objects of the initial quaerimus (we 
inquire) in the first passage pertain to ira--whether anger originates from 
choice or impulse on the one hand, and whether it arises of its own accord 
or with our knowledge on the other--the inextricable association between 
ira and iniuria cited in the second passage (and often elsewhere) is so 
313Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224. Cf. Berger, 662. 
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drawn that the distinctions pursued in both passages serve a similar 
purpose: a working definition of anger preliminary to any conclusion as to 
its reduction or outright elimination. If Seneca cannot prove that anger 
is subject to the will, assented to by the mind, or amenable to reason, the 
request of Novatus becomes futile and the De Ira pointless. As a 
consequence, the success or failure of the De Ira depends on how well 
Seneca settles these issues, a task he begins to achieve in a crucial 
segment of chapter one, immediately after he has formulated the 
alternatives introduced by quaerimus . 
... nam species capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem 
ei us concupiscere et utrumque coni ungere, nee laedi 
se debuisse et vindicari debere, non est ei us impetus 
qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur. Ille simplex 
est, hie compositus et plura continens: intellexit 
aliquid, indignatus est, damnavit, ulciscitur: haec 
non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur 
adsensus est. 
(11.1.4-5) 
(For to form the impression of having received an in-
jury and to long to avenge it, and then to couple 
together the two propositions that one ought not to 
have been wronged and that one ought to be avenged--
this is not a mere impulse of the mind acting without 
our volition. The one is a single mental process, the 
other a complex one composed of several elements; the 
mind has grasped something, has become indignant, has 
condemned the act, and now tries to avenge it. These 
processes are impossible unless the mind has given assent 
to the impressions that moved it.) 
The context of Seneca's comments earlier in chapter one and in the 
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three passages previously listed becomes much clearer as a result of these 
concluding sections of the chapter. The conscious, deliberate, and 
voluntary basis for anger must be proven before any attempt at curbing 
it can possibly proceed, and Seneca expeditiously works toward this 
determination by demonstrating that anger involves a complex process 
which engages both mind and will. The lucid presentation of each stage 
of this process--speciem ... acceptae iniuriae (the impression of having 
received an injury, ultionem concupiscere(the desire for revenge), nee laedi 
se debuisse (the judgment that one ought not to have been wronged, and 
vindicari debere (ought to be avenged)--to a great extent answers the 
formal questions posed earlier, initiated by the two instances of quaerimus 
(we inquire) and followed by the occurrence of quaestio (the question).314 
Furthermore, Seneca boldly supplies answers to his own questions without 
any of the conversational give-and-take which is customary in a 
philosophical dialogue. 315 More significantly, however, he couches his 
conclusions in terms which are quite unambiguous, for he systematically 
describes the course of anger as the identical series of steps necessarily 
314At II.1-2.1, Seneca questions whether ira originates from choice or 
impulse, and whether it arises with our knowledge or of its own accord. 
Only by determining what anger is can Seneca conclude that it is--or is 
not--subject to the will and reason. 
315Griffin, Appendix B2. Cf. Hirzel, II, 27-34. 
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undertaken for legal action based on a violation of iniuria. 
In the course of establishing the intricate cognitive and volitional 
foundation of ira, Seneca begins by stressing the judgment that an injury 
has been received (acceptae iniuriae). Any idea that the sense of iniuria 
he intends possesses no more than a generic meaning stripped of any 
specialized significance (a corollary to the proposition that the De Ira is 
foremost and primarily a philosophical work) is quickly dispelled by the 
immediately subsequent appearance of terms typically descriptive of 
Roman legal procedure. 316 This fact, coupled with a recognition that 
anger advances in a manner indistinguishable from the conduct of 
litigation, has broad implications. To begin with, Seneca points out that 
the subjective judgment that one ought to be avenged (vindicari debere) is 
the first stage in the composite process basic to anger (compositus et plura 
continens). He has already introduced an official term for a deli ct (iniuria), 
and now includes the verb vindicari, the formal expression for remedial 
action approved by law.317 In what may conceivably be one of the most 
316See above, Chap. 2. 
317Seneca uses this verb throughout the De Ira to mean the act of 
avenging or exacting reparation for an offense (OLD, entry 5a). The 
regular occurrence of some form of vindicare to signify the ordinary 
response to various violations of the law, however, is noteworthy. That 
Seneca widely employs the word to cover legal actions brought as a result 
of parricide (1.12.1), outrage (Ill.5.7), and monetary lass (Ill.33.3) implies 
a more general application than has been commonly assumed and blurs 
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the distinction between actiones in rem (actions asserting one's right to a 
thing) and actiones in personam (actions asserting a right against a 
person). Cf. Nicholas, 99-103. Under vindicatio (vindicare), Berger, 766, 
notes the following: "In earlier times, the act of avenging an offense, self-
defense against the violence of an aggressor. Later, the term was applied 
to the defense of one's property by seeking its recovery in court. Gaius 
(Inst. 4.5) uses the term vindicationes for all actiones in rem and Justinian 
accepted his terminology (Inst .. 4.6.15)." OLD, entry la, concurs with 
Berger's remarks, and lists the assertion to "one's title to ... one's property" 
as the legal definition of vindicare. Vindicatio, however, the common legal 
term denoting an actio in rem (claim to a thing), does not appear in the 
Senecan corpus. To confuse the matter further, OLD, entry 2, cites a more 
general meaning for vindicatio than the primary legal sources would 
suppose, and offers the following definition by Cicero (Inv. 2.66; 2.161): 
"vindicationem (earn appellant) per quam vim et contumeliam defendendo 
aut ulciscendo propulsamus a nobis et nostris, qui nobis cari esse debent, 
et per quam peccata punimur ... " This contrasts sharply with the legal 
definition given (OLD, entry 1) for vindicatio, and the examples provided 
are taken from later legal sources (e.g., Gaius, Inst. 4.5: "appellantur ... in 
rem quidem actiones vindicationes, in personam vero 
actiones ... condictiones ... "). Cicero cites vis (force/violence) and contumelia 
(insult), terms normally associated with iniuria, in connection with 
vindicatio, which refers to an actio in rem (action asserting one's right to 
a thing) in the primary legal sources. The term condictio, which Gai us 
(Inst. 4.5) uses and Berger, 346, elaborates on regarding actiones in 
personam, is strangely absent from the De Ira in particular, and Seneca's 
works in general. Remarkably, neither vindicatio nor condictio, the two 
nouns used used in the primary legal sources to separate the two most 
fundamental classes of legal action in Roman law, actiones in rem and 
actiones in personam, are present in the De Ira, despite Seneca's 
thoroughgoing references to other technical terms ordinarily associated 
with iniuria (e.g., contumelia, convicium, and percutere) and despite his 
well-attested legal background and career (See above, p., n.). That Seneca 
introduces vindicare in a legal context is clear based on the topics at hand 
in the passages where the verb appears (e.g., I.12.1, II.4.1, II.32-33, and 
III.32-33); why he misappropriates a verb describing one course of legal 
actions (with the exception of IIl.32.2) which the sources reserve for a 
different class of actions is not. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be 
reached from the facts at hand. David Daube, Roman Law: Linguistic, 
Social, and Philosophical Aspects(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
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critically telling sections in the entire work, Seneca not only employs two 
more legally significant terms, indignatus (outraged or offended) and 
damnavit (has found guilty or sentenced), but demonstrates convincingly 
that two processes are simultaneously at work. 318 Intellexit 
(understanding), indignatus (personal affront), damnavit (judicial 
condemnation), and ulciscitur (revenge)--the four phases which constitute 
the necessary stages of a successful suit based on iniuria--are the same 
1969), 11-63, examines the process whereby a pattern becomes evident in 
the history of language: nouns which refer to actions appear much later 
than the verbs from which they are formed. This would account for the 
use of vindicatio and condictio in Gaius and Justinian to distinguish an 
actio in rem from an actio in personam and suggest that these distinctions 
were officially observed later than the first century A.D. Secondly, 
Seneca's use of vindicare to describe legal action as such, but especially 
iniuria, would not only offer an important example demonstrating Daube's 
theory; it would indicate that the sense of vindicatio as a means of 
redressing violence and insult--the definition provided by Cicero--still 
prevailed in Seneca's time as evidenced by his use of the cognate verb, 
vindicare, to describe this type of legal action. Finally, vindicare, although 
initially referring to general legal action, most probably acquired the more 
specialized sense as described in the post-classical sources and as defined 
in the lexica and the most recent surveys of Roman law. 
318lndignor (OLD, entry 1: "To regard with indignation, take offense 
at ... ") implies the recognition that one has been the victim of an offense 
against either one's person or reputation. Cf. contumelia (OLD, entry 1). 
Indignor asserts that one is in the state of having been affronted or 
outraged as a result of the commission of iniuria, and is necessary prior to 
a legal judgment or penalty denoted by damno (OLD, entry 1: "To pass 
judgment against <in a civil or criminal case>, condemn.") Cf. OLD, 
entry 4: "To deliver by judicial sentence, consign." Cf. Gaius, Inst. 3.224 
for damno in cases of iniuria. 
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four phases which comprise the course of ira. 319 As a consequence, 
quaerimus (we inquire) and quaestio (the question), terms which commonly 
appear in epistolary responsa of the classical period to identify the legal 
issues at hand, identify a legal issue here as well. 
If, as Seneca certainly implies, the conduct of an iniuria case from 
onset to conclusion exactly parallels the duration of anger from the first 
assessment of wrongdoing to the exacting of revenge, a number of 
apparently unrelated facts reveal new associations which compel an 
extensive reinterpretation of the De Ira. First, Seneca's recurrent 
references to iniuria, whether straightforward or oblique, cannot be 
construed as a merely coincidental occurrence of allusions or off-hand 
metaphors derived from the law in an otherwise philosophical context. 
The evidence by now is sufficiently clear-cut: to address the problem of ira 
is to examine the enigma of law, not as the ars boni et aequi (the art of the 
good and the fair), but as ars irae et ultionis (the art of anger and 
319/ntellexit, the first word of the series, occurs commonly in the 
primary legal sources, and in its most general sense means to "grasp 
mentally, understand, realize ... " (OLD, entry 1). Cf. Gaius, Inst. 4.178: 
"nemo damnatur nisi qui intellegit non recte se agere ... " It may also mean 
to "understand, regard (as being ... " or "(a term) to mean ... " (OLD, entries 
6a and b). Cf. Gaius, Inst. 3.224: " ... nulla iniuria intellegitur fieri ... " or 
Justinian, Inst. 4.4.3: " ... nulla iniuria fieri intellegitur ... " Intellexit in the 
passage under discussion= iniuria fieri intellegitur. Cf. Berger, 506. See 
above, p., n., for ulcisci in connection with iniuria. 
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revenge).320 Seneca's insight that ira is as much a legal issue as iniuria 
is a moral one--a paradox which serves as the focus of the following 
chapter--thus supplies the raw material for his parody of an epistolary 
responsum, given the inability of the legal process itself to deal with moral 
issues or the higher good is to be thoroughly exposed and satirized. 
Seneca has chosen his terms well: iniuria (injury), vindicari (legal redress), 
indignatus (personal affront), and damnavit (legal condemnation). Anger 
is described in the language of the law, as any jurist would treat a 
debatable legal point. An epistolary responsum would have been Seneca's 
most appropriate form of choice in which to draw the connections he 
recognized between iniuria and ira. His choice became all the more ironic 
in that Roman law could neither acknowledge ira as illegitimate, nor 
iniuria as immoral. 
All this considered, there is yet more to suggest that the De Ira 
structurally and thematically merits comparison to an epistolary 
responsum besides the calculated use of quaesitum est (it has been asked), 
quaerimus (we inquire), or quaestio (the question), terms conventionally 
associated with legal inquiry. Other examples of the formulaic expression 
which mark the surviving legal literature of problems occur with 
regularity throughout the entire work. Of these, one of the most 
320Digest 1.1. 
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noteworthy is the omnipresent inquit (he says), upon whose precise import 
and frequency there has been both attention and speculation. 321 The 
now commonplace observation that the De Ira lacks the setting, 
characters, or conversation formally present in a typically representative 
dialogue is often accompanied by the observation that inquit (he says) or 
a variant thereof--such as inquis (you say) or ait (he says)--is the sole 
feature of the De Ira which approximates the conversational element or 
technique of the dialogue.322 Apart from Senecan scholarship on the 
incidence and function of its use, however, at least one study of the legal 
literature cites a more specialized meaning for inquit. 323 Rather than 
signal the comments or objections of one of the participants in a dialogue, 
inquit has been noted to introduce the opinions of another (often unnamed) 
jurist or the guidelines from the praetor's edict.324 Given the evidence 
of legal usage thus far, the purpose inquit serves as a transitional device 
marking an objection or a new direction deserves another look as a 
convention of Roman legal writing. 
As observed earlier, Seneca perceptively identifies the process of 
321Griffin, 414-15. 
322Ibid., 413-15. 
323Berger, 359, mentions inquit under the heading "ait (aiunt)." Cf. 
Digest 47.2.21, e.g.: " ... inquit Trebatius ... " 
324Ibid. Cf. inquam (OLD, entries la and lb) and ait (OLD, entry 7). 
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anger with that of an iniuria suit in every phase, a connection which not 
only underscores his references to the delict, but influences his choice of 
historical anecdotes as models for emulation or avoidance. The ubiquity 
of inquit, however, plays at least as important a role in Seneca's overall 
design, as a few representative passages will indicate. Its first 
occurrences, in the third chapter of book one, not only supply the 
necessary context for connecting ira and iniuria, but they inaugurate the 
continuous association of the two ideas. 
"Irascimur" inquit "saepe non illis qui laeserunt, 
sed iis qui laesuri sunt; ut scias iram non ex in-
i uria nasci." Verum est irasci nos laesuris, sed 
ipsa cogitatione nos laedunt, et iniuriam qui factur-
us est iam facit. "Ut scias" inquit "non esse iram 
poenae cupiditatem, infirmissimi saepe potentissimis 
irascuntur nee poenam concupiscunt quam non sperant." 
(1.3.1-2) 
("We often get angry," someone rejoins, "not at those 
who have hurt us, but at those who intend to hurt us; 
you may, therefore, be sure that anger is not born of 
injury." It is true that we do get angry at those who 
intend to hurt us, but by the very intention they do 
hurt us; the man who intends to do injury has already 
done it. "But," he says, "that you may know that anger 
is not the desire to exact punishment, the weakest men 
are often angry at the most powerful, but hardly 
desirous of a punishment which they have no hope of in-
flicting.) 
The most obvious point of contention between Seneca and his adversary 
curiously concerns the part iniuria plays in fixing the origin of ira. The 
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passage is crucial for other reasons also, chief among which is that it 
establishes a pattern and tone for other passages of the same kind. 325 
First of all, the exchange appears unexpectedly in the aftermath of 
Seneca's acknowledgement of Novatus' request and a lengthy diatribe on 
the baneful social and legal effects of anger. The inclusion of legal 
consequences, however, provides a prelude to subsequent references to 
iniuria, the first of which takes place in the course of Seneca's description 
of the spectators at the games who are offended by a gladiator's 
unwillingness to die. 326 In the two sections immediately preceding the 
initial disagreement between Seneca and his adversary, iniuria figures 
three times, effectively becoming the operative term seized upon by 
Seneca's opponent to distinguish their differences and indeed fundamental 
points of view. 327 Significantly, this first occasion of inquit (he says) 
represents an attempt to disassociate ira from iniuria--to dissociate the 
ethical from the legal, that is--a position Seneca disputes repeatedly and 
successfully counters in the legally phrased description of the course of 
anger in book two. 328 Nonetheless, the implications of this leading 
325Cf. 11.26.1, just one of many examples. 
3261.2.4 
3271.2.4-5. 
328See especially 11.1.3-5. 
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conversational interlude are clear: ira and iniuria have become formally 
connected as principal concepts which either must logically relate or else 
have no affinity. More importantly, a legal notion and a legal manner of 
disagreement are given considerable weight at the very outset of the work. 
Although the objections of Seneca's unnamed opponent vary widely, 
the manner of objecting remains the same: quoted comments accompanied 
by an unadorned and undistinctive "inquit." Of the numerous arguments 
his adversarius presents, every conceivable attempt is made to give some 
semblance of justification and respectability to anger, whether on serious 
or trivial grounds. The necessity and utility of ira--conditions applied 
legally in a variety of circumstances--are addressed from different 
perspectives (the soldier and orator, for example), but when these grounds 
fall short, more emotional pretexts--the nobility of savage beasts or the 
languor of a peaceful spirit--prevail and are given due regard, since such 
commonplaces and constituted real evidence for Seneca and his 
adversarius.329 Toward the conclusion of book two, however, his rival 
returns to the original association between ira and iniuria proposed by 
329Both Seneca and his adversarius introduce exempla from the animal 
world for the sake of argument. Cf. 1.1.6-7 and II.15.4-16.2. See Wright, 
55, for a brief analysis of this argument. Animal parallels for human 
action and emotion were common and were taken as genuine evidence 
from Homer on. Pliny Natural History 7-11, passim, offers an exhaustive 
survey of animals and their distinctive traits. 
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Seneca in the early chapters of the first book. The interchange between 
the two adversaries at this point in the De Ira is noteworthy. 
"Minus" inquit "contemnemur, si vindicaverimus in-
iuriam." Si tamquam ad remedium venimus, sine ira 
veniamus, non quasi dulce sit vindicari, sed quasi 
utile; saepe autem satins fuit dissimulare quam ul-
cisci. 
(Il.33.1) 
("If we avenge an injury, "he says," we shall be less 
subject to contempt." If we must resort to a remedy, 
as it were, for contempt, let us do so without anger--
not with the plea that revenge is sweet, but that it 
is expedient; it is often, however, better to feign 
ignorance of an act than to take vengeance for it.) 
As already noted, Seneca's anonymous adversary insists early on 
that anger does not originate with iniuria, a notion with which Seneca 
completely disagrees. By well into the second book, Seneca's opponent 
introduces iniuria once again as a term apropos to the discussion; this 
time, however, with a telling difference. Here, the reference to iniuria is 
unequivocally legal in the context of what has preceded and what follows. 
The famous exemplum in which Seneca invokes Marcus Cato's refusal to 
vindicate the assault in the public bath occursjust before this excerpt, and 
Seneca's use of the incident to illustrate his point heralds the adversarial 
opinion that avoiding contempt (saving face, in other words) demands the 
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vindication of iniuria. 330 More importantly, however, Seneca's 
opponent's rejection of the standard proposed in the anecdote assumes a 
dismissal of the legal as well as the moral recommendation being 
introduced, since both elements are essential to Seneca's argument and 
presentation.331 Cato's grounds for litigation are indisputable at law, as 
both the facts which Seneca presents and his choice of the verb vindicare 
(to assert a legal claim) in the anecdote clearly demonstrate.332 
Obviously not convinced by Seneca's recourse to Cato's exceptional 
restraint as a norm, the adversarius uses vindicaverimus (if we avenge)--
with iniuriam as its object--as being essential to avoiding scorn and in 
consequence to preserving one's personal dignity. Seneca's reply not only 
repeats vindicari (to be avenged), but adds remedium, a term often 
employed to denote legal redress.333 
The adversarius has by now either accepted Seneca's initial claim 
that ira and iniuria are intimately connected or has at least given up 
330Il.32.2-3. 
331For the legal sense of percussum and atrox iniuria contained in the 
anecdote, see Chap. 2, 94-95. 
332See above, n. 317. 
333Berger, p.67 4, comments on re medium as follows: "Legal procedural 
measures introduced by praetorian law, senatusconsulta, or imperial 
legislation, such as actio, interdictum, exceptio, restitutio in integrum, 
appellatio, etc." 
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attempting to refute Seneca's arguments. 334 He not only accepts 
Seneca's use of the term iniuria, but actively defends legal retaliation for 
the delict of iniuria.335 Just as important, however, are Seneca's 
opposing remarks, which grant some value to the usefulness of litigation, 
but with a caveat that it be undertaken "sine ira. "336 But whether in 
3341.3.1 provides the first connection between the two notions. 
335II.33.1 seems to make this clear, given the terminology: "Si 
tamquam ad remedium venimus, sine ira veniamus, non quasi dulce sit 
vindieari, sed quasi utile ... " 
336Cf. the disclaimer "sine ira" here with a similar expression at the 
opening of the Apocolocyntosis: "Quid aetum sit in eaelo ante diem III idus 
Oetobris anno novo, initio saeeuli felicissimi, volo memoriae tradere. Nihil 
nee offensae nee gratiae dabitur." Knoche, 107-108, comments on 
similarities between parts of the Apocolocyntosis and the rules for a 
Roman will. The formulaic language includes an official disavowal ("nee 
offensae nee gratiae") which parallels the "sine ira. .. non dulce" at Il.33.1. 
Although Knoche, 104, interprets the beginning of ther Apocolocyntosis as 
the parody of a standard introduction to historical treatises, the famous 
"sine ira et studio" (Annals I.1) or "neque amore ... et sine odio" (Histories 
I.1) of Tacitus bear striking resemblance to the two Senecan passages in 
structure, tone, and meaning, amounting to formulaic judicial disclaimers 
of what J.M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 31-
68, calls improper influences in Roman litigation on the part of the judge. 
Thus, rather than Seneca parodying the introductions of historical 
treatises, both Tacitus and Seneca may in fact have been employing the 
standard formulaic language of the law. In addition, Tacitus himself(with 
heretofore unrecognized, but characteristicirony) may have been using the 
phraseology of the Roman will which ensured the exile of L. Fabricius 
Veiento (Annals 14.50). Tacitus, Annals XIII-XVI, ed. John Jackson 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), 186 n.2, contains the 
following remark about the literary activity of this figure of the Neronian 
age: "His libels were embodied in an imaginary will. For as candour, 
under the empire, was safest when posthumous, this was a favorite vehicle 
for attacks on the great." Knoche, 107-108, dates the parodying of the 
rules for a Roman will to Varro, and comments that parodies which made 
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the adversarial plea for vindication or in Seneca's appeal to utile 
(expedience) as the only acceptable condition upon which litigation for 
Iniuria be pursued, the context of the passage is unmistakeably legal. 337 
Both content--a legal case accompanied by legal distinctions and terms--and 
form--objections prefaced only by inquit (he says)--in each of the excerpted 
sections presumably typify various classical epistolary responsa in their 
original unexpurgated versions.338 Colorful case presentations, extensive 
and copiously detailed legal analyses, and an often casual or colloquial 
manner of speaking expected in a letter--elements readily observable in the 
De Ira--all suggest the unabridged and unepitomized structure of the 
responsa only surmised from the evidence available from the 
fragments. 339 
One final and significant attribute of the responsum appears 
use of legal formulae were also circulating in imperial times as separate 
brochures in prose. Knoche also makes passing mention of the will of the 
little pig, the Testamentum Porcelli, as a legal parody which circulated in 
late antiquity. F. Buecheler, Petronii Saturae (Berlin: Weidmannsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), 346-47, includes a copy of this parody. 
337Berger, 756, notes the legal meaning of utilis: "Used of legal acts, 
transactions, and procedural steps which have been, or can be, successfully 
accomplished in a given situation." Cf. OLD, entry 2b. 
338Digest excerpts, themselves excerpted at times from responsa seem 
to establish this. Frier, 177-200, offers various examples drawn from the 
primary legal sources which demonstrate this point. 
339Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26. 
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frequently in the De Ira. The casuistic nature of the work comes in full 
view when Seneca's legal vocabulary becomes apparent: specific arguments 
acquire an altogether different sense, anecdotes once thought to be 
overstated and extreme examples of Stoic virtus (virtue) in fact represent 
concrete cases cases at law, and a particular problem or issue (iniuria) 
obtains the sort of exhaustive examination it would at the hands of the 
jurisconsults. 340 The cautelary character of many of the responsa--an 
early and persistent aspect of the genre--is also present in the De Ira, and 
closely parallels the reformative element of satire intimated by the 
numerous advisory passages which recur. 341 As mentioned before, the 
term cautelary refers to one of the essential functions of the Roman legal 
expert: estimating the legitimacy or propriety of a particular act that is 
contemplated by the inquirer.342 As to the De Ira, Seneca's ostensible 
subject is anger, but his concern with the delict iniuria invariably compels 
a legal look at a problem otherwise deemed exclusively moral. Seneca 
340Ibid. 
341See above, Chap. 3, on the reformative aspect of satire. The 
intentions of the jurist and the satirist merge at this point. The advisory 
elements of the De Ira are in keeping with a satiric insistence on reform 
or a juristic proposal consisting of sound advice, but inappropriate to a 
philosophical demonstration of proofs. This advisory feature has thus 
produced the hypothesis that Seneca's dialogues are more akin to the 
informal Hellenistic diatribes. Cf. Weber, passim. 
342Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 19-22. 
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disparages ira and especially inveighs against actions for iniuria as its 
accepted social expression; even more disapprovingly, he calls to account 
the least hint of anger in anyone charged with dispensing justice. It is 
this insistence that a judge restrain his own anger, perhaps more than any 
other aspect of the De Ira, which furnishes a secure context for Novatus' 
query and Seneca's reply, since our author offers no other clue to the 
background or circumstances which gave rise to his brother's petition. 
Seneca's opening charge, though examined earlier at some length, 
bears repeating, since it provides a suitable point of for comparison with 
later passages of an explicitly cautelary nature. 
aeque enim impotens sui est, decoris oblita, necessi-
tudinum immemor, in quod coepit pertinax et intenta, 
rationi consiliisque praecl usa, vanis agitata causis, 
ad dispectum aequi verique inhabilis, ruinis simillima, 
quae super id quod oppressere franguntur. 
(1.1.2) 
(For it is equally devoid of self-control, forgetful of 
decency, unmindful of ties, persistent and diligent in 
in whatever it begins, closed to reason and counsel, 
excited by trifling cases, unfit to discern the fair 
and true--the very counterpart of a ruin that is shat-
tered to pieces on what it overwhelmed.) 
As discussed earlier, Seneca's choice of terms appears oddly unsuited for 
general application and more closely tailored to describe the consequences 
of anger among those in positions of civic responsibility and authority.343 
343See above, Chap. 3. 
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The comments which bracket this description are yet more intriguing, 
since they narrow the focus of Seneca's remarks and specify the grounds 
on which he will continue. As he says before listing the results of anger: 
Quidam itaque e sapientibus viris iram Dixerunt 
brevem insaniam .... 
(I.1.2) 
(Certain wise men, therefore, have ruled that anger 
is temporary madness ... ) 
And concluding the survey, he states: 
Ut scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit, 
ipsum illorum habitum intuere. 
(1.1.3) 
(But you have only to behold the aspect of those 
possessed by anger to know that they are insane.) 
Anger produces the personal effects he cites, then, since it either 
indicates or resembles madness, whose physiological manifestations he 
soon begins to detail. More importantly, however, Seneca's terms deserve 
notice, for they correspond to a standard manner of speaking noted in the 
responsa. 344 Secondly, and even more remarkable, the connection of ira 
with insania unquestionably raises a legal issue, since insanity involved 
344Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 225, notes the following with regard 
to the occurrence of dixi in the responsa: "Many of our responsa may have 
come from this source; they may even be presumed to have done so when 
the jurist introduces his answer by "dixi." And: "The use of the word dixi 
is proof enough, since it would have been sheer affectation for a jurist to 
use the past tense in reference to an opinion which he was reaching at the 
moment of writing." 
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restrictions on personal freedom according to Roman law.345 To start 
with, the verb dixerunt (they have said/ruled) and the connective ut in 
combination with scias (so that you may know) have legal overtones. The 
former became a common formulaic expression by which jurists would 
refer to an earlier opinion or ruling, whereas the latter--found at critical 
points throughout the De Ira--has almost the approximate sense of 
sciendum est (it must be understood), "a favorite locution of many jurists 
to introduce an important, general legal rule," as Berger observes. 346 
Seneca's reliance on sapientibus viris (wise men) can be quite misleading, 
however, and been taken to mean philosophers generally, or, in a more 
confined sense, the wise (i.e., the virtuous) according to the tenets of the 
Stoic school.347 Yet another possible (and more likely) meaning of 
345 Although insania remains the general term for mental disease 
(Berger, 503), forms of furor, furere, or furiosus are the terms of choice in 
the primary legal sources (Cf. Digest 50.17.124.1 and 50.17.40). Seneca 
uses these terms repeatedly in connection with ira, as, for example, at 
II.36.5: " .. .irasci se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi." Cf. Berger, 
480, on the legal restrictions placed on the furiosi. 
346Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 225, 230, 234. Cf. Berger, 691. Busa 
and Zampolli, 1194-97, list the frequency of scire and its variants as 
spoken by both Seneca and his adversarius in the De Ira. 
3470LD, entries la and lb, provide the general meaning: "A wise man 
(esp. as implying a virtuous man); ... a teacher of wisdom, sage, 
philosopher." By itself, then, the phrase may refer to earlier philosophers 
of the Stoic school, such as Panaetius, Posidonius, or Chrysippus, a 
plausible interpretation in that the thought conveyed appears doctrinal. 
It is less likely that the phrase alludes to the Stoic "sage," or virtuous man 
(Cf. Sandbach, 22, 28, 43-45, 126), since this sense of sapiens is generally 
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sapiens (wise man) pertains to the epithet awarded certain eminent jurists 
known for their perspicacity of judgment, among whom would be included 
Sempronius in the late fourth century B. C. and Lucius Acilius in the late 
Republic. 348 If for no other reason, the context would seem to call for 
this interpretation given the absence of any qualification limiting 
sapientibus viris (wise men) to notable Stoic figures by direct citation or 
indirectly by the use of a possessive adjective (e.g., nostris), methods he 
employs elsewhere to designate Stoic affiliation.349 
Though brief, this entire passage (1.1.2-3) illustrates Seneca's legal 
aims in several ways: the nature of the description of anger, the 
association of ira and insania, and the deliberate use of both legal terms 
applied to someone whose specific conduct is exemplary, such as Cato in 
De Constantia Sa.pientis. In short, the difference of interpretation recalls 
the Aristotelian distinction between practical and intellectual virtue in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
348Berger, 694, cites these two figures in particular as having acquired 
the agnomen "Sapiens" because of their extensive knowledge of the law, 
a use that presupposes the general use of Sapiens as equivalent to "wise 
in the law," as in the De Ira. Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid. Gronovius, 
2, while commenting on the passage and the notion that ira implies brevis 
insania, cite parallel statements by both Greek and Roman authors who 
predate Seneca. 
349Cf. 11.19.3: "Volunt itaque quidam ex nostris iram in pectore moveri 
effervescente circa cor sanguine ... 11 Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid. 
Gronovius, 64 n.3, identify nostris as being the Stoics. Cf. OLD, entry 6b: 
"of our sect or philosophy; (masc. pl. as sh.) those who hold our views. 11 
Seneca thus appears to be making a distinction between sapientes 
generally, and nostri, or those belonging to the Stoic school. 
196 
and the formulaic expressions found in the responsa. Appearing as early 
in the De Ira as they do, the inclusion of these elements sets the pattern 
for the legal dimension of what follows. Even more to the point, Seneca's 
fundamental approach is presented: the nature of his study will be legal. 
The formulaic dixerunt (they have said/ruled) and ut scias (so that you may 
know), coupled with a short catalogue of anger's ill effects, underscore the 
cautelary aspect which marks much of the De Ira. Seneca not only views 
anger as a legal issue, he repeatedly refers to it as a particularly 
destructive judicial problem as well, paying special attention to the 
conduct of the iudex (judge) in the discharge of his duties. Taken together, 
the anecdotes or exempla in the third book in fact comprise a contrasting 
set of judicial practices which illustrate Seneca's point. Generally 
speaking, iudex (judge), and (to judge), and other words which specify 
aspects of the judicial process regularly occur in a cautelary context. 
Following a very general series of suggestions on preventing anger in 
various circumstances, Seneca begins a sequence of explicitly legal 
recommendations. 
De parvola summa i udicat uro tibi res sine teste non 
probaretur, testis sine iureiurando non valeret, utri-
que parti dares actionem, dares tempus, non semel 
audires; magis enim veritas elucet quo saepius ad 
manum venit: amicum condemnas de praesentibus? Ante-
quam audias, antequam interroges, antequam illi aut 
accusatorem suum nosse liceat aut crimen, irasceris? 
lam enim, iam utrimque <quid> diceretur audisti? Hie 
ipse, qui ad te detulit desinet dicere, si probare 
debuerit: "non est" inquit "quad me protrahas; 
ego productus negabo; alioqui nihil umquam tibi dicam." 
Eodem tempore et instigat et ipse se certamini pugnae-
que subtrahit. Qui dicere tibi nisi clam non vult, 
paene non dicit: quid est iniquius quam secreto credere, 
palam irasci? 
Quorundum ipsi testes sumus: in his naturam excut-
iemus voluntatemgue facientium. 
(Il.29.3--30.1) 
(If the question of even a small payment should come 
before you to be judged, you would require a witness 
to prove the claim, the witness would have no weight 
except on oath, you would grant legal action to both 
parties, you would allow them time, you would give more 
than one hearing; for the oftener you come to close 
quarters with truth, the more it becomes manifest. Do 
you condemn a friend on the spot? Will you be angry 
with him before you hear his side, before you question 
him, before he has a chance to know either his accuser 
or the charge? What, have you already heard what is to 
be said on both sides? The man who gave you the infor-
mation will of his own accord stop talking if he is 
forced to prove what he says. "No need to drag me for-
ward," he says; "if I am brought forward I shall make 
denial; otherwise, I shall never tell you anything." 
At one and the same time he both goads you on and with-
draws himself from the strife and the battle. The man 
who is unwilling to tell you anything except in secret 
has, we may almost say, nothing to tell. What is more 
unfair than to give credence secretly but to be angry 
openly? 
To some offences we can bear witness ourselves; in 
such cases we shall search into the character and the 
intention of the offenders. 
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Although Seneca's opening protasis specifies a trivial issue of the 
sort which might be summarily treated in a modern small claims court, his 
diminution of the offence--parvola summa (a minimal amount)--is deliberate 
198 
and worthy of notice. First and foremost, the legal context of the passage 
is immediately apparent from Seneca's choice of terms. Iudicaturo (about 
to judge), teste and testis (witness), probaretur (given official approval), 
iureiurando (on oath), and dares actionem (grant of legal action) evince an 
unequivocally judicial setting; condemnas (pass sentence), accusator 
(accuser or plaintiff), and crimen (crime) in the suceeding sentences sustain 
the effect.350 Most unusual, however, is the scope of Seneca's advisory 
comments and prescriptions compared with so negligible a problem. Even 
a pittance warrants great thoroughness and caution, and Seneca considers 
every conceivable angle and each step necessary for arriving at a 
conclusion untainted by ira, the topic with which he begins the chapter. 
But here too, his remarks are clearly confined to ira as it bears on judicial 
propriety. 
Maximum remedi um irae mora est. Hoc ab illa pete 
initio, non ut ignoscat, sed ut iudicet ... 
350Given the judicial setting, it should come as no surprise that in much 
of Seneca's vocabulary here the legal sense is the primary sense. Note the 
following terms: iudico (OLD, entry 1: "To judge, try, or decide <a 
case> ... "); testis (OLD, entry 1: "One present at a legal transaction to give 
the proceedings validity, a witness."); probo (OLD, entry le: "<leg.> to 
give official approval to ... "); ius iurandum (OLD, entry 5: "A binding 
formula to be sworn to, an oath <whether or not in legal contexts> ... "); 
actionem dare (OLD, entry 2c: " ... to grant <the right to take a legal 
action> ... "); condemnas (OLD, entry 1: "<leg.> To pass sentence of 
condemnation on, condemn <whether in a criminal or civil case> ... ); 
accusator (OLD, entry 1: "The prosecutor in a public trial, accuser, 
plaintiff."); crimen (OLD, entry 1: an indictment, charge, accusation ... "). 
II.29.1 
(The best remedy for anger lies in delay. Beg this 
of anger at the first, not in order to pardon, but 
in order to judge.) 
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Judgment without anger, then, is Seneca's stated ideal; but 
judgment in a technical sense, as the passage soon discloses. The small 
size of the contested amount only further stresses the great care needed to 
circumvent the influence of anger in decisions over seemingly negligible 
matters. The aequus iudex (fair judge) or bonus iudex (good judge) is a 
figure to whom Seneca makes repeated mention, either in passing or with 
greater detail. 351 A few of the exceptional cases are noteworthy. 
(1) Si volumus aegui rerum omnium iudices esse .... 
(II.28.1) 
(If we wish to be fair judges in all matters .... ) 
(2) N eque enim aeguus iudex aliam de sua, aliam de 
aliena causa sententiam fert. 
(I.14.2) 
(For no just judge will pronounce one sort of judg-
ment in his own case and a different one in the case 
of others.) 
351Kelly, 102-117, examines the problem of "the misbehaving judge," 
the "iudex qui litem suam facit" (Digest 5.1.15.1), and a related matter, 
improper influences in Roman litigation (31-68). Kelly, 33, quotes Cicero's 
ideal of the ius civile (Pro Caecina, 71): "Quod enim est ius civile? quod 
neque infiecti gratia neque perfringi potentia neque adulterari pecunia 
possit." The Senecan passages below add a fourth corrupting influence--
ira--to Cicero's tricolon, and insist on the ideal of the aequus or bonus 
iudex. 
(3) Deinde ad condicionem rerum humanarum respiciendum 
est, ut omnium accidentium aequi iudices simus .... 
(111.26.3) 
(Again, we must consider the limitations of our human 
lot if we are to be fair judges of all that happens.) 
(4) ... bonus iudex damnat improbanda, non odit. 
(1.16.6) 
( ... a good judge condemns wrongful deeds, but he does 
not hate them.) 
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Each of these instances calls attention to an important aim of the De Ira: 
the presentation of a standard of judicial propriety untainted by anger. 
Such an emphasis is at bottom juristic and in keeping with the spirit of 
the responsa in accent and design. Now here does Seneca display this 
better than at the center of a sustained critique of punishment 
accompanied by anger in Book One. 
ltaque etsi perversa induenda magistratui vestis 
et convocanda classico contio est, procedam in 
tribunal non furens nee infestus sed vultu legis 
et illa solemnia verba leni magis gravique quam 
rabida voce concipiam et agi lege iubebo non ira-
tus sed severus; et cum cervicem noxio imperabo 
praecidi et cum parricidas insuam culleo et cum 
mittam in supplici um militare et cum Tarpeio pro-
ditorem hostemve publicum imponam, sine ira eo 
vultu animoque ero, quo serpentes et animalia 
venenata percutio. 
(1.16.5) 
(Accordingly, even if as a magistrate I must put on 
my robe awry and summon the assembly by the trumpet, 
I shall advance to the high tribunal, not in rage 
nor in enmity, but with the visage of the law, and 
as I pronounce those solemn words my voice will not 
be fierce, but rather grave and gentle, and not with 
anger, but with sternness, I shall order the law to 
be enforced. And when I command a criminal to be 
beheaded, or sew up a parricide in the sack, or send 
a soldier to his doom, or stand a traitor or a public 
enemy upon the Tarpeian rock, I shall have no trace 
of anger, but shall look and feel as I might if I 
were killing a snake or any poisonous creature.) 
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These comments feature the author himself, unlike similar passages 
where Seneca's discussion of judicial practice remains one of detached 
observation and advice; no longer in the background, Seneca states 
emphatically how he is determined to conduct himself as a magistrate. In 
sum, his comments are a profession of personal resolve to be the aequus 
iudex (fair judge) he proclaims as the figure to be emulated. More broadly, 
however, Seneca's personal declaration of impartiality in the exercise of 
judicial office contains much more of note. Not surprisingly, as in other 
sections of this type, he singles out ira as the vice least tolerable in a judge 
and introduces his own avowal of equanimity as a more intense personal 
recognition of the problem as well as his own responsibility as a public 
official to ensure that anger does not impair his judgment. The examples 
he uses to illustrate the difficulty of sustaining the desired attitude are 
deliberately extreme--the parricide, the traitor, the public enemy--so as to 
emphasize his objective even more. As a consequence, he replies to the 
earlier examples of his adversarius--the robber and poisoner--with the most 
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dire cases he can imagine, thereby heightening the contrast between judge 
and criminal, justice and crime.352 
That Seneca so naturally places himself in the role of iudex (judge) 
or praetor (praetor) with authority to pass sentence for capital offenses 
clearly reveals a familiarity with the office and its processes he can easily 
assume in collegial correspondence with a fellow magistrate. Likewise, he 
can readily refer to or advise on matters of magisterial or judicial conduct 
in general on similar grounds, as one jurist writing to another, a 
circumstance the representative passages quoted illustrate so well. More 
than this, however, Seneca's not infrequent insistence on the absence of 
anger in one who aspires to be considered, as he so often says, an aequus 
iudex (fair judge), simply redirects attention to the overall legal aspect of 
the De Ira, of which his remarksonjudicial conduct constitute only a part. 
Together with other key features, such as the formulaic terms found in the 
legal literature of problems, for example, Seneca's advisory comments on 
the deportment of a judge add one more element among several which 
parallel elements known to have distinguished epistolary responsa in the 
classical era. At the same time, the coexistence of elements in the De Ira 
that are found in the responsa help, at least in part, to explain the 
352At 1.16.1, the adversarius asks: "Quid ergo? Non irascar latroni? 
Quid ergo? Non irascar venefico'f' 
203 
puzzling absence of conventions which mark the philosophical dialogue: 
the lack of definite setting, organized conversation, and named characters. 
In terms of both structure and content, then, the De Ira resembles 
both a literary epistle and a legal responsum; its addressee is stated and 
the sum of Seneca's observations comprise a lengthy reply to an 
apparently sincere ethical question. Ira, the subject of Novatus' inquiry, 
is not solely a moral issue: this Seneca clearly believes, given the way that 
he associates each aspect of anger with the stages of litigation for 
iniuria.353 But even if Seneca constructed the De Ira with the 
responsum of his age as a model, his basic position regarding anger 
suggests a further possibility, since he so closely links the two notions of 
ira and iniuria. Not merely one vice among the usual roster of Stoic sins 
to be avoided, ira is a delictum animi (delict of the mind), and he discusses 
it correspondingly--asajurist rather than a philosopher. The consideration 
of anger as a delict produces a curious paradox whereby iniuria, a delict 
de iure almost by definition becomes a de facto philosophic vice as well. 
Thus, the De Ira, which seems to share so many features with an 
epistolary responsum, may well reproduce the form while concealing a 
more elusive purpose--taking the law itself to task for encouraging ira 
through sanctioning iniuria--by means of the very genre enlisted in the 
35311.1.3-5. 
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service of legal clarity. If ira is, as Seneca seems to claim, a genuine legal 
ill and iniuria an avoidable vice, the responsum furnishes the consummate 
form by which to parody the artificial and ineffective claims of the law, a 
form which enables him to speak not solely as a jurist, but as a satirist. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DE IRA AS PARODY 
Although the recognized features of the epistolary responsum clearly 
correspond to the form of the De Ira, Seneca does not merely use the 
responsum as a model; he parodies it. A typical responsum of the classical 
period might discuss any problematic point of law, such as a particular 
delict, for example. The ostensible theme of the De Ira is moral, however, 
not legal, and Seneca uses the form of the responsum to discuss the delict 
iniuria only as it pertains to ira, thereby diminishing the importance of 
the delict as part of the discussion. By giving the delict lesser status, 
Seneca "insults" the legal dignity of iniuria and misappropriates the form 
of the responsum for the analysis of a moral problem, an irony which 
would not be missed by his addressee or a contemporary audience. A later 
audience, however, neither attuned to the technical nature of Seneca's 
vocabulary nor familiar with the unabridged writings of the Roman jurists, 
could hardly be expected to understand the De Ira as anything other than 
a discussion on the morality of anger and a dialogue of inferior quality 
when held up to earlier standards of composition. A parody of the 
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responsum to censure a moral ill and discourage the legitimate use of the 
delict both mocks the legal genre and is an affront to the seriousness of 
iniuria, details a Roman audience would have immediately noticed. 
The epistolary responsum was by nature as serious an effort as a 
philosophical dialogue, and could be distorted by parody only at the hands 
of an author skilled at adapting a serious genre to a far different and more 
subtle end. As his works reveal, Seneca was a multi-talented author, 
capable of serious philosophical works and tragic drama, but of satire as 
well, as we know because of a single work which may offer the best clue 
for understanding Seneca's purpose in choosing the responsum as the most 
suitable model for the De Ira. 
Perhaps the most intriguing work of the Senecan corpus which has 
been handed down by tradition, the Apocolocyntosis, represents an 
excellent example of Menippean satire, a genre in which prose was 
intermixed with various verse forms in order to "enhance a moment of the 
story or to illustrate the argument," as one critic puts it.354 Long 
considered an anomaly among Seneca's writings, the Apocolocyntosis 
demonstrates the extent to which its author was capable of adding satire 
354Coffey, 149. 
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to a repertoire composed primarily of tragic drama and philosophy. 355 
Written early in the reign of the emperor Nero by most accounts, it is a 
few years later than the De Ira.356 Consequently, it bears comparison 
with the De Ira; Seneca had already satirised the law there, and the 
Apocolocyntosis continues the practice.357 The recognizable legal 
trappings which it features--the formulaic dating and disclaimer (1), the 
355Knoche, 99-108, offers an excellent discussion of the exceptional 
nature of the Apocolocyntosis among the writings of Seneca, and includes 
a brief synopsis of the MSS tradition and the questioning of authorship. 
According to Coffey, 166, the title ludus is not found in the MSS, but 
rather in "the epitome of Cassius Dio (60 ... 35) ... among the jokes and 
frivolities that followed the death of Claudius ... " 
356K. Abel, Bauformen in Senecas Dialogues (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 
Universitatsverlag, 1967), 155-70, surveys the evidence for the dating of 
Seneca's works. Cf. F. Giancotti, Cronologia dei "Dialoghi" di Seneca 
(Turin: Loescher, 1957), 93-150. 
357Knoche, 107-108, makes a number of interesting observations about 
the Apocolocyntosis as a political pamphlet and a parody of a Roman will, 
remarking that the latter enjoyed a lengthy tradition which begins with 
Varro's Menippean satires (543) and continues well into the imperial age. 
Cf. Suetonius Augustus 56 and Tacitus Annals 14.50 for examples of 
political pamphlets and parodies of this sort. Knoche also notes that 
parodies " which made use of legal formulae were ... circulating in imperial 
times as separate brochures in prose, but since here it was only a case of 
quite modest writings serving the purpose of amusement, our knowledge 
of them is both casual and incomplete." Horace Sermones 2.1 offers a 
parody of a legal discussion between the poet and the jurist Trebatius 
which demonstrates Knoche' s point. Lines 82-86 are especially relevant 
here, since defamatory poems (carmina mala), one of the offences included 
within the scope of iniuria, is the issue discussed. Horace's "Esto, si quis 
mala. .. " (line 83) parodies the formulaic language of the Twelve Tables as 
well as later legal writings. See Berger, 381, on carmen malum, or carmen 
famosum. 
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senatorial deliberations (8-11), and the scene from the Roman court 
(14-15)--indicates how very comfortable (and masterful) Seneca was with 
parody.358 
Undeniably the difference of genre makes comparison difficult at 
first glance; as transmitted, the De Ira is classified a dialogus (dialogue) 
and the Apocolocyntosis a ludus (play/skit/) or satura (satire). 359 On the 
face of it, the Menippean form of the Apocolocyntosis is unmistakeable, 
and the parodies present are obvious. Seneca's adroit ridicule of the 
funeral and deification ceremonies, however, is apparent because of his 
revealing use of the familiar Meni ppean form and an unconcealed 
distortion of the formalities he describes; the Menippean form, however, 
was not the genre on which the De Ira was based, and herein lies a 
frequently cited obstacle to the acknowledgement that a parody is taking 
place, a difficulty which has been overlooked by scholars attempting to 
358Cf. Petronius and Seneca, Apocolocyntosis, trans. Michael Haseltine 
and W .H.D. Rouse, rev. E.H. Warmington, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 436-39, 456-69, and 478-83, 
for text and translation. Seneca describes the Roman courts and their 
environs in unflattering terms at De Ira Il.7-9 .. 
359See above, Introduction, on the classification of the De Ira as a 
dialogue. Knoche, 99-100, and Coffey, 166-67, discuss the Apocolocyntosis 
and the problem of attribution. 
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understand the structural irregularities in the De Ira. 360 The terms 
ludus (play/skit/joke) and satura (satire) at least suggest the possibility 
that parody--one of the most attractive and effective forms of satire--will, 
of course, be found upon even an initial reading. Absent such a title, the 
De Ira can be parodying a whole genre (i.e., Roman legal procedure as 
such) and go entirely unnoticed; especially so the more cleverly and 
skilfully an author succeeds in concealing the original form upon which he 
bases his imitation. 361 In the case of the Apocolocyntosis, then, no such 
problems arise; it is the De Ira, if it is to be understood as parody, that 
poses all the problems. 
Although nothing in the title or its traditional generic designation 
would prompt any conclusion other than the most widely accepted--that the 
De Ira is a philosophical work--its failure to meet the previous standards 
of the genre ever since the dialogues of Plato have persuaded most critics 
360Highet, 72, remarks that skillful parody "almost coincides with 
reality ... ," and is such that it "might, by the unwary, be accepted as 
genuine work of the original author or style parodied." Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), s.v. "Parody," by R. P. Falk and Frances Teague, enlarges on 
Highet's observations: "Because the success of parody depends not only on 
the reader's understanding of the text, but also on the recognition of the 
source-text it is based on and the comical twist or reversal of those cultural 
values embedded in the source-text, the readerly transaction is complex. 
And the parody itself of course instantiates the source at the same time 
that it subverts it." 
361Ibid. 
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that Seneca's methods were unsatisfactory.362 In light of the outright 
ridicule of Claudius in the Apocolocyntosis, the one work which certainly 
reveals a facility with satire on Seneca's part, both critics and admirers 
overlook the more subtle Etwas fehlt of which he was capable. The 
versatile Seneca, after all, penned this caustic mockery of Claudius at 
precisely the same time he publicly eulogized the safely dead god in a 
speech written for the young Nero to deliver.363 Not even that 
panegyric, however, could remain free from the irony that survival had 
cultivated in Seneca under the reigns of Gaius and Claudius, as a well-
known observation of Tacitus testifies . 
... postquam ad providentiam sapientiamque fl.exit, nemo 
risui temperare, quamquam oratio a Seneca composita 
multum cultus praeferret, ut fuit illi viro ingenium 
amoenum et temporis eius auribus adcommodatum. 
(Ann. XIII.3) 
( ... after he shifted to the foresight and wisdom < sc., 
of Claudius>, no one could keep from laughing, although 
the speech, written by Seneca, displayed much care, 
as the man possessed a talent congenial and suit-
able for the listeners of his age.) 
Noted mostly for the seriousness of the Dialogi or Epistulae Morales 
and the grimness of his Tragoediae, the Seneca of the Apocolocyntosis is 
too easily dismissed, an oversight resulting in a failure to appreciate the 
362See Wright, 39-40. Cf. Griffin, Introduction. 
363Tacitus Annales 13.3. contains a description of the event. 
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not inconsiderable gift for satire hinted at by Tacitus. Despite the slim 
bulk of the Apocolocyntosis in the Senecan corpus, the talent for parody 
evidenced is quite as remarkable as the attested sense of irony displayed 
in the ghost-written eulogy for Claudius, whose reputation for unwisdom 
and improvidence is well-documented.364 Such facility for satiric 
technique, although observed in the philosophical works and letters by 
some scholars, undercuts an assumed seriousness of intent in those 
writings and occasions an understandable disregard for the degree to 
which Seneca could indeed shift from philosopher to satirist and back 
again.365 
Non-fiction parody had enjoyed a tradition at least as far back as 
Plato's Menexenus, with its mockery of the sophists: Plato's knack for 
parody remains one of his more memorable gifts. 366 Yet Seneca had a 
Roman tradition on which to rely as well. Prose parodies of Roman legal 
formulae can be found in Varro, and similar efforts have been attested in 
the imperial age, though our knowledge of them is scanty. 367 In addition 
to the satiric elements already noted in the De Ira, the above factors 
364Suetonius Claudius passim. 
365See Weber,1-6. 
366Highet, 137-8, examines Plato's parody of Lysias' style at the 
beginning of the Phaedrus and his parodies of speeches in the Menexemus. 
367See above, n. 357. 
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suggest that there is a scheme in the De Ira far different from the ethical 
purpose that it has been assumed to exhibit, a design in which the satirist 
of the Apocolocyntosis presupposes the satirist of the De Ira. 
Whereas the parodies in the Apocolocyntosis--including the self-
parody of the Hercules Furens--point to the models on which they are 
founded, the structure of the De Ira, possessing little formal resemblance 
to earlier philosophical dialogues, suggests no source-text or original upon 
which to establish a comparison. 368 But if Seneca's legal emphasis is 
kept in mind, it becomes clear that the legal literature provides the source-
text for the De Ira. The most likely candidate in this regard are the legal 
briefs discussed in the preceeding chapter--the responsa; unfortunately, not 
a single complete example survives, but there are enough surviving 
fragments of the genre which the De Ira may well illustrate if not entirely 
exemplify. 369 If this is the case, many of the unsettling problems of form 
and content in the De Ira find a solution and Seneca's underrated abilities 
368Knoche, 104-08, elaborates on the various parodies within the 
Apocolocyntosis, including the funeral eulogy (laudatio funebris) and even 
self-parody--the figure of Hercules here, based on the Hercules Furens. Cf. 
0. Weinreich, Senecas Apocolocyntosis, die Satire auf Tod, Himmel- und 
Hollenfahrt des Kaisers Claudius: Einfiihrung, Analyse, und 
Untersuchungen (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1923), passim. 
369See Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-61, on the state of the 
evidence. Lenel, passim, remains the most complete attempt at 
reconstructing portions of the responsa and other forms of the literature 
of legal problems. 
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as a satirist--and a parodist--assume a new prominence. The humor and 
sense of the ridiculous necessary to the best of parodies depend on an 
accuracy of imitation in which the parody and its source become 
indistinguishable the more aware the reader is of the sty le and thought of 
the text or tradition being parodied. 370 Since only fragments of the 
responsa and references to their general shape and content survive, 
evidence must be confined to these sources and what Roman legal 
historians have been able to adduce about them. Nonetheless, enough 
parallels exist between what is known of the responsa and internal data 
from the text to support the idea that the De Ira is a parody of a 
responsum. 
Pedantry, dullness, pomposity, and self-importance have been listed 
as some of the more obvious targets of parody which, when successful, 
provides the most trenchant criticism of its subject by attacking it on its 
own grounds.371 As chance would have it, these are precisely the 
qualities that critics of the De Ira have not merely cited as characteristic 
of the work, but even turned into judgments long detrimental to Seneca's 
370See Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 1972 ed., s.v. 
"Parody," by R.P. Falk and William Beare. 
371Ibid. 
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reputation.372 It is hardly in character for the author of so lively a piece 
as the Apocolocyntosis or so ironic a speech as that which he wrote for 
Nero on the occasion of Claudius' funeral to pen a deliberately tedious and 
unphilosophic "dialogue" when outstanding models of the dialogue in both 
Greek and Roman traditions were still well-known. The greater 
probability is that the juristic writing availed Seneca the opportunity to 
apply his talent for parody toward illuminating the legalistic absurdities 
of the age in a style all too common in the legal writing in any era--dull, 
pedantic, and pompous. 373 Combining legal expertise with a satiric 
sensibility, he could mimic the jurists and Claudius, whose mania for legal 
pronouncements is amply attested and seems to have stamped his 
reign.374 It is the selfsame Seneca who decried the way people resorted 
to actions for iniuria in the De Ira who later envisions Claudius in the 
underworld, accused of transgressing the very Lex Cornelia to which he 
372Michele Coccia, I problemi del De ira di Seneca alla luce dell'analisi 
stilistica (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1957) addresses many of these 
issues. Cf. Giovanni Cupaivolo lntroduzione al De Ira di Seneca (Naples: 
Societa Editrice Napoletana, 1975), provides a more recent survey of the 
problems. 
373The pronouncements of Judge Bridlegoose in Rabelais' Gargantua 
and Pantagruel are examples of what would now be called "legalese." 
374Villy Sorensen, Seneca: The Humanist at the Court of Nero trans. 
W. Glyn Jones (Edinburgh and Chicago: Canongate Publishing Ltd. and 
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 110, casually comments on this 
trait of Claudius. Cf. Tacitus Annales 13.4, and Suetonius Claudius 14-15. 
had apparently resorted so often in life. 375 
Ducit ilium ad tribunal Aeaci: is lege Cornelia 
quae de sicariis lata est, quaerebat. Postulat, 
nomen eius recipiat; edit subscriptionem: occisos 
senatores XXXV, equites R. CCXXI, ceteros oaa 
11J&µa0o, -re Kov1, '!:€. Advocatum non venit. 
(Apocolo. 14) 
(Pedo brings him before the judgment seat of Aeacus, 
who was holding court under the Lex Cornelia to try 
cases of murder and assassination. Pedo requests 
the judge to take the prisoner's name, and produces 
a summons with this charge: Senators killed 35, Roman 
knights, 221; others. as many as the grains of sand 
and dust. Claudius finds no counsel.) 
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The roughshod misuse of the law depicted here is of the same sort 
recounted over and over in the De Ira, especially in the exempla of book 
three.376 Seneca's protests about the condition of the courts and those 
who frequent them, or his unrelenting condemnation of iniuria as little 
more than legitimized anger, are straightforward and conspicuous satiric 
features with origins in the diatribe.377 Aside from the reasons already 
375Berger, 549-50, lists the various Cornelian Laws (Leges Corneliae) 
enacted under the dictator Sulla during the years 82-79 B.C., which 
included the Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis mentioned by Seneca 
here. Berger notes that although some of these laws were repealed, the 
Lex Cornelia de sicariis et venejiciis remained in force under Justinian. Cf. 
Digest 48.8. Suetonius Claudius 14-15 and 34-38 details many of the 
emperor's misdeeds. 
376Cf. III. 14-21. 
377Cf. Horace Sermones 1.1.28 ff. and 1.1.1 ff. with De Ira 111.33 and 
III.31 respectively, parallels observed in the last century by Weber, 3. 
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given, the element of parody in the De Ira remains hard to recognize 
precisely because it too closely resembles a philosophical line of reasoning. 
Yet one of the most effective weapons at the disposal of the parodist is the 
slight distortion which compels a novel, cutting, but ultimately accurate 
recognition of the object of parody--in this case, Roman law and the bloated 
pronouncements of the imperial jurists.378 There may be very little 
which distinguishes an ethical from a legal line of argument, and Seneca 
has brilliantly blurred the lines separating morality and law early in Book 
Two by representing anger as a process identical to the stages of litigation 
for iniuria . 
.. .intellexit aliguid, indignatus est, damnavit, ul-
ciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis 
quibus tangebatur adsensus est. 
(II.1.5) 
(He has formed a judgement, become outraged, has 
passed sentence, and achieves vengeance. These 
processes are impossible unless the mind has given 
assent to the impressions that moved it.) 
378Highet, 68-70, remarks that satiric parody "wounds the original 
(however slightly), pointing out faults, revealing hidden affectations, 
emphasizing weaknesses and diminishing strengths ... " In addition, he 
observes that there are satiric parodies "in which the form is maintained 
virtually unaltered, without exaggeration, without distortion, while the 
thought within it is made hideously inappropriate to the form, or inwardly 
distorted, or comically expanded." Seneca uses the responsum to his 
advantage in the De Ira and achieves many of effects which Highet lists, 
ironically employing a legal form to criticize legal principles--most 
prominently iniuria--considered worthwhile from the time of the Twelve 
Tables. 
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On first glance, Seneca's concise account of this process looks like a 
standard philosophical treatment in which anger is treated as a moral 
problem involving an acknowledged course of action freely chosen; his 
ostensible topic is an ethical malaise, not a statutory offense, unless one 
examines the language and context of the chapter and recalls a revealing 
remark from Book One which bears further examination: 
... nam cum ira delictum animi sit, non oportet 
peccata corrigere peccantem. "Quid ergo? Non 
irascar latroni? Quid ergo? Non irascar venefi-
co?" Non; neque enim mihi irascor, cum sanguinem 
mitto. Omne poenae genus remedi loco admoveo. 
(1.16.1) 
( ... For since anger is a deli ct of the mind, it is 
not right to correct wrong-doing by doing wrong. 
"What then," you exclaim; "shall I not be angry 
with a robber? Shall I not be angry with a poison-
er?" No; for I am not angry with myself when I let 
my own blood. To every form of punishment will I 
resort, but only as a remedy.) 
Here, in unequivocal terms, Seneca boldly employs the legal metaphor 
"delictum animi" (delict of the mind) to characterize anger.379 In doing 
379Cf. the legal contexts of Seneca's use of delictum at 1.14.2, 11.6.2-4, 
and 1.19.6. There are, however, other significant aspects about the passage 
that are worthy of mention. First of all, the question asked by Seneca's 
adversarius suggests that ira is an appropriate response to the robber 
(latro) or the poisoner (veneficus). By referring to anger as a delict of the 
mind, Seneca has criminalized ira and places it in relationship with the 
criminal offences introduced by his adversarius. Secondly, there is a legal 
nuance to Seneca's use of non oportet(it is not right). David Daube, Forms 
of Roman Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 8-23, closely 
examines the substitutes for the imperative which express necessity or 
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so, Seneca's emphasis and intent is to establish a context which "poena" 
(penalty) can be exacted, but fairly. Delictum (delict) denotes a statutory 
offense, and poena (penalty) is the generic term for a legal fine or 
judgment.380 With this in mind, Seneca's later discussion on the nature 
and the course of anger (Il.1.1-5) assumes a direction not unlike that of a 
juristic analysis of some particular crime or offense, and reaches a 
crescendo delivered as though it were the final statement of a judge's 
verdict of guilt: intellexit (he formed a judgment), indignatus est (became 
outraged), damnavit (passed sentence), ulciscitur (achieves revenge)--a 
succinct and powerful summation of the facts essential for Seneca to secure 
a verdict in iram (against anger) in the "court" of public opinion. That 
Seneca has concluded his condemnation of ira by enlisting terms which 
express an approved procedure of the law achieves an irony pleasantly 
reminiscent of the satiric subtleties of Horace, not the philosophical 
sobriety of Cicero. 
Repeatedly and consistently, legal metaphor and analysis recur in 
obligation, such as oportet and necesse est, to present a recognized legal 
standard or juristic interpretation of what is required by law. For the 
frequency of oportere or its forms in the De Ira, see Busa and Zampolli, 
924. 
3~erger, 430, comments thus on delictum: " ... the source of one group 
of obligations (obligationes ex delicto) which in the fundamental division 
of obligations is opposed to the contractual ones (obligationes ex contractu). 
Cf. Nicholas, 207-09. 
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the De Ira, most noticeably where the ethical analysis seems to be 
plodding along precisely because Seneca has adopted the airs (or rather 
long-windedness) of a jurist so faithfully that his very skill at imitation 
has been taken for a genuinely unskillful effort on his part. 381 The 
result has been that critics fail to recognize the tone the significance of 
precisely those stretches of the work where parody of a responsum is often 
most successfully achieved. Seneca's continuous handling of ira as a delict 
conforms to an observed feature of the responsa so far as can be drawn 
from fragments or testimonia: the exhaustive legal analysis of a single 
problematic legal question or issue. 382 In addition to the specialized 
terminology of iniuria, to the advice specific to the activities of a judge, 
and to the number of anecdotal exempla which double as either legal cases 
or trial settings, Seneca's treatment of ira as delict presents a still more 
persuasive argument for the De Ira as parody of a jurist's responsum. The 
381Suetonius Claudius 38.1, refers to an edict of Claudius which may 
well have been Seneca's inspiration for writing the De Ira: 11/rae atque 
iracundiae conscius sibi, utramque excusavit edicto distinxitque, pollicitus 
alteram quidem brevem et innoxiam, alteram non iniustam fore. 11 (He was 
aware of his tendency to anger and irascibility and excused both in an 
edict; he also drew a distinction between them, promising that the former 
would be short and harmless and the latter not unjust.) 
382Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223, characterizes the literature of 
legal problems as 11 ... works devoted exclusively to problems, to the most 
difficult and perplexing questions of law ... The problems are discussed 
individually, at varying length ... " 
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implications of this conclusion and a more detailed account of just how 
Seneca's parody unfolds require additional discussion, however, before a 
final assessment can be ventured as to the status of the De Ira as legal 
parody in particular and as satire in general. 
With regard to Seneca's idiosyncratic view of ira, one must begin by 
examining some of the common characteristics and effects of parody and 
the ways they function in the De Ira. One of the hallmarks of parody is 
distortion of a style, author, or work by as close an imitation as possible 
in order to heighten the intended ridicule of what is being parodied. 383 
Whether Seneca had an individual jurist in mind can hardly be 
determined at this late date--their works are mostly lost, in any case--but 
the content and structure of the De Ira certainly appear to mimic the style 
and format of a responsum in so far as the available evidence allows. The 
distortion occurs as a result of Seneca's equation of anger with a legally 
actionable delict. He thus fashions both a reversal of social priorities--
morality taking precedence over law--and infers the moral and legal 
equivalence of ira and iniuria. At this point, law turns into a universal 
collusion to legalize acts malign by nature. Accordingly, Seneca strips the 
pretense of innocence from the victims of iniuria in their pursuit of justice 
383Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 1972 ed., s.v. 
"Parody," by R.P. Falk and William Beare. 
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and exposes the delict as merely an opportunity for the aggrieved to 
satiate their desire for revenge. In much the same fashion as the tragic 
cliche that suffering brings wisdom, for the parodist, distortion yields a 
clarity which also produces wisdom. 384 
Well-versed in Stoic thought and an innovator in tragic drama, 
Seneca understood the power and importance of paradox in each 
tradition. 385 Indeed, the epigrammatic point for which he is both blamed 
and praised is often no more than a terse truth consisting of an elegant 
paradox, and although the De Ira has its share of these pithy aphorisms, 
the overriding paradox of ira as delict, and delict as vice, suffuses the 
work.386 Much like the realization in the tragedy of Oedipus that vision 
384See Aeschylus Agamemnon 171-78. Aristotle Poetics 4 briefly 
comments on the distorted mask of comedy. 
385The Stoic paradoxes were well known in the Republic. Cicero 
(Paradoxa Stoicorum) lists and discusses the six most common paradoxes. 
These paradoxes were at times the object of satire, perhaps because of the 
unattainable moral standards they established. Horace Sermones 1.3, 2.3, 
and 2.7 criticizes those which he finds extreme and incompatible with 
sensible living. D. and E. Henry, 13, cite paradox as one of the most 
important elements of Seneca's tragedies. G.K. Hunter, "Seneca and 
English Tragedy," in Seneca, ed. C. D. N. Costa (London and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 166-204, primarily examines Seneca's 
influence on Elizabethan drama, but often comments on his importance for 
continental drama as well. 
386J. R. G. Wright, 39, remarks on "the straining for 'point' and 
rhetorical effect" in Seneca's writings. R. Pfennig, De librorum guos 
scripsit Seneca de ira compositione et origine (diss. Greifswald, 1887), 
attempts to be a comprehensive survey of Seneca's stylistic "flaws." 
11.28. 7 provides a typical epigram: " ... et fidei acerrimus exactor est 
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itself possesses both a physical and a moral dimension, the recognition 
that law may as easily contribute to vice or virtue and is not one-
dimensional forms the central theme of the De Ira. Paradox thus lies as 
much at the core of the effective parody as at the heart of tragedy. The 
end result is also similar: a serious idea arrived at from different 
directions--the one tragic, the other comic. Seneca's legal examination of 
ira combines with a moral analysis of iniuria to diminish the dignity of 
Roman law and emphasize its moral bankruptcy. That he uses the idiom 
of the law to mock the solemn and portentous auctoritas (authority) behind 
the jurist's own medium--the responsum--only intensifies the incongruities 
of the law as well as maximizing the satiric effect. 
Parody and paradox, the operative form and principal figure of the 
De Ira, offer but a general sense of Seneca's purpose and intended 
meaning. In order to appreciate the overall effect, it is necessary to 
examine his imitation of a responsum as well as the legal paradox he 
constructs in more detail. As discussed earlier, Seneca clearly sets iniuria 
in a legal context, a tactic which substantially alters the nucleus of his 
design; particularly so when one appraises the importance of the concept 
in relation to his definition of ira and the regularity with which iniuria 
perfidus ... " ( ... the strictest enforcer of loyalty is the traitor ... ) 
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appears throughout. 387 Likewise, the fact that Seneca devotes large 
portions of the De Ira to iniuria seems odd. 
Despite his stated topic, analysis of what does or does not constitute 
the delict of iniuria and of the various acts which fall within its compass 
comprises a large proportion of a work supposedly devoted to ira. 388 
Additional emphasis also results from the numerous exempla which serve 
as much to illustrate iniuria or represent a court proceeding as to promote 
a Stoic ethic. 389 However out of keeping or tangential Seneca's concern 
with iniuria may initially appear, his preoccupation with the delict is 
paramount for understanding ira, and without it, neither the parody nor 
the paradox can prevail. 
Precise and impressive legal analysis is perhaps the central feature 
of Seneca's treatment of iniuria, but a feature his examination of ira 
shares. He refers to anger as a delictum animi (delict of the mind) and 
387See above, Chap. 2. 
388Busa and Zampolli, 648-9, list seventy occurrences of the word in the 
De Ira. Iniuria appears with any frequency only in the De Ira, De 
Constantia Sapientis, De Beneficiis, and Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. 
References to the delict are both explicit, as at II.1-5 and 25-33, and 
implicit. The frequent and obviously legal use of the term in these works 
(particularly in the De Ira), coupled with Seneca's characterization of ira 
as the desire for revenge (Il.1.4), underscore the Senecan influence on 
Nero's promise "to bring neither outrages nor a desire for revenge" (nullas 
iniurias nee cupidinem ultionis adferre) on the occasion of his initial speech 
to the Roman senate (Tacitus Annales 13.4). 
389See II.32-33 and III.14-24. 
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evaluates it accordingly by applying all the rigor one would expect of a 
jurist interested in every conceivable side of a problem and hopeful of 
composing the definitive and comprehensive responsum on the question. 
As a consequence, Seneca makes the same sort of investigation of ira that 
he does in his exploration of iniuria: what it is, what distinguishes it or 
sets it apart, what its effects are, and what can be done to curtail it are 
taken up in turn and explored. But more than this, it becomes apparent 
that Seneca does not castigate the delict in the same manner in which he 
addresses and faults the justification and expression of anger; he must of 
necessity grapple with iniuria as the social outlet of ira and a widely 
abused legal safeguard originally conceived in order to offer protection 
against very basic antisocial behavior, such as assault, battery, libel, and 
defamation.390 It is clear, however, from Seneca's intermittent diatribes 
on the courts that iniuria, driven by ira, had become a pretext rather than 
a protection--a convenient resource for avenging even trivial 
dissatisfactions.391 If Seneca's portrait of the courts and their irate 
390That there should be legal redress for these basic violations to one's 
person developed early in Roman law and continued throughout Roman 
legal history. See Warmington, 474·77, and Digest 47.10-25; also Frier, 
177-200, and Nicholas, 215-17. As such, Seneca's plea for restraint in 




denizens are any guide, the anger resulting could even be worse than the 
acts that purportedly warranted the anger to begin with. The De Ira, 
modelled on the epistolary responsum, could most effectively convey this 
insight--and with all the sharpness and force of which parody is capable. 
Point by point, Seneca considers ira as a delict--its nature, its 
characteristics, and its consequences--using the language of the law and 
the art of legal reasoning. Immediately prior to identifying the processes 
of anger and litigation cited earlier, Seneca begins by questioning the 
nature of anger as a Roman jurist would question what would constitute 
violation of a delict. 392 
(1) quaerimus enim ira utrum iudicio an impetu in-
cipiat, id est utrum sua sponte moveatur an 
quemadmodum pleraque, quae intra nos <non> 1n-
sciis nobis oriuntur. 
(11.1.1) 
( ... for the question is whether anger originates 
from choice or impulse, that is, whether it is 
aroused of its own accord, or whether, like much 
else that goes on within us, it does not arise 
without our knowledge.) 
(2) Iram quin species oblata ini uriae moveat non est 
dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsa statim sequatur 
et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsen-
tiente moveatur quaerimus. Nobis placet nihil 
illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam 
speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius 
concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nee laedi se 
392See Il.1.4-5, where Seneca identifies the two processes. 
debuisse et vindicari debere, non est eius impetus, 
qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur. 
(Il.1.3-4) 
(There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by 
the direct impression of injury; but the question 
is whether it follows immediately upon the impress-
ion and springs up without assistance from the 
mind, or whether it is aroused only with the assent 
of the mind. Our opinion is that it ventures noth-
ing by itself, but acts only with the approval of 
the mind. For to form the impression of having re-
ceived an injury and to long to avenge it, and then 
to couple together the two propositions that one 
ought to be avenged--this is not a mere impulse of 
the mind acting without volition.) 
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The significance of quaerimus ("we inquire" or, better, "for the 
question is") as a key legal term in the responsa, and of iniuria 
("injury/outrage") as an important delictal classification are by now 
apparent from our earlier analyses.393 The passages are still more useful 
with respect to the Senecan paradox that ira is a delict. On the surface, 
his inquiry may easily be taken for a standard ethical query, since a 
common method of determining the moral basis of an action consists in 
evaluating the part played by knowledge and the will. Seneca's approach 
and position here are more in keeping with a presumption of wrong than 
a neutral investigation of the nature of anger. The alternate indirect 
questions in which sua sponte (of its own accord) and insciis nobis (without 
393See above, Chaps. 2 and 4. 
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our knowledge) occur in the first section and non accedente animo (without 
assistance of the mind) appear in the second section, particularly followed 
by voluntate (volition) in the final sentence, provide a structure which more 
closely parallels a legal question posed for the purpose of establishing 
innocence or guilt. In fact, Seneca's concern with knowledge and volition 
as the necessary conditions for anger anticipate the formula "knowingly 
and willfully" in a common-law verdict of guilt.394 This is precisely the 
ruling he passes on ira, and, with great irony, as a reaction to iniuria, 
since his criteria for assessing a violation of the delict are the same. Later 
in the second book, Seneca discusses what cannot constitute iniuria and 
why it cannot. 
(1) lrascimur aut iis a quibus ne aecipere quidem 
potuimus iniuriam, aut iis a quibus accipere in-
iuriam potuimus. Ex prioribus quaedam sine sensu 
sunt, ut Uber quem minutioribus litteris scrip-
tum saepe proiecimus et mendosum laceravimus, ut 
vestimenta quae, quia displicebant, scidimus .... 
(II.26.1-2) 
(Our anger is stirred either by those from whom we 
could not have received any injury at all, or by 
those from whom we nright have reeeived one. To the 
former class belong certain inanimate things, such 
as the manuscript which we onen hurl from us be-
cause it is written in too small a seript or tear 
up because it is full of mistakes, or the articles 
of clothing which we pull to pieces because we do 
not like them .... ) 
394Black's Law Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. "Knowingly and willfully." 
"This phrase, in reference to violation of a statute, means consciously and 
intentionally. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (C.C.A.) 204 F.705, 
708." 
(2) Atqui ut his irasci dementis est quae anima carent, 
sic mutis animalibus, quae nullam iniuriam nobis fac-
iunt, quia velle non possunt; non est enim iniuria 
nisi a consilio profecta. Nocere itaque nobis possunt 
ut ferrum aut lapis, iniuriam quidem facere non possunt. 
(11.26.4) 
(But as it is the act of a madman to become angry at 
things without life, it is not less mad to be angry 
at dumb animals, which do us no injury because they 
cannot will to do so; for there can be no injury un-
less it arises from design. Therefore they can harm 
us just as the sword or stone may do, but they cannot 
injure us.) 
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Seneca's analysis of iniuria in these passages culminates in the same 
judgment that he passes on anger. The two key words that mean to 
decide, velle (to intend) and consilio (by design), parallel his use of 
voluntate (in accord) and animo adprobante (with the approval of the mind) 
in the previous passages.395 And as considered earlier, the distinction 
Seneca makes between nocere (to harm) and iniuriam facere (to cause an 
injury) makes it plain that he is differentiating legal culpability from 
harm caused by no human agent and outside the purview of the law.396 
Overall, comparison of the two passages emphasizes the close link between 
ira and iniuria by providing examples for which the same standards are 
applied. Seneca concludes (II.1.4) that anger cannot occur without 
395See II.1.1-4. 
396Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation, 5, 38-9, 45, and 73, examines 
the legal sense of facere (OLD, entries 21a and b: "To do, perform <an 
action> ... " and "to commit <a erjme > "). Iniuria as the direct object of 
facere occurs throughout the De Ira in a clear-cut legal context. See I.3.1 
and 18.6; II.26.4, 28.5, and 32.2; IIl.8.4. 
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knowledge and volition and later (II.26.4) establishes that iniuria requires 
recognition and intent: in other words, he evaluates anger on legal 
grounds and subsequently clarifies the legal scope of the deli ct on the legal 
grounds that one would expect. For Novatus or, for that matter, any 
jurist, to characterize anger as a delict would be shocking, since according 
to the legal texts, as well as the De Ira, the commission of iniuria is 
actionable for redress. 397 From the very beginning, however, Seneca 
refers to ira as an affectus (passionfemotion), a determination outside the 
scope of the law.398 Nonetheless, he pursues this approach throughout, 
397E.g., Gaius Inst. 3.220: "Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum 
quis pugno puta aut fuste percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed ... " 
(Outrage is committed not only when someone is struck with a fist or a 
club, or even flogged, but ... ) Cf. II.32.2: "M. Catonem ignorans in balineo 
quidam percussit imprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea 
satis facienti Cato: "Non memini," inquit? "me percussum." Melius putavit 
non agnoscere quam vindicare. " (Once when Marcus Cato was in the public 
bath, a certain man, not knowing him, struck him; for who would 
knowingly have committed outrage against that man? Later, when the 
man was making an apology, Cato said, "I do not recall that I was struck." 
He thought it better to ignore the incident than take it to court.) 
398At I.1.1, Seneca calls ira " ... hunc ... adfectum ... maxime taetrum ac 
rabidum ... " ( ... this ... most hideous and frenzied ... of emotions ... ). Although 
generally translated "emotions" (Basore, passim), affectus (OLD, entry 8) 
can also signify an intention or purpose (based on emotional not rational 
grounds), thus implying a close connection between emotion and a 
disposition toward action. Affectus is, in fact, used in the legal sources to 
mean "intent;" so, Digest 47.10.3.1: "Cum enim iniuria ex affectu facientis 
consistat ... " (For since outrage arises from the offender's intent ... ). Cf. 
Gaius Inst. 4.178: "calumnia enim in adfectu est, sicut crimen furti ... " (for 
calumny, like the crime of theft, lies in the intention ... ). Seneca uses 
motum animi (II.3.4), agitatio animi (II.3.5), and concitatio animi (II.3.5) as 
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and refines the legal nuances even more, as the following passage 
illustrates. 
Nam si quis poenam exigit non ipsius poenae avidus 
sed quia oportet, non est adnumerandus iratis. 
(I.9.4) 
(For if someone exacts punishment, not because he 
desires punishment for its own sake, but because it 
is proper to exact it, he ought not to be counted 
as an angry man.) 
Perhaps the most striking feature of this sentence is its remarkable 
resemblance to the language of the statutes. Nam si quis (for if someone) 
is a familiar introduction in any number of sections from the Institutes of 
Gaius or Justinian's Digest. 399 In context, the phrase normally occurs 
immediately prior to stating the conditions which constitute a violation of 
the law, or an exception constituting compliance, as this excerpt shows. 
Si quis alienum vinum vel frumentum consumpserit, 
non videtur damnum iniuria dare ideoque utilis danda 
est actio. 
(D. 9.2.30.2) 
(If someone consumes another's wine or grain, he is not 
understood to cause a wrongful loss, and so the analogous 
equivalent to the noun "affect" as meaning visible emotion, which he 
carefully distinguishes from adfectus animi (11.3-4). It is clear in both 
chapters that by adfectus Seneca means a state of mind intent upon action. 
399See Berger, 707, and Digest 50.16.1 on the use of the indefinite 
pronoun in the protasis of conditional statements in the legal sources. 
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action should be given.)400 
Seneca's phraseology plainly approximates this passage from the Digest, 
but with an important difference: the Digest segment unequivocally 
pertains to liability under the Lex Aquilia. 401 The sentence from the De 
Ira (I.9.4) relates to anger, but in the familiar formulaic language of 
Roman jurisprudence. The former states a condition under which wrongful 
loss does not occur, but under which another course of action applies; the 
latter states a condition under which a penalty may be exacted and one in 
which it may not. Seneca makes the same distinction elsewhere, insisting 
that duty (oportet) or expedience (utile) are the only appropriate intentions 
whereby the exacting of punishment is acceptable.402 The structural 
400Cf. the use of actionem dare (to grant the right of process/ an action) 
in the De Ira at II.29.3: "De parvola summa iudicaturo tibi res sine teste 
non probaretur, testis sine iureiurando non valeret, utrique parti dares 
actionem, dare tempus, non semel audires ... " (If the question of even a 
small sum should come before you to be judged, you would require a 
witness to prove the claim, the witness would have no weight except on 
oath, you would grant to both parties the right of process, you would allow 
them time, you would give more than one hearing ... ). The legal context 
here is plain, yet Seneca begins the chapter by recommending a remedy 
(remedium) for ira, as though it were a legal offence. 
401Frier devotes much of his Casebook to a detailed and systematic 
examination of the Lex Aquilia, the statute enacted in the 3d century B.C. 
to set broad rules of liability for damage to property. Cf. Nicholas, 218-33, 
and Buckland, 585-89. 
402See above, n.377, on the legal use of oportet (it is right/necessary) to 
advise necessity or obligation by some principle or standard in various 
circumstances(OLD, entry la). At Il.33.1, Seneca sets the condition under 
which iniuria may be justifiably vindicated at law: "Si tamquam ad 
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parallels between these passages and legal terms they contain reveal a 
surprisingly juristic spirit and tone in the De Ira, a spirit and tone which 
appear frequently, and regarding a topic, ira, not generally considered 
legally problematic. 
Seneca's parody of the form of the responsum, while requiring this 
extraordinary view of ira as a delict, still depends heavily on a satiric 
censure of iniuria which is inspired by ira for the paradox to succeed. As 
a consequence, it is no accident that, just as his reflections on ira imitate 
the idiom of the law, Seneca's more detailed analyses of iniuria resemble 
sections of the Digest excerpted from various jurists. His insistence in 
book two that knowledge and volition are necessary for iniuria to have 
occurred precede a passage in which he argues against resorting to legal 
recourse for the delict, even when it may in fact have been committed. 
Cogitemus, inquam, alios non facere iniuriam sed 
reponere, alios pro nobis facere, alios coactos 
facere, alios ignorantes, etiam eos, qui volentes 
scientesque faciunt, ex iniuria nostra non ipsam 
iniuriam petere; aut dulcedine urbanitatis prolap-
sus est, aut fecit aliquid, non ut nobis obesset, 
sed quia consequi ipse non poterat, nisi nos repul-
isset .... 
remedium venimus, sine ira veniamus, non quasi dulce sit vindicari, sed 
quasi utile ... 11 (If we resort to a remedy (for outrage), let us do so without 
anger--not with the view that revenge is sweet, but that it is expedient ... ). 
See above, n. 317, on vindicare. Berger, 756, gives the concise legal sense 
of utilis: 11U sed of legal acts, transactions, and procedural steps which have 
been, or can be, successfully accomplished in a given situation. 11 
(11.28.5) 
(Let us consider, I say, that some are not doing us 
an injury but repaying one, that others are acting 
for our good, that some are acting under compulsion, 
others in ignorance, that even those who are acting 
intentionally and wittingly do not, while injuring 
us, aim only at the injury; one slipped into it allured 
by his wit, another did something, not to obstruct us, 
but because he could not reach his own goal without 
pushing us back .... 
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Although he cites instances where the delict iniuria has admittedly 
been commited according to criteria--volentes scientesque(intentionally and 
wittingly)--which he has already established, Seneca plays devil's advocate 
here, cautioning against too strict or legalistic a judgment when a prima 
facie case exists, a position certainly consistent with his criticism of the 
courts and his numerous anecdotes depicting historical figures--such as 
Cato--who ignored flagrant offenses. 403 Appearing in the middle of a 
long chapter whose purpose is primarily to advise, Seneca's recommends 
leniency and extols the superior authority of pietas (duty) and fides 
(integrity) "quae omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt" (all of which lie 
outside the statute books). 404 Oddly enough, however, and with an 
amusing irony, there is a decidedly legal ring to his counsel here as well 
403Cf. 11.32 for the Cato anecdote, and llI.22-24 for other instances of 
restraint or clemency. 
404See II.28.2. 
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as in the passage quoted earlier in which he discusses the conditions 
essential to iniuria. A similar tone is discernible in the following excerpt 
from the Digest. 
Illud relatum peraeque est eos, qui iniuriam pati 
possunt, et facere posse. (1) Sane sunt quidam, 
qui facere non possunt, ut puta furiosus et inpu-
bes, qui doli capax non est: namque hi pati ini ur-
iam solent, non facere. cum enim iniuria ex affectu 
facientis consistat, consequens erit dicere hos, 
sive pulsent sive convicium dicant, iniuriam fe-
cisse non videri. (2) ltaque pati quis iniuriam, et-
iamsi non sentiat, potest, facere nemo, nisi qui 
scit se iniuriam facere, etiarnsi nesciat cui faciat. 
(3) Quare si quis per iocum percutiat aut dum certat, 
ini uriarum non tenetur. 
(D. 47.10.3 pr.-3) 
(It is equally held that those who can suffer iniuria 
can also inflict it. (1) To be sure, there are some 
who cannot inflict it, e.g., a lunatic and a minor 
not capable of dolus; for these persons may suffer in-
iuria, not inflict it. For since iniuria arises from 
the offender's intent (affoctus), the logical conse-
quence is that they (lunatics and minors) are not held 
to inflict iniuria, whether they strike (another) or 
raise a clamor. (2) And so a person can suffer iniuria 
even if he does not feel it, but no one can do it ex-
cept a person who knows that he inflicts iniuria, even 
if the one to whom it is done is unaware. (3) There-
fore if someone strikes (another) as a joke or during 
a contest, he is not liable for iniuria.)405 
Many comparable excerpts from the Digest on the full range of the 
405The translation is that of Frier, Casebook, 192. By dolus the 
classical lawyers meant "fraud" or "bad faith" (Nicholas, 170), evidence of 
which established liability in contractual law (Nicholas, 176) and the law 
of delicts (Nicholas, 223). 
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Roman law of delicts would only add to the impression of the similarity 
between a typical legal discussion and Seneca's discourse on ira and 
iniuria. The above passage is of more than passing interest, however, 
since its theme is iniuria. The obvious parallels to previously quoted 
sections from the De Ira are noteworthy in that they accurately 
demonstrate not only the legal nuances of the De Ira, but reveal how 
precisely Seneca parodies the substance and tone of Roman legal writing 
in his criticism of a moral failing, an achievement which is noticeable only 
on comparison with the literature of the law. 406 The Digest excerpt 
offers the exact conditions or requirements under which iniuria applies by 
law, as do the aforementioned passages from the De Ira.407 Although 
Seneca concurs with the later opinion of Ulpian on iniuria, his method of 
determining ira is also in harmony with Ulpian's (and his own) position on 
iniuria.408 As the Digest shows, the offender's intent (ex affectu facientis) 
and knowledge that he has committed iniuria (nisi qui scit se iniuriam 
facere) are the necessary conditions which determine violation of the 
406Cf. 11.1-4, 26.1-2, and 28.5. 
407Ibid. 
408Digest 47.10.3 pr.-3 is selected from Ulpian, Libro quinquagesimo 
sexto ad Edictum (the fifty-sixth book on the Edict). 
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delict.409 Likewise, Seneca stipulates decision (velle) and design (nisi a 
consilio profecta) as requirements for iniuria, in agreement with the 
general legal opinion as expressed by Ulpian and the editors of the 
Digest.410 However, the crucial elements in Seneca's analysis of ira are 
the legal methods or criteria used to distinguish it. The will (voluntate) 
and the approval of the mind (animo adprobante) are the standards to be 
employed in determining ira, the identical standards he uses to establish 
iniuria.411 The moral criteria which Seneca recommends not only 
supersede the particular measures of legal analysis mentioned above, but 
even the most general or universally accepted principles of law (iuris 
409See nn. 398 and 396 on adfectus (intent) and iniuriam facere (to 
commit outrage/insult). That Seneca uses affectus to describe ira (I.1.1) 
rather than the neutral sensus (feeling) is noteworthy, as is the distinction 
he makes between what is called "affect," or the visible sign of an emotion, 
and intent (11.3.2-5 and 4.1), which he discusses unequivocally in legal 
terms: "Et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut 
efferantur, est primus mot us non. voluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus .. . ; 
alter cum voluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me vindicari, cum 
laesus sim, aut oporteat hun.c poen.as dare, cum scelus fecerit." (That you 
may know, further, how intentions begin or become stronger or 
uncontrollable, the first prompting is involuntary, as though a preparation 
for an intention ... ; the next is combined with an act of volition, not 
unyielding, which assumes that it is right for me to seek legal action 
because I have been offended, or that he ought to pay a penalty, since he 
has committed a crime.) 
41
°Cf. Digest 47.10.3. 
411Cf. 11.1.3-4. and 11.28.5. 
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regula).412 Thus, Seneca's incisive comparison between the ideal 
virtues--duty (pietas), humanity (humanitas), generosity (liberalitas),justice 
(iustitia), integrity (/ides)--and the impoverished statutes of Roman law--the 
very lifeblood of Roman civilization--best summarizes the aim of the De Ira 
and marks the culmination of his juristic analysis. 
The contrast between Roman ideals and Roman law is clear and 
straightforward for the short stretchj ust mentioned, but this is as close as 
Seneca comes to a straightforward statement of his position. Elsewhere, 
he consistently applies the methodology of legal analysis recognizable from 
the primary sources of Roman law to ira as delictum animi (delict of the 
mind). To support this view, Seneca even seems to draw on areas of law 
completely separate from the law of delicts--a regular practice in both 
Roman and modern legal systems--in order to find the metaphors adequate 
to demonstrate the severity of anger. For example: 
Primum facilius est excludere perniciosa quam re-
gere et non admittere quam admissa moderari; nam 
cum se in possessione posuerunt, potentiora rectore 
sunt nee recidi se minui ve pati untur. 
(I.7.2) 
(In the first place, it is easier to exclude harmful 
passions than to rule them, and to deny them admit-
tance than, after they have been admitted, to control 
them; for when they have established themselves in 
412See 11.28.2-3. 
possession, they are stronger than their ruler and do 
not permit themselves to be restrained or reduced.) 
238 
In what might seem a casual or offhanded analogy to illustrate the 
harmfulness of anger, Seneca resorts to a practice familiar to anyone 
acquainted with legal argument: reasoning by example, or from case to 
case.413 In this instance, he alludes to a commonplace of Roman 
property law--the distinction between ownership and possession--to 
underpin his case, even though the law of delicts and property law at first 
glance appear to be quite unconnected and dissimilar.414 Seneca's 
example and, more specifically, his use of possessione (possession) 
introduces a basic legal concept: namely, that possession is the foundation 
of ownership and has both a privileged and protected status.415 By 
appropriating the concept of possessio (possession) from property law for his 
analysis of ira, Seneca merely follows the usual process whereby similarity 
is observed between cases, the rule of law inherent in the first case is 
413Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948; rep. Phoenix Books, 1961), 1-8, 
discusses the mechanics of legal argument, which is based on reasoning by 
example. 
414Nicholas, 107-115, notes the differences between the concepts of 




cited, and this legal ruling is made suitable for the second case.416 
So here Seneca applies the leading principle of the "delict" of ira. 
Just as adverse possession by one party may defeat a claim of ownership 
by a second party, so anger denies a claim to self-rule or the undisputed 
claim to control of one's actions. Seneca notes the similarities, refers to 
precedent, and extends the precedent to ira to establish a legal basis for 
his position, an end he pursues by availing himself of still another 
province of the law. At various times he speaks of potestas (legal authority 
or control) in the context of anger .417 For example: 
Commota enim semel et excussa mens ei servit quo 
impellitur. Quarundam rerum initia in nostra 
potestate sunt, ulteriora nos vi sua rapiunt nee 
regressum relinquunt. 
(I.7.3-4) 
(For when once the mind has been aroused and shaken, 
416Levi, 2, describes this process, as valid in Roman law as in the 
historical development of modern liability law which he meticulously 
traces in succeeding chapters. The practice is most apparent in analogous 
actions (actiones utiles) or actions based on the facts (actiones in factum), 
whereby modifications of an existing formula are employed "to cover legal 
situations and transactions for which the original formula did not suffice," 
as Berger, 34 7, maintains. Cf. Frier, 3. Such case analysis becomes 
necessary because the general language of legal statutes precludes 
mention of every conceivable situation which may arise. 
417Berger, 640, maintains that in "its broadest sense potestas means 
either physical ability (=facultas) or the legal capacity, the right (=ius) to 
do something." More narrowly, it referred to magisterial power in public 
law and power over a family or things in private law. Cf. Digest 1.12 and 
OLD, entries le and 3. 
it becomes the slave of the disturbing agent. 
There are certain things which at the start are 
under our authority, but later hurry us away by 
their force and leave us no retreat.) 
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And in the final book, Seneca once again makes reference to potestas (legal 
authority or control), but on this occasion while providing a distinctively 
Roman and legal interpretation to remarks made by Plato, who refused to 
exercise domestic rule when angry. 
ltaque abstulit sibi in suos potestatem et ob pec-
catum quoddam commotior: "Tu," inquit "Speusippe, 
servulum istum verberibus obiurga; nam ego irascor." 
Ob hoc non cecidit, propter quod alius cecidisset. 
"Irascor" inquit; "plus faciam quam oportet, liben-
ti us faciam: non sit iste servus in eius potestate 
qui in sua non est." 
111.12.6-7 
(He therefor denied himself all authority over his 
own household, and once, when he was deeply pro-
voked at some fault, he said, "Do you, Speusippus, 
punish this young slave with a whip, for I am angry." 
His reason for not striking was the very reason that 
would have caused another to strike. "I am angry," 
said he; "I should do more than I ought, and with 
too much satisfaction; this slave should not be un-
der the authority of a master who is not master of 
himself.") 
In both passages Seneca resorts to the terminology of the law to 
strengthen his position, but this time he uses servus (slave) and potestate 
(legal authority or control)--terms included in the law of persons--to argue 
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by example.418 Referring chiefly to the rights and privileges enjoyed by 
the senior male in the Roman family, the paterfamilias, potestas (legal 
authority or control) represented the highest ordinary legal status as 
compared to the servus (slave), for whom there were no legal rights.419 
In the first selection Seneca describes the initial disturbances of the mind 
which may result in anger as enslaving (servit), although control (potestate) 
is still retained.420 In the subsequent passage he employs the same legal 
nomenclature to characterize Plato's refusal to discipline a slave while 
angry. Quite cleverly, Seneca utilizes both paranomasia and anachronism 
to embellish the anecdote, thereby providing a Roman twist to the tale. 
The idea of "control" (continentia, moderatio, or dictio) would have sufficed 
for the point Plato intended, but Seneca further adorns the incident not 
only by introducing a Roman legal term unfamiliar to Plato (thus the 
418Joh. Frid. Gronovius apud Justus Lipsius, 114, cites Xenocrates, 
Diogenes, Stobaeus, and Plutarch for other instances of this anecdote. As 
in other anecdotes which originally occur in the works of Greek authors, 
Seneca cleverly alters the tale to suit his legal purpose and his Roman 
audience, using a legal vocabulary consistent with the Roman law of 
persons as it applies to masters and slaves. He confers on Plato the 
benefits of Roman legal status, that of patria potestas, which Plato could 
not have enjoyed. 
419Nicholas, 60-75, surveys these legal categories. Cf. Gaius Inst. 1.48-
54. 
420See above, nn. 398 and 409, on Seneca's distinction between an 
initial reaction to an event, which is involuntary, and an intention, which 
is voluntary and involves interpretation of the event. 
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anachronism), but also by using this term to suggest the double 
significance of potestate: as legal authority and as self-control. 
In short, both excerpts contain status designations from the law of 
persons, yet display them in a new context, much as the notions of 
ownership and possession. Despite belonging to separate domains of 
Roman law, however, possessio (possession) and potestas (legal authority) 
share a logical kinship which in turn connects them with Seneca's 
denunciation of ira. Each in its own fashion denotes control, whether of 
property or family and slaves, and each consequently forms a partial basis 
for Seneca's case against iraas deli ct. It is clear that possessio(possession) 
constitutes a claim of ownership just as potestas (legal authority or control) 
establishes a claim of status; both confer legal governance of either things 
or persons, a principle that enables Seneca to infer a certain similarity 
between such precedents and his legal treatment of ira. The irate man, 
having knowingly and voluntarily decided upon a vindictive course of 
action, relinquishes his self-possession and status to ira, thereby violating 
the principle of self-control inherent in Roman property law as well as the 
law of persons or status. 
A number of observations can be made about Seneca's line of 
reasoning, the first being that he gives legal precedents for his delictal 
analysis of ira. Secondly, the methodological consistency of Roman legal 
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analysis and Stoic moral analysis allows us to comprehend why the latter, 
stripped of legal nuance, could conceal the former, especially since 
autonomy and personal liberty, the idealized goals of Stoic moral 
philosophy, are themes expected of a Stoic philosopher. These ideals, 
however, have their counterparts in autonomous ownership of property and 
the full citizen rights of the paterfamilias(oldest male), important features 
of the Roman legal landscape in which Seneca's mention of possessio 
(possession) and potestas (legal authority or control) are set. Finally, and 
most significant of all, these terms and the case-to-case arguments in 
which they occur contribute further evidence that the De Ira parodies a 
jurist's responsum. 
One further parallel between the De Ira and the legal texts 
underscores his parody of the responsum and needs to be examined: the 
comparison between citations of certain philosphers in the De Ira and the 
opinions of notable jurists regularly invoked in the primary legal sources, 
including those who antedate Seneca. References to jurists from the 
classical age of Roman law--the period extending from Augustus to 
Diocletian--are abundant in the Digest, especially those jurists renowned 
for noteworthy or innovative contributions, such as Labeo or 
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Pomponius.421 Mention of classical jurists does, in fact, appear to be 
typical of Roman legal writing and functions not unlike the case to case 
reasoning just discussed. 422 Judicial thought no less than case precedent 
serves to either reinforce and refine an issue or differentiate opposing 
views, as this sample on conuicium (clamor) indicates. 
Convicium iniuriam esse Labeo ait ... (5) Sed quod ad-
icitur a Praetore "adversus bonos mores" ostendit non 
omnem in unum collatam vociferationem Praetorem notare, 
sed earn, quae bonis moribus improbatur quaeque ad in-
famiam vel invidiam alicuius spectaret. (6) Idem ait 
'adversus bonos mores' sic accipiendum non eius qui 
fecit, sed generaliter accipiendum adversus bonos mo-
res huius civitatis ... (8) Fecisse convicium non tantum 
is videtur, qui vociferatus est, verum is quoque, qui 
concitavit ad vociferationem alios vel qui summisit 
ut vociferentur ... (11) Ex his apparet non omne male-
dict um convicium est .... 
(D. 47.10.15.3, 5-6, 8, 11.) 
(Labeo says that a clamor is an iniuria ... (5) But the 
Praetor's qualification "contrary to good morals" shows 
that the Praetor does not censure every outcry directed 
at a person, but (only) one that offends against good 
morals and looks to someone's disgrace or odium. (6) 
He (Labeo) also says that "contrary to good morals" 
should be interpreted not with respect to (the morals 
of) the offender, but generally: contrary to the morals 
of this community ... (8) Not just the person who cried 
out is held to have raised a clamor, but also a person 
421Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 99 and n.2, provides these terminal 
points and surveys a number of differing scholarly opinions on the dating 
of this period, the most generous of which includes both the entire 
republican and imperial ages. 
422See above, n. 416. 
who roused others to cry out, or who brought about the 
outcry ... (11) From this it is clear that not all abusive 
language is clamor.) 
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Ulpian systematically lays out the problem of convicium (clamor) 
here as a category of iniuria by summoning the testimony of the late 
Republican jurist, Labeo, who no doubt significantly advanced legal 
thought regarding the matter by proposing more prescribed and carefully 
distinguished conditions.423 Ulpian thus gives due credit in mentioning 
the earlier jurist's views by name, first of all, and inserting the familiar 
and formulaic ait (he says), before briefly citing Labeo's additions to the 
legal scope of the delict.424 
In much the same spirit, Seneca pays tribute to the philosophers, 
most notably Aristotle and Plato, but chiefly the former, since he presents 
a contrary opinion of ira. 
Atqui, ut in prioribus libris dixi, stat Aristoteles 
defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecrari: calcar 
ait esse virtutis, hac erepta inermem animum et ad 
conatus magnos pigrum inertemque fieri. 
423The Digest selection is taken from the 57th book of Ulpian's 
commentary on the edict (Ulpian.us~ Libro quinquagesimo septimo ad 
Edictum). 
424See above, Chap. 4, on the regular and formulaic use of ait in the 
legal literature. Horace Sermones 2.1.4-6, in an imaginary dialogue with 
the jurist Trebatius, parodies a legal dialogue: "Trebati, quid faciam, 
praescribe. "Quiescas." Ne faciam, inquis, omnino versus? "Aio." 11 
(Trebatius, give me counsel. What am I to do? "Be quiet. 11 I am not to 
write verses at all, you say'?" "That is what I say. 11) 
(IIl.3.1) 
(And yet, as I said in earlier books, Aristotle stands 
forth as the defender of anger, and forbids us to 
cut it out; it is, he claims, a spur to virtue, and 
if the mind is robbed of it, it becomes defense-
less and grows sluggish and indifferent to high en-
deavor .)425 
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And toward the very beginning of the De Ira, Seneca provides a similar 
commentary. 
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, 
non facultatem; concupiscunt autem homines et quae 
non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est qui poe-
nam vel summi hominis sperare non possit; ad nocen-
dum < omnes > potentes sumus. Aristotelis finitio 
non multum a nostra abest; ait enim iram esse cupid-
itatem doloris reponendi. 
(1.3.2-3) 
(In the first place, I gave my opinion on the desire 
to exact punishment, not of the power to do so; more-
over, men do desire even what they cannot attain. In 
the second place, no one is so lowly that he cannot 
hope to punish even the loftiest of men; we all have 
power to do harm. Aristotle's definition differs 
little from mine; for he says that anger is the de-
sire to repay suffering. 426 
The most obvious parallels between the passage from the Digest and 
these selections from the De Ira are the naming of those whose viewpoints 
are either at variance with or useful for clarifying the problem at hand, in 
4251.3.2, 9.2, 17.1, and II.13.1. are the other chapters in which the 
authority of Aristotle is introduced as an outside or contrary opinion. 
426Cf. De Anima, 403 a 30. 
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particular using the formulaic ait (he says) to set off the officially noted 
opinion by another expert on the issue. More to the point, however, this 
pattern introduces a decidedly casuistic analysis of ira which bears 
immediate resemblance to Ulpian's comments on convicium (clamor) into 
which Labeo's thoughts on the delict are admitted. Aristotle's name 
likewise occurs as a quasi-legal authority whose advocacy of ira is 
markedly opposed to Seneca's condemnation. In the first excerpt, which 
appears rather late in the De Ira, Seneca recalls his fundamental 
opposition to Aristotle's position on ira as initially cited in Book One.427 
The sequence in each case is remarkably formulaic and closely follows the 
pattern in the Digest selection: either a definition or further distinction of 
a previous definition takes place.428 In this case, Seneca carefully 
4271.3.2 contains Seneca's introductory statement of the two views. For 
discussion of the legal nature of Seneca's definition, see above, Chap. 2. 
428Digest 47.10.15.3, 5-6, 8, 11 is quite typical of the style and tone of 
the work and evokes comparable passages in the De Ira. Digest 
47.10.13.3-4, also on iniuria, is an equally representative passage: Si quis 
per iniuriam ad tribunal alicuius me interpellaverit vexandi mei causa, 
potero iniuriarum experiri. (4) Si quis de honoribus decernendis alicuius 
passus non sit decerni ut puta imaginem alicui vel quid aliud tale: an 
iniuriarum teneatur? et ait Labeo non teneri, quamvis hoc contumeliae 
causa faciet: etenim multum interest, inquit, contumeliae causa quid fiat an 
vero fieri quid in honorem alicuius quis non patiatur. ("If, to obstruct me, 
a person outrageously interrupts me before someone's tribunal, I will be 
able to sue on iniuria. (4) If, with regard to decreeing honors for someone, 
a person did not allow that, for instance, a statue or something similar be 
decreed in someone's honor, should he be liable for iniuria? Labeo says he 
is not liable, even though he did this to be insulting. For, he says, there 
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distinguishes between exacting punishment (poenae exigendae) and 
repayment of suffering (doloris reponendi), considering the former an 
eagerness for the legal action that a penalty or punishment (poena) 
requires and a foundation on which to build his vehement objections to the 
crowded dockets (II. 7-9) and his thoroughgoing denunciation of capricious 
and arbitrary claims of iniuria.429 
Perhaps just as significant, however, in light of the similarities 
noted above and the scholarship on the responsa, is the use of the perfect 
tense with dixi and diximus (I have said=ruled/given an opinion) rather 
than dico or dicimus (I say=rule/give an opinion) as evidence of a 
responsum. His use of the perfect tense in an already familiar legal 
context is sufficient proof that a jurist is responding to a formal legal 
question in a responsum, as Schulz has mentioned, since "it would have 
been affectation for a jurist to use the past tense in reference to an opinion 
which he was reaching at the moment of writing. "430 Although dixi (I 
have ruled/given an opinion) in the first passage (111.3.1) clearly refers to 
an earlier section of the De Ira, diximus (I have ruled/given an opinion) as 
is a great difference between what is done to insult and what someone does 
not allow to be done to honor another.") 
429See above, Chaps. 1 and 2, for more detailed analyses of these 
passages. 
430Schulz, Roman Legal Scince, 224-25. 
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it initially appears (1.3.2-3) has no prior reference in the work itself, and 
precisely exemplifies Schulz's observation.431 The legal vocabulary and 
tone of the work becomes increasingly obvious by comparison with fairly 
typical samples from the Digest, and therefore adds yet another element 
common to the De Ira and the responsa. 
In closing, then, Seneca's remarkable assertion that anger is a delict 
of the mind (delictum animi) is neither a rhetorical exaggeration nor a 
casual metaphor. To the contrary, this assertion directs and informs the 
entire work and is the key to Seneca's legal design. Without such an 
overtly legal statement, this most comprehensive of the Dialogi would 
remain, as critics of Seneca have complained, a long-winded moral treatise 
undeserving of serious regard, if only because it propounds what to many 
is an untenable and unattainable moral ideal.432 The evidence, however, 
suggests quite another conclusion and a Senecan purpose quite different 
from what is usually supposed. From the very beginning he has associated 
ira with iniuria and leaves no doubt thereafter that he has been referring 
to the delict iniuria as the Digest or the Institutes of Gaius have 
4310ther examples of diximus and dixi (I have ruled/given an opinion) 
in a similar context occur at 1.5.3. and 8.3; II.4.2, 27.3, and 31.1; 111.6.6. 
432See Pfennig, passim, for one of the most critical evaluations of 
Senecan style generally, and the De Ira in particular. 
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characterized it.433 Furthermore, Seneca surveys and evaluates the two 
notions on the same grounds, denouncing ira in all its manifestations 
while grudgingly offering assent to the process for iniuria only in cases 
where expedience is the determining issue. 434 Add to these factors a 
remarkable frequency of legal terms, numerous parallels to legal formulae 
and discourse, or the many anecdotes which do the work of legal 
precedents, and the De Ira begins to assume an unexpected intent and 
significance. 
The extent to which elements of Roman law recur in the work 
should come as no surprise, given what we know of Roman education 
among the aristocracy, Seneca's rhetorician father, and more relevant still, 
the careers of both Novatus and Seneca.435 Though the occasion of the 
De Ira remains open for conjecture, the rationale for the presence of these 
legal features in it has not been suspected--and for good reason. 436 Stoic 
433See Digest 47.10-25, Gaius Inst. 3.220-25, and Justinian Inst. 4.4. 
434While conceding an acceptable vindication for iniuria at 11.33.1, 
Seneca uses utile in the legal sense, meaning "actionable" or "valid" (OLD, 
entry 6). Although generally translated "expedience" (Basore, 239), the 
legal emphasis and terminology in the chapter would support "actionable" 
or "valid" as more appropriate to the context. 
435See above, nn. 78and144 on the legal character of Roman education 
and the careers of Novatus and Seneca. 
436 Aside from the obvious desire to present a detailed Stoic position on 
ira, speculation on what prompted Seneca to write the De Ira has 
inevitably accompanied attempts to interpret the work. His criticisms of 
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ideas still prevail throughout the De Ira, to be sure, yet they obscure a 
formal design available only by close comparison with the primary sources 
of Roman law and whatever general characteristics legal scholars have 
been able to assemble from the fragments and testimonia of responsa. 
Once the comparison is made, however, Seneca's intent becomes clear: the 
De Ira is an epistolary responsum underneath it all, and appears out of the 
fog of philosophical assumptions to match the descriptions of responsa 
provided by commentators and scholars of Roman jurisprudence. Seneca's 
judicial recommendations, case narratives, and his treatment of ira as 
delict comprise three of the most salient features known to have marked 
a responsum in its original form. 
Taken alone, the structural correspondences between the De Ira and 
attested responsafail to account for Seneca's condemnation of anger in his 
highly peculiar reworking of a legal genre. That he introduces a moral 
failing into the list of actionable delicts in much the same way Ulpian or 
Labeo discourse on clear-cut offences to public order leads, finally, to 
several observations or conclusions as to the intended meaning of the De 
Ira. Whereas no Roman of Seneca's education or standing could have 
Caligula (II.33 and III. 18-19) have suggested (Sorensen, 98) that it was 
written as a denunciation of that emperor's conduct and the character of 
his regime. Griffin, 319 n.5 points to Seneca's mention of Novatus' fear 
of anger (Naturales Quaestiones 4, pref. 10 ff.) as a likely pretext for 
making Novatus his addressee. 
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seriously construed anger as an actual delict, this is the Seneca who later 
parodies elements of Roman law in the Apocolocyntosis: Seneca the 
satirist. And it is the satirist, exiled and impatient, who could attempt 
what no jurist would do: an obloquy on the vice of iniuria, the principal 
remedy protecting Roman dignity from the time of the Twelve Tables to 
Justinian's Digest, in a legal genre appropriated for a clever parody of the 
law itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the insights of scholars during the past century that the De 
Ira possessed features of the Hellenistic diatribe and that the work lacks 
important formal elements which distinguished the philosophical dialogue, 
students of Seneca's prose works and philosophical positions have 
continued to view the De Ira as a Stoic condemnation of anger added to a 
tradition of similar dialogues on the subject which are known only from 
testimonia and have passed into obscurity. Flawed though it may be 
compared to earlier specimens of the genre, the De Ira nonetheless 
includes a sufficient enough moral and philosophical emphasis to be 
considered a philosophical essay, if not a poorly crafted dialogue, by many 
students of Seneca's works. However inelegant in execution and radical 
in viewpoint as some have regarded it, the De Ira proceeds by way of 
argument, rebuttal, and recommendation toward the aim which Seneca 
directly announces at the outset: the reduction or elimination of anger. 
Seneca's goal presupposes that anger as generally defined is morally 
unacceptable and must be categorically disallowed, a task that requires a 
thorough rejection of any effort to mitigate its harmfulness or to propose 
that anger may have some ethical value relative to circumstances. As in 
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the philosophical dialogues of earlier writers, the case develops largely 
through the systematic refutation of objections raised by one of the 
characters; unlike earlier dialogues, however, there are no named 
characters and Seneca's interlocutor remains anonymous throughout. 
Added to these exceptional departures from the lex operis of a dialogue, the 
De Ira contains no prologue or setting and, therefore, no occasion for the 
dramatic exchange of conversation which allows for the transition from 
small talk to the discussion of a philosophical problem. 437 Instead, the 
work opens atypically: Seneca quickly cites the request of his addressee for 
advice as a pretext for what is to follow. Furthermore, Seneca does not 
avail himself of a famous figure to present his views, an odd omission 
which also breaks with convention. Marcus Cato, whom Seneca extols in 
the De Constantia as a worthy example of someone who consistently 
remained unaffected by injury and insult, would have been a natural 
candidate for such a role. In fact, Seneca represents his own positions, an 
expected epistolary convention, but one foreign to the dialogue tradition. 
Whereas the De Ira, however classified, omits important elements 
of the philosophical dialogue, the work does, however, include far too 
numerous an array of devices common to the satiric monologues and 
437Cf. Plato's Symposium and Cicero's De Amicitia. Discussions of the 
central topics, love and friendship, begin after several chapters of casual 
conversation. 
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epistles of Horace to dismiss. As we have seen, the De Ira is in fact a sort 
of epistle--the judicial responsum. In any case, despite its prose medium, 
the De Ira adheres to both ancient and modern standards of what 
constitutes a satiric programme. Seneca denounces a specific vice, offers 
exaggerated descriptions of angry men, and presents horrifying accounts 
of cruel autocrats; in short, he casts ira in the worst possible light by 
employing the sustained hyperbole typical of satire. Also in the satiric 
mode, Seneca proposes a radical ideal of restraint in counterpoint to his 
criticism of anger. Satire demands vivid comparisons and contrasts 
between virtue and vice, not just the progressive series of objections and 
rebuttals characteristic of philosophy, for which the argument is all that 
matters. For Seneca, anger must be avoided not only because it is 
logically indefensible, but because it is ugly. 
A survey of the elements of satire in the De Ira still does not explain 
the structural irregularity of the work; in point of fact, the presence of 
these elements complicates the problem. At various intervals in the work, 
Seneca very carefully defines his terms. He describes anger as the desire 
to exact punishment (poenae exigendae cupiditas) and maintains that it 
originates with the appearance of injury (species iniuriae). However 
generic Seneca's use of these phrases may appear at first glance, closer 
inspection reveals a more technical significance: iniuria happens to be the 
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term under which a number of legal offenses are classified in the Roman 
law of delicts. More importantly, Seneca continually refers to iniuria in 
his discussion of anger, and in each instance the legal case is clear. 
Furthermore, the legal context of Seneca's remarks widens once it becomes 
plain that by iniuria he means the delict and by poena the assignment of 
a legal penalty. Thus, it becomes increasingly apparent that the De Ira 
was written to address legal issues with which Seneca considered anger to 
be inseparably connected, and a more detailed analysis of the structure 
and vocabulary of the work support this conclusion. 
Enough evidence is supplied by the primary sources and the work 
of modern scholars of Roman law to substantiate the legal meaning of 
many of the terms which Seneca uses and the anecdotes he presents for 
Novatus' benefit. Moreover, the instances of these legal terms in the 
Senecan corpus often occur only or predominantly in the De Ira. 438 The 
pattern which now emerges in the work discloses a criticism of and a 
satiric approach to iniuria and litigation which parallels the denunciation 
of ira from start to finish. Seneca's satiric treatment of anger doubles as 
a satire of the legal machinery that enables the easily affronted Roman 
438Conviciator (OLD, entry 1: "one who utters abuse") and advocatio 
(OLD, entries 2 and 3: "pleading in the courts" and "postponement [of a 
trial]") are two such instances of legal terms used only in the De Ira. At 
the same time, there are seventy occurrences of forms of iniuria in the 
work, far more than in any other of Seneca's works. 
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citizen to justify his ire. The intent of Seneca's diatribe on the crowded 
courts, the base lawsuits, and baser attorneys contributes to the overall 
design and is not the aimless and exaggerated digression of which it 
initially appears to consist. So also his numerous anecdotes and advisory 
comments on the appropriate conduct for judicial magistrates: the former 
not only describe contrasting approaches to anger, but contrasting styles 
of judicial conduct; the latter refer to the elimination of anger Seneca 
advocates throughout, but especially its elimination in anyone who 
dispenses justice. 
Although some have noted legal aspects of the work, such as the 
judicial recommendationsjust cited, the overall emphasis on law in the De 
Ira discloses a legal agenda of perhaps as great a significance as Seneca's 
moral agenda. If so, the usual format in which to exhaustively argue a 
point of law would be a legal genre such as the epistolary responsum, not 
a philosophical dialogue. Inasmuch as the De Ira lacks many of the 
conventions of the dialogue, it does possess enough of the formal features 
of the epistolary responsum to conclude that this was the genre on which 
Seneca relied for making his case against ira and iniuria. Furthermore, 
since nothing more than fragments of the responsa have survived, the De 
Ira may be of inestimable value for both Seneca's apologist's and Roman 
legal historians: first, as a piece more carefully and deliberately crafted 
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than considered by detractors of the work; second, as the only complete 
example of this type of legal analysis which survives; and last, as an 
important source of evidence for the prominence of iniuria during Seneca's 
age. 
Finally, the De Ira provokes further interest as a literary work, 
since it unites the formality and seriousness of the responsum with the less 
weighty features of satire: an uncommon combination, but one that reveals 
an unsuspected originality and a more subtle purpose than has been 
supposed. Passages from the satires of Horace and the attested circulation 
of parodies of legal formulae in the early empire support a tradition of 
legal parody, and Seneca's masterful parody of legal formulae in the 
Apocolocyntosis demonstrates his participation in that tradition. 
Nonetheless, Seneca's use of the responsum as a model for the De Ira still 
fails to explain elements of satire present in the work; the elements of an 
epistolary satire, however, may account for his use of the equally 
epistolary responsum. As a genre typically employed by jurists to discuss 
issues of law, Seneca's purpose throughout is to criticize a legitimate deli ct 
and a vice--hardly aims one would expect to find in such a genre. He 
parodies the format of the responsum so closely that one might assume his 
purpose to be legal, yet everywhere he censures the law and its role in the 
justification of ira. The moral ideals of the satirist are unmistakable: 
Quanto latius officiorum patet quam iuris regula! 
Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, iustitia, 
fl.des exigunt, quam omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt! 
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APPENDIX 
SENECAN LEGAL VOCABULARY 
[Note: The following is an alphabetical list of the legal vocabulary 
identified in the De Ira. The definition, one or two citations representing 
the legal use of the term, and the listing from the Oxford Latin Dictionary 
(OLD) or Justinian's Digest corresponding to the definition follows each 
word.] 
absolvo: acquit (3.29.2 and 1.14.3) OLD 2. 
accedo: assent to (2.1.3) OLD 8. 
accusator: an informer, prosecutor (2.29.3) OLD 2b. 
accuso: bring a charge, accusation (2.7 .3 and 3.5.3) OLD 2a. 
actio: legal action (1.8.4 and 2.29.3) OLD 2c. 
affectus: an intention, motive (1.12.3) OLD 8. 
adprobare: to assent to (2.1.4) OLD lb. 
advocatio: pleading in the law-courts (3.9.3) OLD 2; postponement of a trial (1.18.1) 
OLD3. 
advocatus: one who advises a party to a lawsuit (2.7.3 and 2.13.1) OLD 1. 
aestimatio: the assessment of a penalty, damages (3.12.3) OLD 2. 
aestimo: assess, judge (2.27.4 and 3.32.2) OLD 4. 
aio: prescribe, lay down (1.17 .1) OLD 7 and Digest 23.2.45.5. 
caedes: the crime of murder (1.2.1and1.12.2) OLD 1. 
causa: case (1.2.5 and 2.22.4) OLD 1. 
causam agere: to conduct a case (1.38.2) OLD 3a. 
condemrw: pass sentence on (2.29.3) OLD 1. 
consilium: deliberate or rational action, choice (2.26.4) OLD 6. 
contemrw: treat with contempt in word or action (2.26.5) OLD le. 
contendo: contend in a lawsuit (2.34.1) OLD 8c. 
contumelia: insulting language or behavior (3.8.4 and 3.38.1) OLD 1 
contumeliosus: insulting (3.20.2) OLD 1. 
conviciator: one who utters abuse (3.24.1) OLD 1. 
convicium : insulting talk, abuse (2 .25 .4) OLD 2. 
crimen: an indictment, charge (3.29.3) OLD 1. 
criminari: to make charges against (2.22.3) OLD 1. 
damrw: pass judgment against (2.1.5 and 2. 7 .3) OLD 1. 
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damnum: sum to be paid in retribution or as a penalty (3.43.4) OLD 4. 
delator: an informer, accuser (2.7.3) OLD 1. 
delictum: misdeed, offense (2.6.4) OLD 1. 
delinquo: commit an offense (3.24.4) OLD 3a. 
dico: declare, prescribe, state a rule (1.3 .2) OLD lOa. 
dignitas: rank, status (2.6.2) OLD 3. 
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excusatio: the action of excusing or pardoning (2.26.3) OLD 4 and Digest 4 7.4.2. 
facio: commit (a crime) (2.26.4 and 2.28.5) OLD 21b. 
fitriosus: lunatic, raving mad (2.34.4) OLD 1. 
fitrio: rage with anger, hatred, or similar passions (1.16.5) OLD 3. 
fitror: hostile rage, fury, anger (1.13.3) OLD 2b. 
indignor: take offense at (2.1.5) OLD 1. 
infamia: official disgrace (3.41.3) OLD 2b. 
iniuria: any act, insulting in kind and intention, calculated to injure a person's 
reputation or outrage his feelings (ranging from physical assault to 
defamation of character). (2.1.3.and 3.26.1; used 70 times) OLD 4. 
inquam: say (used in presenting a real or imaginary objection (1.3.1) OLD la 
and band Digest 47.2.21. 
intellego: grasp mentally, understand (2.1.5) OLD 1. 
iudex: a judge (1.12.3 and 2.26.6) 
iudicium: legal proceedings before a iudex (3.12.4) OLD 1. 
iudico: judge a case (3.29.2) OLD 1. 
ius: a legal code, oath (2.28.2) OLD 2. 
iusiuro: swear to a binding formula (2.29.3) OLD 5. 
laedo: offend (3.32.3) OLD 2b. 
latro: a robber (1.16.1 and 2.17.2) OLD 2 
lex: law (1.16.1) OLD 1. 
(st)lis: a dispute at law (2.27.4 and 3.32.2) OLD 1. 
litigo: go to law (3.23.3) OLD 1. 
magistratus: an officer of the state (1.16.5) OLD 2. 
maledictum: an insult (1.19.1) OLD 1. 
mancipium: a slave (3.14.3) OLD 3. 
manifestus: detected in the act, flagrant, plain (2.7.3) OLD 2. 
obiurgatio: the act of reproving (1.16 .2) OLD 1. 
obiurgator: one who reproves or rebukes (3.14.2) OLD 1. 
obiurgo: find fault with, censure (2.28.4) OLD lb. 
offendo: offend against, wrong (2.25.4 and 2.26.3) OLD 6. 
offensum: offense committed against a person, injury (2.33.3 and 2.34.2) OLD 4a. 
oportet: it is demanded by some principle or standard (1.16.1) OLD 1. 
percussus, -us: a blow (2.32.2) OLD 1. 
percutio: land a blow on, strike forcibly (2.32.2) OLD 1. 
poena: the penalty paid in satisfaction for an offence (2.3.4) OLD la. 
poenam dare: to pay the penalty (2.4.1 and 3.40.1) OLD lb. 
possessio: occupancy (1. 7 .2) OLD 1. 
potestas: possession or control (3.12.7) OLD le. 
probo: give official approval to accuser, plaintiff (2.29.3) OLD le. 
quaero: hold a judicial inquiry into (1.16.1) OLD 10. 
quaestio: a judicial investigation (2.2.1) OLD 3. 
remedium: legal remedy (2.33.1) Digest 12.6.23.1. 
reus: a defendant (1.18.2 and 2.7.3) OLD 2. 
scelus: a crime (2.4.1) OLD 2a. 
scire: to be aware of a fact stated (2 .2.1) OLD 6a and c. 
servus: a slave (2.31.4) OLD 1. 
species: a specific legal situation or case (2.1.3 and 2.28.6) OLD 11. 
sui iuris: one's own master, independent (2.12.3) OLD 13c. 
supplicium: the extreme penalty, death (3.32.2) OLD 3b. 
talio: exaction of compensation in kind (2.32.1) OLD 1. 
testis: a witness (2.29.3) OLD 1. 
ulciscor: exact retribution for (2.3.4 and 2.4.1.) OLD lb. 
ultio: the act of taking vengeance, revenge, retribution (2.32.1) OLD 1. 
utilis: (of legal processes) applicable (2.33.1) OLD 2b. 
velle: to take voluntary action (2.26.4) OLD 5c. 
veneficus: a poisoner (1.16.1) OLD 2. 
vindico: exact reparation for an offense (1.12.1 and 3.33.3) OLD 5a. 
vindicta: revenge, punishment (3.30.4) OLD 2. 
voluntas: one's decision or intention (2.1.4 and 2.2.1) OLD 5. 
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